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Abstract
Revenue management is a commonly used practice in many industries, such
as airlines, hotels, fashion, and car rentals. It takes advantage of customers’
different valuations for a product or products and charges different prices to
different customers to extract customers’ surplus.
In revenue management, most literature assumes that customers are myopic
and will buy immediately if the price is low and leave otherwise. In recent years
there has been much research involving strategic customers who have the ability to
predict future prices and thus make a purchase at the price that maximizes their
utility. In Chapter 2 and 3, I will study a different type of customer behavior,
which we call patient customer behavior. A patient customer will wait up to some
fixed number of time periods for the price of the product to fall below his or her
valuation at which point the customer will make a purchase. If the price does
not fall below a patient customer’s valuation at any time during those periods,
then that customer will leave without buying. Chapter 4 describes a learning
and pricing problem in which the seller does not know the fraction of patient
customers.
In practice, customers may wish to search for product information before
making purchase decisions. That is, they may wish to research the product or
products under consideration. This research behavior will introduce costs to
customers, which may include time cost, travel cost, and mental processing cost.
Since such research costs could be part of a customer’s utility, they may affect
iv
a customer’s purchasing behavior and thus the firm’s strategy. However, most
literature in revenue management does not consider the existence of customers’
search cost. In Chapter 5, I consider a pricing problem in which customers face
uncertainty about whether they will like certain products. Those customers can
incur research costs to learn product information.
In summary, I will focus on deriving optimal pricing decisions for companies
that face customer behavior that is more complex than typically assumed in
traditional models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
My research focuses on deriving optimal pricing decisions for companies when
customer behavior is more complex than typically assumed in traditional models.
In revenue management, most literature assumes that customers’ behavior is
myopic. That is, a customer will make a purchase immediately if the current
price is below his valuation, and leave otherwise. Recent years, customers are
becoming more and more sophisticated. They may delay a purchase if the current
price is high; they may predict future prices based on their past purchasing
experience; they may search for more alternatives before purchasing a specific
one. It is important to understand the effect of consumer behavior on a firm’s
optimal pricing strategy, as much literature has shown that the firm will suffer
considerable losses if it does not recognize the existence of strategic customers.
In Chapter 2, I consider what I call patient customers, which can be considered
as being “between” myopic customers and strategic customers in terms of
sophistication. When faced with a high price for a product, patient customers will
wait in the market and possibly purchase the product in the future if the price falls
1
2low enough. However, they do not try to predict future prices. We study pricing
decisions of a firm facing this type of consumer behavior. In particular, I consider
an infinite-horizon single-product pricing problem in which a fraction of customers
is patient and the remaining fraction is impatient. A patient customer will wait
up to some fixed number of time periods for the price of the product to fall below
his or her valuation at which point the customer will make a purchase. If the
price does not fall below a patient customer’s valuation at any time during those
periods, then that customer will leave without buying. In contrast, impatient
customers will not wait, and they either buy immediately or leave without buying.
I prove that with such customer behavior, there is an optimal dynamic pricing
policy comprised of repeating cycles of decreasing prices. I obtain bounds on the
length of these cycles, and by exploiting these results we can compute such an
optimal policy via an efficient dynamic programming approach. I also consider
problems in which customers have variable levels of patience and develop bounds
and heuristics.
In Chapter 3, I consider the same problem as Chapter 2 but with a continuous
price set. I show that the decreasing cyclic policy is still optimal in this continuous
price setting through a discretization procedure. Next, I propose a new approach
to derive the optimal decreasing sequence within each cycle for a special case,
in which each customer’s patience level k is relatively small and customers
have uniform valuation distribution. Chapters 2 and 3 include material from
Liu and Cooper (2015).
Chapter 4 describes a learning and pricing problem in which the seller does
not know the fraction of patient customers. Each period, a stochastic number of
3customers arrive with heterogeneous patience levels. I propose some algorithms
combining learning and pricing to minimize the revenue loss compared to the
optimal revenue collected by a clairvoyant who knows the true fraction of patient
customers in advance. By assuming a deterministic arrival stream of customers
and homogeneous patience level, I derive a regret ofO(
√
T ), where T is the number
of time periods.
Customers often need to search for product information before making
purchase decisions. However, in revenue management, most literature assumes
that customers have full information about the product, and neglects the effect of
customers’ search cost on their behavior and then on the firm’s strategy. In
Chapter 5, I consider a pricing problem in which customers face uncertainty
about a product’s valuation, but can resolve that uncertainty by incurring a
research cost. In the single product setting, customers need to decide whether
or not to research a product by comparing the expected utilities of each action.
I characterize a customer’s optimal policy, and then study the optimal pricing
decisions for the seller. It is perhaps surprising that the seller’s revenue need
not be increasing with an increase in a customer’s research cost. I also consider
a two-product setting in which customers need not only to decide whether to
research, but also to decide in which order to do so. Based on customers’ optimal
behavior, I study how the seller should manage the research cost of each product to
best influence customers’ actions and to maximize its own revenue. It is interesting
to see that assigning research cost to only one of the two products can better
differentiate the customers than assigning research cost to both products.
Chapter 2
Optimal Dynamic Pricing with
Patient Customers
2.1 Introduction
Nowadays, as firms make pricing decisions by involving more and more
sophisticated techniques, customers also develop their own purchasing strategies
to maximize their utilities. It is natural that a customer will wait some amount
of time to make a purchase if the current price is too high. When the price
falls within his budget, he will make purchase immediately and leave the market
then. This is different from strategic customer behaviors in existing literature,
wherein customers have the ability to predict the prices in the future and make
purchase decisions based on their expectations. In this chapter I study such
patient customers who wait and postpone their purchase if the current price is
above their valuation. As soon as the price falls below their valuation, they
4
5will make the purchase immediately and never come back. I assume there is a
deterministic number of arrivals each period and customers are either myopic or
patient. Patient customers are homogeneous in their patience levels and there is
no inventory consideration.
My main result is that for any customer valuation distribution and any fixed
patience level, there is an optimal cyclic policy that is comprised of a decreasing
sequence of prices within each cycle. This result is obtained under the assumption
that there is a discrete price set. In addition, I derive a lower bound and an upper
bound for the cycle length, and exploit it to propose a dynamic programming
algorithm to compute the optimal decreasing sequence. I also consider a problem
in which customers have heterogeneous patience levels and develop bounds and
heuristics.
In my model setting, demand is not only a function of current price, but also
depends on the prices in the last k periods. One may wonder if this problem
can be analyzed with a dynamic programming approach in which the state is the
last k periods’ prices and the decision variable is the current price with the aim
to maximize the average revenue. However, due to the curse of dimensionality
of dynamic programming, it becomes extremely hard to solve this problem
especially when k is sufficiently large. In this chapter, I formulate the problem
as an infinite-horizon problem involving a monopolist facing myopic customers
and patient customers. The monopolist aims to maximize the long-run average
revenue. I firstly reduce the original problem to a finite-horizon optimization
problem with some constraints, then compare different pricing structures and
finally prove that the decreasing structure is optimal for the finite-horizon
6problem. Thus, repeating this decreasing structure is optimal for the original
problem.
Early literature about intertemporal demand models can be found in Stokey
(1979). In Stokey’s model, the customers stay in the market until the end of the
horizon and no new customers enter the market. The firm’s objective is to identify
a pricing policy that maximizes the present discounted value of its profit, while
the customer’s objective is to decide whether and when to make the purchase with
the knowledge of the pricing policy. For the model without production cost, the
result shows that for a large class of customer utility functions the firm would
rather sell the product only at the beginning of time horizon instantly than sell
to different customers at different dates with different prices.
Coase (1972) studies a model in which a monopolist sells a durable good to
customers who stay in the market indefinitely if they did not make the purchase.
Each period a fixed amount of customers arrives with two different valuations for
the good: high willingness to pay and low willingness to pay. The monopolist has
to make a price decision each period to maximize discounted present value. The
customers make the purchase when their utility is maximized. The author shows
that a decreasing cyclic pricing policy is optimal in which the monopolist sells
only to high-value customers except the last period in the cycle and then offer a
markdown to the low-value customers at the end of the cycle. Interestingly, their
conclusion coincides with a special case of our theoretic results. Sobel (1991) also
studies the problem of durable goods monopoly and gets similar results.
Besides the above economics literature, there are a number of papers about
dynamic pricing with strategic customers in OR/MS community. We refer
7readers to these papers and books: Aviv et al. (2009), Popescu and Wu (2007),
Shen and Su (2007), Talluri and van Ryzin (2004).
Besanko and Winston (1990) study a game involving intertemporal demand.
The customers enter the market when the sale begins and stay there until the time
ends. All the customers have rational expectation about the pricing sequence and
only make purchase when the utility is maximized. The monopolist has to make a
price decision every period given the accumulative sales up to that point. Through
backward induction, they figure out that a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium
exists and the optimal pricing sequence decreases monotonically over time.
Borgs et al. (2014) study a multi-period pricing problem with service
guarantees. They assume all the customers are strategic with respect to timing of
their purchases. The firm announces a vector of prices upfront, and the customer
chooses to purchase the service at a time with the lowest price between the time
he comes and he leaves if his value is greater than the lowest price. Moreover,
the firm has a constraint that all the demand have to be satisfied. Although their
optimization problem is non-convex, they provide a polynomial time algorithm
that computes the optimal sequence of prices. They also find that when customers
are more patient, the firm offers higher prices, which lead to overage capacity, lower
revenues and reduced customer welfare.
Su (2007) studies an intertemporal pricing problem with strategic customer
behavior. He divides the customers along two dimensions: valuation and
patience. Patient-high-types, impatient-high-types, patient-low-types and
impatient-low-types. The seller needs to decide the pricing and rationing policies
(which will be announced when the time begins) and control policies (cumulative
8sales processes and departure processes) while the customers aim to maximize
their utilities. The author identifies a full spectrum of pricing policies including
pure markup policy, pure markdown policy and non-monotone policy as optimal
policy depending on the different composition of the four types of customers. More
specifically, when high-value customers are less patient than low-value customers,
markdown pricing is effective, while markup is optimal when high-value customers
are more patient than the low-value customers.
Besbes and Lobel (2007) study a problem where the firm has to offer a
sequence of prices at the start of time horizon with the aim to maximize its
revenues. The customers are different along two dimensions: their valuation about
the product and their willingness to wait. Customers know all the prices and are
strategic in timing their purchase in order to maximizing their own utilities. They
prove that the cyclic pricing policy is optimal and the cycle length is at most twice
the maximum willingness to wait. In addition, by using dynamic programming,
they propose a polynomial time algorithm to compute an optimal policy.
Li et al. (2014) conduct an empirical study from the Air-Travel industry to
answer whether customers are strategic. They develop a structural model to
estimate the fraction of strategic customers. It is notable that in their demand
model, they assume that strategic consumers wait for at most one period, thus
the demand includes three parts: myopic customers who arrive and purchase,
strategic customers who arrive and purchase, and strategic customers who arrive
in last period but purchase in this period. Their results show that 4.9 to 44.9
percent of the population are strategic, measured by the 5th and 95th percentiles.
There is one paper very closely related to our work. Ahn et al. (2007) study
9the pricing and manufacturing decisions when demand is a function of prices
in multiple periods. They have myopic customers and patient customers as we
assume. Their objective is to choose the optimal pricing and production decisions
with the aim to maximize the total profit (or average profit) under some capacity
constraint. Their primary result is just a special case with only pricing decision
that the customers are willing to wait at most one period and demand function
is linear. They establish that the optimal policy in this special case is a 2-period
decreasing cyclic policy. They do not have theoretical results for the general k
problem (arbitrary patience levels) but come up with some heuristic policies.
My work theoretically identifies the structure of optimal policy for the general
k problem with arbitrary customers’ valuation distribution. In addition, I provide
some good upper and lower bounds for the cycle length of the optimal policy.
Then based on the structure and bounds, I propose an efficient algorithm which
is able to compute the optimal policy quickly.
The remainder of the section is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
the model and states our main result. Section 2.3 contains preliminary results
and draws connections with finite-horizon problems. Section 2.4 outlines the
proof of the main result through a series of intermediate results. Section 2.5
contains refinements and extensions of our main result as well as a computational
algorithm. Section 2.6 describes bounds for problems with variable patience levels.
Section 2.7 presents results of numerical experiments. Proofs are contained in
appendices in section 2.8.
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2.2 Model Setup and Central Result
We study a multi-period single-product pricing problem with deterministic
demand and unlimited inventory. We assume that demand is a continuous
quantity and that units are scaled so that in a single period a potential new
demand of 1 arrives. This demand is comprised of infinitesimal customers. Each
such customer has a non-negative valuation drawn from a distribution G(·). For
each x, let F (x) = limy↑xG(y) be the left limit of G(·) at x. Hence, F (x) is
the fraction of customers whose valuation is less than x, and 1 − F (x) is the
fraction of customers whose valuation is at least x. If G(·) is continuous, then
F (·) = G(·). We assume that a fraction α ∈ (0, 1] of customers are patient and a
fraction 1 − α are impatient. Each period the firm offers one price. If the price
offered is no greater than a particular customer’s valuation, then that customer
(whether impatient or patient) will make a purchase immediately and then leave.
If the price is above that customer’s valuation, then the customer’s subsequent
behavior depends upon whether the customer is patient or impatient. If the
customer is impatient, then he will simply leave the market without purchasing.
If the customer is patient, then he will wait for up to k more periods. In those k
periods, the patient customer will make a purchase as soon as the price falls to or
below his valuation. If the price remains above the customer’s valuation for the
full k periods, then the patient customer will leave without making a purchase.
We assume that k ≥ 1 is fixed.
Let P = {p(1), . . . , p(m)} denote the set of allowable prices. We assume that
2 ≤ m < ∞; that is, prices are selected from a finite set with cardinality m ≥ 2.
We will be interested in both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon problems. Our
11
analysis of the former will be useful for deriving our main results, which deal with
the latter. For an infinite-horizon problem, a sequence p = (p1, p2, . . . ) ∈ P∞
is called a pricing policy or simply a policy. For finite L ∈ N = {1, 2, 3, . . .},
we will also call p = (p1, . . . , pL) ∈ PL a policy for the finite-horizon L-period
problem, and sometimes use the notation L(p) to denote the length of p. For
p = (p1, . . . , pL1) ∈ PL1 and q = (q1, . . . , qL2) ∈ PL2 with L1, L2 ∈ N we will
use (p, q) to denote the policy (p1, . . . , pL1 , q1, . . . , qL2) ∈ PL1+L2 that implements
price pt for t ∈ {1, . . . , L1} and price qt−L1 for t ∈ {L1+1, . . . , L1+L2}. Similarly,
for q ∈ PL2 , we will use (q, q, q, . . . ) ∈ P∞ to denote the infinite-horizon policy
that charges qt in periods t, t + L2, t+ 2L2, t+ 3L2, . . . for t = 1, . . . , L2.
For p ∈ PL with L ∈ N ∪ {∞}, let
ρt(p) = pt
[
1− F (pt) + α
k∑
i=1
[F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)]+
]
for t = 1, 2, . . .
(2.1)
where we use the convention that pt = 0 for t ≤ 0. Throughout, x+ = max{x, 0}.
The quantity ρt(p) represents the revenue accrued in period t under policy p.
In (2.1), 1−F (pt) represents the number of customers that arrive in period t and
immediately make a purchase. The expression [F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1}) − F (pt)]+
in (2.1) represents those customers that arrive in period t − i and that have a
valuation that is less than all the prices in periods t−i, . . . , t−1 but greater than or
equal to the price in period t. Keeping in mind that α is the fraction of customers
that is patient, we see that α[F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1}) − F (pt)]+ represents the
number of customers that initially arrive in period t− i and subsequently make a
purchase in period t.
We are now ready to present the objective function of the seller. For p ∈ P∞
12
let
H(p) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρt(p)
denote the infinite-horizon long-run average revenue from implementing policy
p ∈ P∞. The limit inferior above will be a limit for the optimal policy we identify.
The seller’s goal is to select a pricing policy to maximize the long-run average
revenue, that is, it wants to solve
sup
p
{H(p) : p ∈ P∞}. (2.2)
As in Besbes and Lobel (2007), we say that a policy p ∈ P∞ is cyclic if there
exists a positive integer L such that pt+L = pt for all t ∈ N. The smallest L > 0
for which this holds is the cycle length of policy p. Note that a cyclic policy with
cycle length L is of the form p = (q, q, q, . . . ) where q ∈ PL. A cyclic policy
p is said be a decreasing cyclic policy if p is of the form p = (q, q, q, . . . ) where
q = (q1, . . . , qL) is such that q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qL. (We use decreasing to mean
weakly decreasing.)
Our central result is the following.
Theorem 1. There exists a decreasing cyclic policy with cycle length L ∈
{1, . . . , m+ k − 1} that is an optimal solution to (5.7.1).
In the following two sections, we build up to the proof of the preceding theorem.
In Section 2.5.2, under some additional mild assumptions, we obtain a lower bound
on the cycle length.
13
2.3 Preliminary Analysis
A key step in the proof of the theorem above involves making a connection between
the infinite-horizon problem and a certain finite-horizon problem. To this end, we
need to introduce some definitions for finite-horizon problems. For L ∈ N and
p ∈ PL let VL(p) and vL(p) denote, respectively, the total revenue and average
revenue accrued over horizon 1, . . . , L under policy p; that is,
VL(p) =
L∑
t=1
ρt(p) and vL(p) = VL(p)/L.
For p ∈ ∪L∈NPL, let V (p) = VL(p)(p) and v(p) = vL(p)(p). Throughout, we will
show the “length subscript” on V (·) or v(·) when we wish to emphasize the length
of the finite-horizon policy in question.
Next, we need some terminology. For p ∈ P∞ we say that time t ≥ 2 is an
I-regeneration point of p if
min{pt, pt+1, . . . , pt+k−1} ≥ pt−1.
For L ∈ N and p ∈ PL we say that time t ∈ {2, . . . , L} is an F-regeneration point
of p if
min{pt, pt+1, . . . , pmin{t+k−1,L}} ≥ pt−1. (2.3)
No customers who join the market prior to time t purchase in time t or later,
because the prices from time t to time t + k − 1 are greater than or equal to the
price in time t− 1. We have attached the modifiers “I-” and “F-” because it will
help later to clearly distinguish between infinite price sequences and finite price
sequences. Observe that by definition, time t = 1 is not a regeneration point.
For any policy p ∈ P∞, we call the sequence of prices between any two
successive I-regeneration points a component of p. Let r(i) denote the ith
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I-regeneration point, then pr(i) is the price at ith I-regeneration point. We refer
to the sequence Ci(p) := (pr(i), pr(i)+1, . . . , pr(i+1)−1) as the ith component of p for
i ≥ 1. By definition of r(i) and r(i + 1), there are no I-regeneration points in
time periods r(i) + 1, . . . , r(i+ 1)− 1. For simplicity, we also define r(0) = 1 and
refer to (pr(0), . . . , pr(1)−1) as C0(p). Both Ahn et al. (2007) and Besbes and Lobel
(2007) use regeneration points and components in their work.
The following lemma provides a link between the infinite-horizon and
finite-horizon problems.
Lemma 1. Fix L ∈ N, and consider q ∈ PL and p = (q, q, q, . . . ) ∈ P∞.
1. Ci(p) = q for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . if and only if q has no F-regeneration points.
2. If q has no F-regeneration points, then H(p) = v(q).
3. If q has no F-regeneration points, then p is cyclic with cycle length L(q).
The lemma is an important ingredient in the proof of the following proposition.
Define κ = k(m− 1) + 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a cyclic pricing policy with cycle length at most
κ that is an optimal solution to (5.7.1). That is, there exists q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q
∗
L)
with L ≤ κ such that p∗ = (q∗, q∗, q∗, q∗, . . . ) achieves the supremum in (5.7.1).
Moreover, the cycles and components of p∗ coincide; i.e., p∗ is cyclic with cycle
length L and Ci(p
∗) = q∗ for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
By Proposition 1, any optimal solution to problem (2.4) below is also an
optimal solution to the original optimization problem (5.7.1).
max
p
H(p) (2.4)
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s.t. p = (q, q, q, . . . ) and Ci(p) = q, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
q = (q1, q2, . . . , qL) ∈ PL and L ≤ κ
For L ≥ 2, let
Ω(L) = {q = (q1, . . . , qL) ∈ PL : qt−1 > min{qt, . . . , qmin{t+k−1,L}} for t = 2, . . . , L}
= {q ∈ PL: q has no F-regeneration points}
For L = 1, we define Ω(1) = P. Let Ω = ∪κL=1Ω(L).
We will also be interested in the following finite-horizon optimization problem.
max
q
{
v(q) : q ∈ Ω
}
(2.5)
Proposition 2. A policy q solves (2.5) if and only if p = (q, q, q, . . . ) solves (2.4).
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we see that to prove Theorem 1, it will
suffice to establish that the optimization problem (2.5) has a decreasing optimal
solution of length L ≤ m+ k − 1. We take up this task below.
We close this section with a comment about the case of k = 1 in which patient
customers are willing to wait one period. When k = 1 the definition (2.3) says that
time t ≥ 2 is an F-regeneration point of q ∈ PL if qt ≥ qt−1. Hence, the (finite) set
Ω in (2.5) contains only strictly decreasing price sequences. In addition, κ = m
when k = 1. Therefore, the above propositions imply that a decreasing cyclic
policy with cycle length L ∈ {1, . . . , m} is optimal for (5.7.1). So at this point
Theorem 1 is proved for k = 1 without any more work. It remains only to prove
the theorem when k ≥ 2. Hence, we shall restrict our attention throughout the
next section to cases with k ≥ 2.
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2.4 Proof of the Theorem
In this section we establish that there exists an optimal solution to (2.5) that is
decreasing, and then use this fact to prove Theorem 1. We begin by exploring the
structure of policies in the set Ω.
For a policy q ∈ PL we say that there is a markup at time t ∈ {2, . . . , L} if
qt > qt−1.
Given q ∈ Ω(L), we let E1 = {t ∈ {2, . . . , L} : qt > qt−1}. If E1 6= ∅, let
e(1) = min{t ∈ E1}. For i ≥ 2, let
Ei ={t ∈ {e(i− 1) + 1, . . . , L} : qt > qt−1, qt−1 = min{q1, . . . , qt−1},
and qt−1 < qe(i−1)−1}.
If Ei 6= ∅, then let e(i) = min{t ∈ Ei}. We say that time e(i) is the time of the
ith strong markup of q. At time e(1), the price strictly increases from a running
minimum in the previous period e(1) − 1. For i > 1, at time e(i), the price
strictly increases from a running minimum price in the previous period e(i) − 1
that is strictly less than the price in period e(i− 1)− 1. From the definition, the
time of the first strong markup e(1) is also the time of the first markup. Note
however that subsequent markups may not be strong markups. A policy has at
least one strong markup if and only if it has at least one markup. The left panel
of Figure 2.1 shows a policy with two strong markups (at times 3 and 10). In that
figure, times 4 and 6 have markups, but not strong markups.
In a number of places throughout the remainder of the paper and in the
appendix, we will make comparisons between a policy that we will call q and
another policy, say q̂. In the interest of minimizing notational clutter, in those
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settings we will use e(i) to mean the time of the ith strong markup of q. (This
notation does not explicitly show that the time of the ith strong markup — if
it exists — depends upon the policy in question.) Hence, q̂e(i) refers to the price
charged by policy q̂ at the time of the ith strong markup of policy q. If we wish
to refer to the time of ith strong markup of q̂, we will use the notation e(i|q̂).
This convention will apply to other quantities that will be introduced later as well
(e.g., t(i) and M(i)).
Define n(q) = max{i : Ei 6= ∅} to be the number of strong markups of policy
q. If E1 = ∅, then we define n(q) = 0. For q ∈ Ω(L), observe that n(q) = 0 if and
only if q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qL. Let
Bn(L) = {q ∈ Ω(L) : n(q) = n} n = 1, . . . , L− 1
= {q ∈ Ω(L): q has exactly n strong markups}
B(L) = ∪L−1n=1Bn(L)
= {q ∈ Ω(L): q has at least one markup}
D(L) = {q ∈ Ω(L) : q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qL}
= {q ∈ Ω(L) : n(q) = 0}
= {q ∈ Ω(L): q is decreasing}.
The left panel of Figure 2.1 shows a policy in a Bn(L).
We note in passing that it is possible to have a decreasing policy q =
(q1, . . . , qL) with F-regeneration points (if a price repeats for at least k consecutive
periods or if the final two prices are the same); such a policy is not in D(L).
From the proceeding definitions we have
Ω(L) = B(L) ∪D(L). (2.6)
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Consequently, each policy in the feasible set Ω of problem (2.5) is either decreasing
or in some Bn(L).
For n ≥ 1, define En(L) as the set of sequences q ∈ PL with the property
that q = (s0, s1, . . . , sn) where si = (qt(i), . . . , qt(i+1)−1) for some times {t(i) : i =
0, . . . , n+ 1} such that 1 = t(0) < t(1) < · · · < t(n+ 1) = L+ 1 and
1. si is decreasing (qt(i) ≥ qt(i)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ qt(i+1)−1) for i = 0, . . . , n
2. qt(i)−1 < qt(i) for i = 1, . . . , n
3. {t ∈ {t(i) + 1, . . . , t(i+ 1)− 1} : qt < qt(i)−1} 6= ∅ for i = 1, . . . , n
4. min{t ∈ {t(i)+1, . . . , t(i+1)−1} : qt < qt(i)−1} ∈ {t(i)+1, . . . , t(i)+k−1}
for i = 1, . . . , n.
Examples of policies in an En(L) are shown in the right panel of Figure 2.1 and in
the left panel of Figure 2.2. Our interest in En(L) stems from the next proposition,
which states that for any policy q ∈ Bn(L) we can find a policy q¯ ∈ En(L) that
performs at least as well.
Proposition 3. For any policy q ∈ Bn(L) with L ≤ κ, there exists a policy
q¯ ∈ En(L) such that VL(q) ≤ VL(q¯) and vL(q) ≤ vL(q¯).
The policy q¯ above is constructed from q by rearranging the prices
(qe(i), qe(i)+1, . . . , qe(i+1)−1) between each two consecutive strong markups e(i)
and e(i + 1) of q into a decreasing sequence and also rearranging the prices
(qe(n), qe(n)+1, . . . , qL) after the last strong markup into a decreasing sequence.
So q¯ will consist of n + 1 decreasing sequences. To get a rough idea why this
works, fix q ∈ Bn(L) and consider the string of prices (qe(1), qe(1)+1, . . . , qe(2)−1)
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between e(1) and e(2). At least one of these prices is strictly less than qe(1)−1
by the definition of e(2). Let the time of the first such price in the string be
called e(1) + w + 1 (this naming convention is used to match the developments
in the proof of the proposition). Also by the definition of e(2), we must have
qe(1)+w+1 ≥ qe(1)+w+2 ≥ · · · ≥ qe(2)−1. Hence, to rearrange (qe(1), qe(1)+1, . . . , qe(2)−1)
into a decreasing sequence, we need only rearrange the prices (qe(1), . . . , qe(1)+w)
into a decreasing sequence and leave the other prices unchanged. See Figure 2.1.
After this rearrangement, revenues obtained in periods 1, . . . , e(1) − 1 remain
unchanged, as do revenues in periods e(1) + w + 2, . . . , L. However, the total
revenue accrued in periods e(1), . . . , e(1)+w+1 increases with the rearrangement.
This increase can be attributed to customers who initially arrive in periods
e(1), . . . , e(1)+w+1 (but not to customers who initially arrive earlier). Complete
details of the argument can be found in the appendix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time
p
ri
ce
e(2)
e(1)
e(1) +m+ 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
time
p
ri
ce
t(2)
t(1)
Figure 2.1: Step 2 illustration1
1Suppose k ≥ 5. The left panel shows a policy in Bn(L) with n = 2 and L = 12. (If k ≤ 4 then
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Define
B = ∪κL=1B(L)
D = ∪κL=1D(L)
E = ∪κL=1 ∪Ln=1 En(L)
Observe that B, D, and E are finite sets. With these definitions in hand, we are
ready for the next ingredient in the proof of our main result.
Proposition 4. Consider d ∈ argmaxp∈D v(p) and q ∈ argmaxp∈E v(p). Then
v(q) ≤ v(d).
The proof of the preceding proposition is quite long, and uses an argument by
contradiction. This allows for a somewhat more concise presentation than does
a direct approach. We do not wish the fact that we argue by contradiction to
obscure the constructive underpinnings of the result, which are as follows. We
know that q ∈ argmaxp∈E v(p) is an element of some En(L). Consider the price
qt(n) that begins the final piece sn of q at time t(n) = t. If we modify q by
adding “enough” copies (say L′) of qt(n) starting at time t and we push the prices
qt(n)+1, . . . , qL later by L
′ periods, then we obtain a new policy of length L + L′
that has an F-regeneration point at time t and that also decreases from time t
onward. See Figure 2.2. It turns out — although it is likely not apparent without
going through the details of the proof — that the decreasing policy comprised
time t = 3 would be an F-regeneration point, and hence the policy would not be in Bn(L).) The
right panel shows the rearrangement of prices described above for periods (e(1), . . . , e(1)+w) =
(3, . . . , 6). Here, the rearrangement yields a policy q¯ in En(L). In general, we would need to
make similar rearrangements between each pair e(i) and e(i+ 1) and after e(n).
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only of the prices of the modified policy from time t onward (p2 in the figure) is
at least as good as the original q.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
time
p
ri
ce
t(n)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
time
p
ri
ce
p1
add
add
p2
Figure 2.2: Step 3 illustration2
We now turn to the problem of maximizing v(p) over p ∈ D. The next
proposition states that for this problem, it suffices to consider only those sequences
with length less than k + m. Of course, the longest possible strictly decreasing
sequence of prices is m, but recall that “decreasing” should be interpreted as
non-increasing, that is, the price can strictly decrease or remain the same as time
moves forward (and so the result is not vacuous).
2Suppose k = 5. The proof of Proposition 4 considers a policy q that maximizes v(·) over E.
The left panel shows a case in which this policy q is a element of En(L) with n = 2 and L = 14.
Inserting L′ = 2 additional copies of qt(n) as shown in the right panel yields policy of length
L+L′ = 16 that has an F-regeneration point at time t = 10. The average revenue of the policy
in the right panel is a convex combination of the average revenues of policies p1 and p2 shown
there.
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Proposition 5. There exists d ∈ argmax{v(p) : p ∈ D} such that L(d) ≤
m+ k − 1.
The key to the proposition is the fact that no prices need repeat after period
k in an optimal policy. Then, since there are m distinct prices in the price set
P, there is an optimal decreasing policy with length less than m + k. (In this
discussion, “optimal” means optimal for the problem max{v(p) : p ∈ D}.) To see
why there is no benefit from repeating a price after period k, consider an L ≥ m+k
and a policy q that maximizes v(p) over D(L). It must be that qj = qj+1 for some
j ≥ k. By removing qj+1 and shifting all later prices one period earlier, we arrive
at a new policy q′ which is in D(L − 1). Some careful thought reveals that the
total revenue of q′ is exactly qj+1[1 − F (qj+1)] less than that of q. This amount
is no greater than max{x[1 − F (x)] : x ∈ P}, which is itself no greater than the
average revenue of the sequence q because the average revenue of the best policy in
D(L) is at least the optimal revenue of a one-period problem (or else the optimal
solution to the one-period problem is itself better than q). Therefore, by removing
such price repetitions from q, the average revenue gets no worse. Complete details
are in the appendix.
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By (2.6), the feasible set Ω in problem (2.5) can be
expressed as Ω = B ∪D. By Propositions 3, 4, and 5 we have
max{v(p) : p ∈ B} ≤ max{v(p) : p ∈ E} ≤ max{v(p) : p ∈ D}
= max{v(p) : p ∈ ∪m+k−1L=1 D(L)} .
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Therefore, for d ∈ argmax{v(p) : p ∈ ∪m+k−1L=1 D(L)} we have d ∈ argmax{v(p) :
p ∈ Ω}. Consequently, (d, d, d, . . . ) ∈ P∞ is an optimal solution to (5.7.1) by
Propositions 1 and 2. 
2.5 Computation, Refinements, and Extensions
In this section we develop a dynamic programming method for computing an
optimal policy. The structure identified in Theorem 1 plays a crucial role in the
development of the approach. We also present some additional results, including
an extension of Theorem 1 to problems with continuous price sets.
2.5.1 A Computational Approach
As seen in the proof of Theorem 1, to find an optimal policy, it suffices to maximize
v(p) over p ∈ ∪m+k−1L=1 D(L). This can be accomplished by maximizing v(p) over
p ∈ D(L) for each individual L = 1, . . . , m+ k − 1 and then selecting the best of
those m+ k − 1 maximizers. The search space can be further reduced to include
only L = k+1, . . . , m+ k− 1 when the assumption in Proposition 6 below holds.
Next we present a dynamic programming approach with a one-dimensional
state variable. The dynamic program computes a decreasing sequence δL of
length L that maximizes v(p) over all decreasing sequences p of length L. The
monotonicity of prices established in our main theorem is what allows us to use
a one-dimensional state variable. Without such monotonicity, we would need a
k-dimensional state vector, rendering the problem computationally intractable for
moderate or large k. To this end, fix L and let πt(x) denote the optimal revenue
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from time t onward in a L-period problem given that we have used a decreasing
policy in periods i = 1, . . . , t − 1 and the price in period t − 1 was x ∈ P. The
algorithm is as follows.
Step 1: Let πL+1(x) = 0 for each x ∈ P.
Step 2: For t = L, . . . , 2 recursively compute
πt(x) = max
z:z∈P,z≤x
{
z
[
1− F (z) + αmin{k, t− 1}[F (x)− F (z)]
]
+ πt+1(z)
}
and let zt(x) denote an optimal solution to πt(x), i.e., zt(x) ∈ argmax πt(x).
Step 3: Compute
π1 = max
z:z∈P
{
z[1 − F (z)] + π2(z)
}
and let z1 denote an optimal solution to π1, i.e., z1 ∈ argmax π1.
Step 4: The policy δL = (δL1 , δ
L
2 , . . . , δ
L
L) given by δ
L
1 = z1 and δ
L
t = zt(δ
L
t−1) for
t = 2, . . . , L maximizes V (p) — and hence also v(p) — over the set of decreasing
policies p of length L. In addition, V (δL) = π1 and v(δ
L) = π1/L.
We note in closing that the decreasing policy δL produced by this dynamic
programming algorithm may have F-regeneration points if the final two prices in
δL are identical or if a price is repeated k or more times consecutively in δL. If
either of these two cases occur, then there is an L′ < L and a policy q ∈ D(L′)
with v(q) ≥ v(δL). Hence, it poses no problem if δL /∈ D(L).
2.5.2 A Lower Bound on Optimal Cycle Lengths
The following result provides conditions under which we can further restrict the
space in which we search for an optimal policy. Let qj ∈ argmax{Vj(q) : q ∈
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D(j)} = argmax{vj(q) : q ∈ D(j)} for j = 1, . . . , k+ 1. For clarification, we note
that the notation qj is used differently in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proposition 6. If v2(q
2) ≥ v1(q1), then v1(q1) ≤ v2(q2) ≤ · · · ≤ vk+1(qk+1) and
therefore, there exists an optimal solution q ∈ D(L) to (2.5) with L ≥ k + 1. If
v2(q
2) > v1(q
1), then v1(q
1) < v2(q
2) < · · · < vk+1(qk+1).
Each of the following conditions (i) and (ii) is individually sufficient for v2(q
2) >
v1(q
1) to hold. For v2(q
2) ≥ v1(q1) to hold, we can simply replace the strict
inequalities by weak inequalities in the following.
(i) There exists some price p ∈ P such that p > q1 and v2(p, q1) > v1(q1).
(Here, (p, q1) is the policy that charges p in period 1 and q1 in period 2.)
(ii) There exists some price pˇ ∈ P such that pˇ < q1 and v2(q1, pˇ) > v1(q1).
Note also that it is not difficult to compute v2(q
2) and v1(q
1), and therefore it is
easy to check directly whether it is true that v2(q
2) ≥ v1(q1).
2.5.3 Two-Point Valuation Distributions
The papers by Conlisk et al. (1984) and Sobel (1991) consider intertemporal
pricing problems in which each customer has one of two possible valuations. In
this section we see what our results say about problems in which customers have
just two possible valuations.
Suppose that the valuation distribution G is discrete and assigns mass at just
two points, a and b with 0 < a < b. Let θ be the fraction of customers that have the
higher valuation b, and 1− θ be the fraction of customers with lower valuation a.
ThenG(x) = (1−θ)1{x ≥ a}+θ1{x ≥ b} and F (x) = (1−θ)1{x > a}+θ1{x > b}.
It is apparent that the seller has no incentive to set a price other than a or b.
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Therefore, with no loss of optimality we take the price set to be P = {a, b} so
that m = |P| = 2.
For m = 2, Theorem 1 establishes that there is a decreasing optimal solution
to (2.5) with length L ∈ {1, . . . , m + k − 1} = {1, . . . , k + 1}. The proof of that
theorem shows that it suffices to solve max{v(d) : d ∈ ∪k+1L=1D(L)}. Proposition 6
shows that if v2(q
2) ≥ v1(q1) then qk+1 ∈ argmax{v(d) : d ∈ D(k + 1)} also
maximizes v(d) over ∪k+1L=1D(L). That is, if v2(q2) ≥ v1(q1), then it suffices to find
the best decreasing policy of length k + 1 with no F-regeneration points. When
there are just two prices a, b, it turns out that there is only one policy in D(k+1).
That policy sets the high price b for k consecutive periods and then sets the low
price a for one. Any other decreasing policy of length k+1 has an F-regeneration
point and hence is not in D(k + 1).
In view of the preceding observations, we immediately have the following result,
where the assumptions on a, b, and θ in (2.7) state that v2(q
2) ≥ v1(q1) as in
Proposition 6.
Proposition 7. Suppose a and b satisfy
1
2
[bθ + a + α(1− θ)a] ≥ max{bθ, a} (2.7)
Then an optimal solution to (5.7.1) is p∗ = (q, q, q, . . . ) where q = (q1, . . . , qk+1) =
(b, b, . . . , b, b, a).
Even if (2.7) does not hold, it is still particularly easy to solve max{v(d) :
d ∈ ∪k+1L=1D(L)} because D(1) = P = {a, b} has only two elements and D(j) =
{(b, . . . , b, a)} has only one element for j = 2, . . . , k+1. Hence, just k+2 policies
need to be evaluated.
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The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. In the first few periods of
a cycle, the seller charges a high price and only high-valuation customers make
purchases immediately. The seller continues charging a high price because new
customers arrive each period. At the same time, the market is accumulating
low-valuation customers who do not purchase at the high price. When enough
low-valuation customers accumulate, the seller then charges the low price and all
these customers purchase and leave as do the high-valuation customers that arrive
that period.
The preceding proposition has some similarities to results of Conlisk et al.
(1984) and Sobel (1991), who establish under some different assumptions that
a cyclic decreasing policy is optimal for a setting with a two-point valuation
distribution. (They do not consider other valuation distributions.) In contrast to
our proposition, prices decline steadily during a cycle in these papers. However,
as in our setting, only in the final period of a cycle do low-valuation customers
buy. The steadily declining prices in their results can be attributed in part to their
models of customer behavior wherein customers, all which are strategic, discount
the value of future purchases and time their purchases to maximize their surplus.
2.6 Variable Patience Levels: Bounds and
Heuristics
In this section we consider a problem involving customers with different patience
levels. The model is the same as that described in Section 2.2, except we now
assume that customers’ patience levels range from 0 to K <∞, and each level k
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accounts for a fraction of αk of customers where
∑K
k=0 αk = 1. A customer with
a patience level k will wait up to k periods to make a purchase. So, a customer
with patience level k = 0 is impatient in the sense described earlier. For p ∈ P∞
let
ρ˜t(p) = pt
[
1− F (pt) +
K∑
k=1
K∑
i=k
αi[F (min{pt−k, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)]+
]
for t = 1, 2, . . . (2.8)
For p ∈ P∞ let H˜(p) = lim infT→∞ T−1
∑T
t=1 ρ˜t(p). The seller now wants to solve
H˜ = sup
p
{H˜(p) : p ∈ P∞}. (2.9)
Proposition 8. There exists a cyclic pricing policy with cycle length at most
K(m− 1) + 1 that is an optimal solution to (2.9).
The proof of this result is identical to that of Proposition 1, and is omitted. It
is seemingly a difficult task to identify additional structure of an optimal policy.
It is also a difficult task even to compute an optimal policy. Note that the
computational approach described in Section 2.5.1 relies on the fact that optimal
cycles are decreasing, which need not be the case here. That approach can readily
be modified to cover the variable patience levels now under consideration, but
doing so yields a dynamic program with K-dimensional state variable. The main
idea is to recursively compute π˜t(xt−K , . . . , xt−1), the maximum revenue from time
t onward in an L-period problem given that the prices in periods t−K, . . . , t− 1
are xt−K , . . . , xt−1. This can be done via the relation
π˜t(xt−K , . . . , xt−1) = max
z:z∈P
{
z
[
1− F (z) +
K∑
k=1
K∑
i=k
αi[F (min{xt−k, . . . , xt−1})
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− F (z)]+
]
+ π˜t+1(xt−K+1, . . . , xt−1, z)
}
(2.10)
with the convention that xj = 0 for j ≤ 0. Such dynamic programs are intractable
except when K is small. Hence, we will confine ourselves to developing bounds
and heuristics.
To do so, let ρkt (p) denote the revenue function defined in (2.1) with α = 1−α0.
Likewise, let Hk(p) = lim infT→∞ T−1
∑T
t=1 ρ
k
t (p) be the value of a policy p and let
Hk = sup{Hk(p) : p ∈ P∞} denote the optimal value in (5.7.1). A little algebra
shows that
ρ˜t(p) =
K∑
k=1
αk
1− α0ρ
k
t (p).
Therefore, for the optimal cyclic policy p˜ whose existence was established in
Proposition 8, we have
H˜ = H˜(p˜) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρ˜t(p˜) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρ˜t(p˜) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
K∑
k=1
αk
1− α0ρ
k
t (p˜)
=
K∑
k=1
αk
1− α0 lim infT→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρkt (p˜) ≤
K∑
k=1
αk
1− α0 supp lim infT→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρkt (p).
Hence, we have established the following result, which states that the optimal
value in (2.9) for the problem with variable patience levels is bounded above by
a convex combination of optimal objective values of problems with fixed patience
levels.
Proposition 9. The optimal value in (2.9) satisfies
H˜ ≤ H¯ :=
K∑
k=1
αk
1− α0H
k.
We close this section by noting that it is straightforward to maximize H˜(·)
over decreasing cyclic policies using a slight variation of the algorithm from
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Section 2.5.1. Specifically, in (2.10) we maximize over {z ∈ P : z ≤ xt−1}
and we can drop all arguments except xt−1 from the function π˜(·) because
min{xt−k, . . . , xt−1} = xt−1 for a decreasing policy. Such an optimization is
tractable because the state variable is one-dimensional. The policy (say q˜ =
(d˜, d˜, . . . ) where d˜ is decreasing) produced by this procedure will generally not
be an optimal policy — even though it is the best decreasing cyclic policy —
because in this setting of variable patience levels, it may be the case that the
optimal policy does not have decreasing cycles (i.e., H˜(q˜) < H˜). Nevertheless,
this does provide a heuristic approach. We will consider this approach in some of
the examples provided in the next section.
2.7 Numerical Experiments
In this section we present the results of some numerical experiments. In the first
set of experiments, we consider settings with fixed patience levels and we suppose
that valuations are drawn from the beta distribution with parameters (a, b). The
density of the beta distribution is given by f(x) = F ′(x) = xa−1(1−x)b−1/B(a, b)
for x ∈ (0, 1) where B(a, b) = ∫ 1
0
ta−1(1 − t)b−1dt. Taking a = b = 1 yields the
uniform distribution on (0, 1). The mean and variance of the beta distribution
with parameters (a, b) are given by µ = a/(a+b) and σ2 = (ab)/[(a+b)2(a+b+1)].
In Table 2.1, we consider examples with a = b so that the mean valuation
is fixed at µ = 1/2, the variance is σ2 = 1/(8a + 4), the coefficient of variation
is cv = σ/µ = 1/
√
2a+ 1, and the valuation density is symmetric about 1/2.
We set m = 10 with prices evenly spaced on (0, 1]; that is, the price set is P =
{1/10, 2/10, . . . , 9/10, 1}. The pairs of numbers in the table denote the optimal
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cycle length and the optimal average revenue for particular values of α, k, and a.
For example, the optimal cycle length is 4 and optimal average revenue is 0.2736
for α = 0.5, k = 2, and a = b = 2. The variance of the valuations decreases
as a (and therefore b) increases. Hence, as we move to the right in the table,
we get examples with lower variances and lower coefficients of variation. When
a = b > 1 the mode (the maximum value of the density) occurs at 1/2, and as a
gets bigger the distribution becomes more concentrated around 1/2. For a = b < 1
the density has a “U shape” and is minimized at 1/2 and grows without bound as
x ↓ 0 or x ↑ 1. As a becomes smaller, the distribution becomes more concentrated
just above 0 and just below 1.
As expected, the revenue increases in k and in α (it is simple to prove this).
It is interesting to note that for fixed k and α the revenue is lowest when a = 1,
which is the case of the uniform distribution. Revenue increases as a function of the
variance of the valuation distribution for a < 1 and decreases in the variance when
a > 1. This is perhaps counterintuitive at first because one might expect revenue
to decrease as a function of the variance, given a fixed mean. This phenomenon
can be explained as follows. Although the variance increases as a goes down to 0,
the distribution becomes more concentrated in a sense as noted in the previous
paragraph, and therefore one may view the “variability” to be low even though
the variance is itself high (of course, variance is only a summary measure of
variability). In the limit as a ↓ 0, one may view the distribution as essentially
placing mass 1/2 at both 0 and 1, and indeed it turns out that the revenue
converges to 1/2 as a ↓ 0. (Note that if the valuation distribution places mass 1/2
at both 0 and 1, then it is optimal to always price at 1, yielding a revenue of 1/2.)
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As a ↑ ∞, the valuation distribution becomes essentially a unit mass at 1/2. In
that case the revenue also approaches 1/2. (Note that if the valuation distribution
places mass 1 at 1/2, then it is optimal to always price at 1/2, yielding a revenue
of 1/2.)
It is also interesting to note that the optimal cycle length is either 1 (fixed
price), k + 1, or k + 2 for all the examples shown on Table 2.1. We see the
same thing in Table 2.2 below as well. In fact, we have not been able to find
any examples in which the optimal cycle length exceeds k + 2. We conjecture
that there are broad conditions under which there is an optimal policy with cycle
length of either k+ 1 or k+2. Recall that for uniform valuations and continuous
price set, Ahn et al. (2007) have previously established that there is an optimal
policy with cycles of length 2 for problems with k = 1. As further support for
the conjecture, we have also proved through a different argument (not presented
here) that for uniform valuations and continuous price set, there is an optimal
policy with cycles of length 3 for problems with k = 2. However, neither of these
arguments appears to readily extend to more general settings. Therefore, it is an
open problem to prove the conjecture.
In Table 2.2 we consider the same setup as in Table 2.1, but suppose
that valuations follow the gamma distribution. The gamma distribution with
parameters (n, λ) has density function f(x) = F ′(x) = exp(−λx)λnxn−1/Γ(n) for
x > 0 where Γ(n) is the gamma function. We take m = 20 with prices evenly
spaced on (0, 5]. The parameters (n, λ) for the table are selected so that the
mean valuation is µ = n/λ = 1/2 for all examples. The variance σ2 = n/λ2
3Optimal Cycle Lengths and Average Revenues for Beta-Distributed Valuations.
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Table 2.1: For Beta-Distributed Valuations 3
a = b −→ 1/8 1/2 1 2 8
α k ↓ cv = 0.89 cv = 0.71 cv = 0.58 cv = 0.45 cv = 0.24
0.2 1 (1, 0.3484) (2, 0.2639) (1, 0.2500) (2, 0.2605) (1, 0.3148)
2 (3, 0.3504) (3, 0.2647) (3, 0.2520) (3, 0.2610) (1, 0.3148)
5 (6, 0.3526) (6, 0.2682) (6, 0.2550) (6, 0.2638) (6, 0.3180)
10 (11, 0.3543) (11, 0.2715) (12, 0.2575) (11, 0.2666) (11, 0.3209)
0.5 1 (2, 0.3529) (2, 0.2705) (2, 0.2600) (2, 0.2694) (1, 0.3148)
2 (3, 0.3567) (3, 0.2786) (3, 0.2667) (4, 0.2736) (3, 0.3211)
5 (6, 0.3632) (6, 0.2900) (6, 0.2783) (6, 0.2858) (6, 0.3302)
10 (11, 0.3692) (11, 0.2995) (11, 0.2864) (11, 0.2923) (11, 0.3343)
0.8 1 (2, 0.3577) (2, 0.2840) (2, 0.2730) (2, 0.2826) (2, 0.3283)
2 (3, 0.3637) (3, 0.2974) (3, 0.2887) (3, 0.2973) (4, 0.3404)
5 (6, 0.3750) (6, 0.3209) (6, 0.3143) (6, 0.3206) (6, 0.3604)
10 (11, 0.3863) (11, 0.3405) (12, 0.3330) (12, 0.3380) (11, 0.3698)
1 1 (2, 0.3609) (2, 0.2943) (2, 0.2850) (2, 0.2944) (2, 0.3398)
2 (3, 0.3700) (3, 0.3159) (3, 0.3067) (3, 0.3163) (4, 0.3621)
5 (6, 0.3839) (6, 0.3479) (6, 0.3467) (6, 0.3567) (6, 0.3963)
10 (11, 0.3981) (11, 0.3751) (12, 0.3750) (11, 0.3842) (11, 0.4164)
and coefficient of variation cv = 1/
√
n of the valuations again decrease as we
move rightward on the table. The column with (n, λ) = (1, 2) corresponds to
the exponential distribution with parameter λ = 2. In this case, we see that
revenues increase monotonically as we move rightward. This differs from what
we saw in Table 2.1, and can perhaps be explained by the fact that the gamma
distributions are decreasing in the convex order as we move rightward on the table;
i.e.,
∫
x
h(x)f(x)dx decreases as we move rightward for any convex h(·). This is a
markedly stronger notion of decreasing variability than merely having decreasing
variance with fixed mean; see, for example, Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002). Hence, the
results in Table 2.2 are consistent with intuition.
The next set of examples is shown in Table 2.3, where we consider variable
4Optimal Cycle Lengths and Average Revenues for Gamma-Distributed Valuations.
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Table 2.2: For Gamma-Distributed Valuations 4
(n, λ) −→ (1/10, 1/5) (1/4, 1/2) (1/2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 4)
α k ↓ cv = 3.16 cv = 2.00 cv = 1.41 cv = 1.00 cv = 0.71
0.2 1 (2, 0.1495) (2, 0.1571) (2, 0.1669) (1, 0.1839) (1, 0.2030)
2 (3, 0.1517) (3, 0.1593) (3, 0.1701) (1, 0.1839) (3, 0.2076)
5 (6, 0.1561) (6, 0.1631) (6, 0.1733) (6, 0.1885) (6, 0.2136)
10 (11, 0.1602) (11, 0.1673) (11, 0.1770) (11, 0.1919) (11, 0.2163)
0.5 1 (2, 0.1592) (2, 0.1665) (2, 0.1780) (2, 0.1937) (2, 0.2141)
2 (3, 0.1682) (3, 0.1759) (3, 0.1867) (4, 0.2008) (3, 0.2241)
5 (7, 0.1848) (6, 0.1923) (7, 0.2020) (6, 0.2169) (6, 0.2342)
10 (12, 0.1992) (12, 0.2052) (11, 0.2155) (11, 0.2248) (11, 0.2387)
0.8 1 (2, 0.1719) (2, 0.1793) (2, 0.1912) (2, 0.2061) (3, 0.2283)
2 (3, 0.1889) (3, 0.1981) (3, 0.2094) (4, 0.2255) (3, 0.2503)
5 (7, 0.2192) (7, 0.2334) (7, 0.2428) (7, 0.2604) (6, 0.2776)
10 (12, 0.2436) (12, 0.2622) (12, 0.2727) (11, 0.2828) (11, 0.2900)
1 1 (2, 0.1813) (3, 0.1894) (2, 0.2013) (2, 0.2178) (3, 0.2407)
2 (3, 0.2031) (4, 0.2168) (3, 0.2270) (4, 0.2458) (4, 0.2701)
5 (7, 0.2423) (7, 0.2654) (7, 0.2768) (7, 0.2950) (6, 0.3173)
10 (12, 0.2735) (12, 0.3047) (12, 0.3173) (11, 0.3316) (11, 0.3436)
patience levels as described in Section 2.6. We take K = 2 so that patient
customers are willing to wait either 1 or 2 periods (and impatient customers will
not wait). In the examples we assume that valuations are uniformly distributed on
(0, 1) and we assume that the fraction of customers that is impatient is α0 = 0.2.
We takem = 50 prices evenly spaced on (0, 1]. ForK = 2, we can use the recursion
(2.10) to compute an optimal policy and the associated optimal revenue. Hence,
these examples allow us to make some assessment of the quality of the upper
bound H¯ from Proposition 9 and also to evaluate the performance H˜(q˜) of the
best decreasing cyclic policy q˜ for problems with variable patience levels. The
columns in the table correspond to different combinations of (α1, α2), which are
the fractions of customers with patience levels 1 and 2. As we move rightward
in the table, customers become less patient. In three of the seven examples,
35
a decreasing cyclic policy turns out to be optimal. In the other two, the best
decreasing policy achieves 99.9% of the optimal revenue. The upper bound on
the optimal revenue is also quite tight. Overall, Table 2.3 suggests that the best
decreasing policy works well for K = 2 when customer valuations are uniform. Is
this still the case with larger K and different valuation distribution? We take this
up next.
Table 2.3: Variable patience levels with K = 2
(α1, α2) −→ (0.1,0.7) (0.3,0.5) (0.5,0.3) (0.6,0.2) (0.7,0.1)
optimal revenue H˜ 0.2869 0.2816 0.2769 0.2749 0.2745
upper bound H¯ 0.2878 0.2840 0.2801 0.2782 0.2763
best decreasing H˜(q˜) 0.2869 0.2816 0.2769 0.2747 0.2744
ratio H˜(q˜)/H˜ 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.9993 0.9996
ratio H˜(q˜)/H¯ 0.9969 0.9915 0.9886 0.9874 0.9931
In Table 2.4, we consider variable patience levels but with larger values of K,
namely K = 4 and K = 10. For these values, it is not practical to compute
an optimal policy with (2.10), so we instead obtain the best decreasing cyclic
policy and compare it against the upper bound H¯ from Proposition 9. In these
examples we suppose that valuations are drawn from the gamma distribution with
parameters n = λ = 1/2 so that the mean valuation is µ = 1 and the variance is
σ2 = 2. The table shows various different values of α0. For each, we considered
three different problem instances. In instance i, we take αi = (1 − α0)/K for
i = 1, . . . , K, which means the fraction of customers with each patience level is
the same. In instance ii, we take α1 = αK = (1− α0)/2, which means half of the
patient customers have patience level 1 and the other half have patience level K.
In instance iii, we take αK/2 = αK/2+1 = (1 − α0)/2, which means half of the
patient customers have patience level K/2 and the other half have patience level
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K/2 + 1. Instances i and ii represent situations where the problem in question is
dissimilar to a problem with fixed patience levels, whereas instance iii represents
a case where the problem is “almost” a problem with a fixed patience level. Not
surprisingly, the best decreasing policy does quite well in instance iii, attaining at
least 99% of the optimal revenue in each case. However, in instances i and ii the
best decreasing policy may not perform as well. For example, when α0 = 0 and
K = 10, the best decreasing policy attains roughly 89% of the upper bound. Note
that the comparison is made against the upper bound, so it is not possible to tell
if the gap arises from a shortcoming of decreasing cyclic policies or because the
upper bound is loose. The table suggests that the ratio H˜(q˜)/H¯ decreases as K
gets bigger, which is not surprising. Even for K = 10, the best decreasing policy
performs reasonably well in all instances.
Table 2.4: Variable patience levels with K = 4 and K = 10
K = 4 K = 10
α0 i ii iii i ii iii
0 upper bound H¯ 0.4718 0.4651 0.4785 0.5455 0.5155 0.5626
best decreasing H˜(q˜) 0.4559 0.4429 0.4753 0.5094 0.4591 0.5601
ratio H˜(q˜)/H¯ 0.9663 0.9523 0.9933 0.9338 0.8906 0.9956
0.2 upper bound H¯ 0.43 0.4257 0.4344 0.4836 0.4635 0.496
best decreasing H˜(q˜) 0.4184 0.4091 0.4327 0.4570 0.4210 0.494
ratio H˜(q˜)/H¯ 0.9730 0.9610 0.9961 0.9450 0.9083 0.9960
0.5 upper bound H¯ 0.3785 0.3766 0.3803 0.4035 0.3942 0.4087
best decreasing H˜(q˜) 0.3717 0.3674 0.3790 0.3894 0.3741 0.4077
ratio H˜(q˜)/H¯ 0.9820 0.9756 0.9966 0.9651 0.9490 0.9976
0.8 upper bound H¯ 0.3423 0.3418 0.3427 0.3487 0.3466 0.3499
best decreasing H˜(q˜) 0.3402 0.3389 0.3420 0.3447 0.3416 0.3497
ratio H˜(q˜)/H¯ 0.9939 0.9915 0.9980 0.9885 0.9856 0.9994
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2
Lemma 1. For any policy p ∈ P∞, the length of any component of p is at most
κ; that is r(i+ 1)− r(i) ≤ κ for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that of Lemma 1 of Besbes and Lobel
(2007). Consider a component (pr(i), . . . , pr(i+1)−1) of a policy p, and suppose for
a contradiction that the length of the component is greater than κ; i.e, r(i+1)−
r(i) > κ.
Let t0 = r(i). There exists t1 ∈ {t0 + 1, . . . , t0 + k} such that pt1 < pt0 .
Otherwise t0 + 1 = r(i) + 1 would be an I-regeneration point of p in which case
r(i + 1) = t0 + 1 = r(i) + 1, which would contradict our supposition that r(i +
1)− r(i) > κ. Note that t1 ≤ t0 + k.
Likewise, there exists t2 ∈ {t1 + 1, . . . , t1 + k} such that pt2 < pt1 . Otherwise
t1+1 would be an I-regeneration point of p in which case r(i+1) = t1+1 ≤ t0+
k+1 = r(i)+k+1, which would contradict our supposition that r(i+1)−r(i) > κ.
So there must exist a t2 as claimed. Note that t2 ≤ t1 + k ≤ t0 + 2k.
Continuing in this fashion for j = 1, . . . , m, we see that there exist times {tj}
with tj ∈ {tj−1+1, . . . , tj−1+k} such that ptj < ptj−1 and tj ≤ tj−1+k ≤ t0+ jk.
We have now established that pt0 > pt1 > · · · > ptm , which is not possible
because the cardinality of the price set P is m. Hence, the supposition that
r(i+ 1)− r(i) > κ cannot hold, and thus r(i+ 1)− r(i) ≤ κ. 
Lemma 2. Consider p ∈ P∞ and suppose Ci(p) = q ∈ PL for some i ≥ 0. Then q
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has no F-regeneration points. That is, if q ∈ PL is a component of policy p ∈ P∞,
then q has no F-regeneration points.
Proof. Suppose q = Ci(p) = (pr(i), . . . , pr(i+1)−1) for some i so that L(q) = r(i+
1)− r(i) and qj = pr(i)+j−1 for j = 1, . . . , r(i+1)− r(i). If L(q) = 1 the lemma is
true. So we need only consider the case with L(q) ≥ 2. Suppose for a contradiction
that q has an F-regeneration point at some time t ∈ {2, . . . , r(i+1)− r(i)}. Then
qt−1 ≤ min{qt, . . . , qmin{t+k−1,r(i+1)−r(i)}}, and so
pr(i)+t−2 ≤ min{pr(i)+t−1, . . . , pmin{r(i)+t+k−2,r(i+1)−1}}
If r(i) + t + k − 2 ≤ r(i + 1)− 1, then pr(i)+t−2 ≤ min{pr(i)+t−1, . . . , pr(i)+t+k−2},
hence r(i) + t − 1 ∈ {r(i) + 1, . . . , r(i + 1) − 1} is an I-regeneration point of p,
which contradicts the fact that q is a component of p. If r(i) + t + k − 2 >
r(i + 1) − 1, then pr(i)+t−2 ≤ min{pr(i)+t−1, . . . , pr(i+1)−1}. Moreover, pr(i+1)−1 ≤
min{pr(i+1), . . . , pr(i+1)+k−1} because r(i+ 1) is an I-regeneration point of p. The
preceding two inequalities imply that r(i) + t− 1 is an I-regeneration point of p,
which is again a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix L ∈ N, q = (q1, . . . , qL) ∈ PL, and p = (q, q, q, . . . ) ∈
P∞.
Part 1a: We will show if q has no F-regeneration points, then Ci(p) = q for
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Suppose q has no F-regeneration points. Then for each t = 2, 3, . . . , L, there
exists some s ∈ {t, . . . ,min{t + k − 1, L}} with qt−1 > qs. Now consider p =
(q, q, q, . . . ). For each t = 2, . . . , L and i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the time u = t+ iL is such
39
that pu−1 = pt+iL−1 = qt−1 > qs = ps+iL and
s+ iL ∈ {t+ iL, . . . ,min{L, t+ k − 1}+ iL} ⊂ {t+ iL, . . . , t+ iL+ k − 1}
= {u, . . . , u+ k − 1}
So pu−1 > ps+iL and s+ iL ∈ {u, . . . , u+k−1}. Hence, u is not an I-regeneration
point of p, and consequently the only possible I-regeneration points of p are {1 +
L, 1 + 2L, 1 + 3L, . . . }.
Next observe that qL = min{q1, . . . , qL}. (Otherwise, there would exist n ∈
{1, 2, . . . , L − 1} such that qn = min{q1, . . . , qL} in which case time n + 1 would
be an F-regeneration point of q, contradicting the original assumption that q has
no F-regeneration points.) Therefore, for each i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , we have pL+iL =
qL ≤ min{p1+L+iL, . . . , pk+L+iL}. Consequently 1 + L + iL for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . are
I-regeneration points of p. This establishes that Ci(p) = q for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Part 1b: If Ci(p) = q for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , then q has no F-regeneration points
by Lemma 2. This completes the proof of part 1 of the lemma.
Part 2: Suppose q has no F-regeneration points. By part 1, we have Ci(p) = q.
Let nT = ⌊T/L⌋. Thus
H(p) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
{ nT∑
j=1
jL∑
t=(j−1)L+1
ρt(p) +
T∑
t=nTL+1
ρt(p)
}
= lim inf
T→∞
1
T
{
nTLv(q) +
T∑
t=nTL+1
ρt(p)
}
= v(q)
This completes the proof of part 2 of the lemma.
Part 3: Suppose q has no F-regeneration points. It is clear that p = (q, q, q, . . . )
is cyclic. To show the cycle length is L = L(q), it suffices to show there does
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not exist a sequence q̂ = (q̂1, . . . , q̂l) ∈ P l and finite integer n ≥ 2 such that
q = (q̂, q̂, . . . , q̂) and L = nl.
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists such a sequence q̂. Suppose
q̂i = min{q̂1, . . . , q̂l}. Thus qi = q̂i = min{q1, . . . , qL}. Therefore, we have qi ≤
min{qi+1, qi+2, . . . , qL}, which implies that period i+1 is an F-regeneration point,
contradicting the fact that q has no F-regeneration points. This completes the
proof of part 3 of the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 1. For policy p ∈ P∞, define NT = max{i : r(i) ≤ T}.
Then
H(p) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
{ NT∑
j=1
r(j)−1∑
t=r(j−1)
ρt(p) +
T∑
t=r(NT )
ρt(p)
}
= lim inf
T→∞
{ NT∑
j=1
r(j)− r(j − 1)
T
v(Cj−1(p)) +
∑T
t=r(NT )
ρt(p)
T
}
≤ lim sup
T→∞
max{v(C0(p)), . . . , v(CNT−1(p))}+ lim sup
T→∞
∑T
t=r(NT )
ρt(p)
T
= lim sup
T→∞
max{v(C0(p)), . . . , v(CNT−1(p))} (2.11)
= sup
i
v(Ci(p)).
The equality (2.11) is justified as follows. By Lemma 1, we know the length of
each component of p is at most κ, thus
∑T
t=r(NT )
ρt(p) is the sum of at most κ
terms, each of which is bounded. Consequently, lim supT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=r(NT )
ρt(p) = 0
and hence the equality holds.
Since the length of each component of p is at most κ and P is finite, there are
finitely many distinct components. Consider q = argmaxi v(Ci(p)). By Lemma 2,
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q has no F-regeneration points. By Lemma 1, the policy p′ = (q, q, q, . . . ) built by
repeating the component q in p with the largest average revenue is such that
H(p′) = v(q) = sup
i
v(Ci(p)) (2.12)
and Cj(p
′) = q for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Combining (2.11) and (2.12), we have that for any p ∈ P∞, there exists p′ for
which H(p) ≤ H(p′), where p′ is a cyclic policy with cycle length at most κ, and
Cj(p
′) = q for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Therefore, we can rewrite the problem (5.7.1) as
sup
p
H(p) (2.13)
s.t. p = (q, q, q, . . . ) and Ci(p) = q, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
where q = (q1, q2, . . . , qL) and L ≤ κ
The length of q is at most κ, so it follows that the set of q above is finite. Therefore,
there exists a cyclic policy p∗ = (q∗, q∗, q∗, . . . ) with L(q∗) ≤ κ that achieves the
supremum in (5.7.1). Moreover, the cycle length of p∗ is L(q∗) by part 3 of
Lemma 1. We have also established that Ci(p
∗) = q∗ for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Z = maxpH(p) in (2.4) and Z
′ = maxq v(q) in
(2.5).
Consider q = (q1, . . . , qL) with L ≤ κ and p = (q, q, q, . . . ) with Ci(p) = q
for every i. Since Ci(p) = q, by Lemma 1, q has no F-regeneration points and
H(p) = v(q). Thus, Z ≤ Z ′. Next consider q = (q1, . . . , qL) with L ≤ κ such that
q has no F-regeneration points. Then for p = (q, q, q, . . . ), by Lemma 1, we have
Ci(p) = q, and H(p) = v(q). Thus, Z
′ ≤ Z. Therefore, Z = Z ′, which establishes
the equivalence of problems (2.4) and (2.5). 
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2.8.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We begin introducing a new definition. For n ≥ 1, define Cn(L) as the
set of sequences q ∈ PL with the property that q = (s0, s1, . . . , sn) where
si = (qτ(i), . . . , qτ(i+1)−1) for some times {τ(i) : i = 0, . . . , n + 1} such that
1 = τ(0) < τ(1) < · · · < τ(n + 1) = L+ 1 and
1. s0 is decreasing (q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qτ(1)−1)
2. qτ(i)−1 < qτ(i) for i = 1, . . . , n
3. {t ∈ {τ(i) + 1, . . . , τ(i+ 1)− 1} : qt < qτ(i)−1} 6= ∅ for i = 1, . . . , n
4. min{t ∈ {τ(i)+1, . . . , τ(i+1)−1} : qt < qτ(i)−1} ∈ {τ(i)+1, . . . , τ(i)+k−1}
for i = 1, . . . , n.
5. qτ(i)+m(i)+1 ≥ qτ(i)+m(i)+2 ≥ · · · ≥ qτ(i+1)−1 where m(i) = min
{
t ∈ {τ(i) +
1, . . . , τ(i+ 1)− 1} : qt < qτ(i)−1
}− τ(i)− 1 for i = 1, . . . , n.
It is apparent that if q ∈ En(L), then q ∈ Cn(L) with {τ(i)} = {t(i)}.
For q ∈ Cn(L), time τ(i)+m(i)+1 is the first time in {τ(i)+1, . . . , τ(i+1)−1}
that the price goes below qτ(i)−1. Immediately after time τ(i)−1, there arem(i)+1
consecutive prices greater than or equal to qτ(i)−1. The length of sequence si is
τ(i+ 1)− τ(i). There is at least one price lower than qτ(i)−1 in si by condition 3;
therefore, we have τ(i+1)− τ(i)− [m(i)+ 1] ≥ 1, thus m(i) ≤ τ(i+1)− τ(i)− 2.
By condition 4, τ(i) +m(i) + 1 ≤ τ(i) + k− 1, thus m(i) ≤ k− 2. Hence we have
m(i) ∈ {0, . . . ,min{k − 2, τ(i+ 1)− τ(i)− 2}}.
Observe also that for q ∈ Cn(L), we have
min{qτ(i), qτ(i)+1, . . . , qτ(i)+m(i)} ≥ qτ(i)−1 > qτ(i)+m(i)+1 ≥ qτ(i)+m(i)+2
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≥ · · · ≥ qτ(i+1)−1. (2.14)
Lemma 3. Consider q = (q1, q2, . . . , qL). If q ∈ Bn(L), then q ∈ Cn(L).
Proof. Consider q ∈ Bn(L). By the definition of Bn(L), we know that q has
no F-regeneration points and that q has exactly n strong markups: 2 ≤ e(1) <
e(2) < · · · < e(n) ≤ L such that qe(i) > qe(i)−1 = min{q1, . . . , qe(i)−1} < qe(i−1)−1
for i = 2, . . . , n. Let e(0) = 1, e(n + 1) = L + 1, then 1 = e(0) < e(1) < · · · <
e(n+1) = L+1. Thus sequence q can be written in the form of q = (s0, s1, . . . , sn)
where si = (qe(i), . . . , qe(i+1)−1) for i = 0, . . . , n.
Next we will show that conditions 1–5 in the definition of Cn(L) are satisfied
by taking τ(i) = e(i) for i = 0, . . . , n+ 1.
Consider sequence s0. We have e(1) ≥ 2. Also we have q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥
qe(1)−1, otherwise there would be a strong markup at some time t < e(1), which
would contradict the definition of e(1) as the time of the first strong markup of q.
Therefore, condition 1 holds.
Next consider sequence si = (qe(i), qe(i)+1, . . . , qe(i+1)−1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Observe that qe(i)−1 < qe(i), so condition 2 holds. In sequence si, there must
exist at least one price strictly lower than qe(i)−1. (For i = 1, . . . , n− 1, otherwise
e(i + 1) would not be a strong markup of q. For i = n, otherwise e(i) would be
an F-regeneration point.) This establishes condition 3. Suppose e(i) +w(i) + 1 is
the first time that the price is strictly lower than qe(i)−1, then we have
min{qe(i), . . . , qe(i)+w(i)} ≥ qe(i)−1,
which means that beginning at time e(i), there are w(i) + 1 consecutive prices
greater than or equal to qe(i)−1. We must have that w(i) + 1 ≤ k − 1,
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because otherwise e(i) would be an F-regeneration point (and we know q has
no F-regeneration points). Hence, condition 4 holds.
Finally, if there are multiple prices strictly lower than qe(i)−1 in si, we must
have qe(i)+w(i)+1 ≥ qe(i)+w(i)+2 ≥ · · · ≥ qe(i+1)−1, otherwise there would be a strong
markup at some time t ∈ {e(i)+w(i)+2, . . . , e(i+1)−1}, which would contradict
the definition of e(i + 1) as the time of the (i + 1)th strong markup of q. Thus
condition 5 holds.
By taking τ(i) = e(i) and m(i) = w(i), we see that q ∈ Cn(L). 
Lemma 4. For any policy y ∈ PL with L ≤ k+1, consider the policy y˜ constructed
by rearranging the prices in y from largest to smallest. Then V (y) ≤ V (y˜) and
v(y) ≤ v(y˜). Therefore, for an L-period problem with L ≤ k + 1, there exists an
optimal policy that is decreasing.
Proof. Consider y˜ = (y˜1, . . . , y˜L) = (yi(1), . . . , yi(L)) obtained by re-arranging
the prices in y = (y1, . . . , yL) from the largest to smallest. Hence, i(t) denotes
the time at which price y˜t (the tth largest price in y) appears in y. If a price
(say p) appears more than once in y (say at times i1 < i2 < · · · < in) then for
some t we have y˜t = y˜t+1 = · · · = y˜t+n−1 = p and we take i(t) = i1, i(t + 1) =
i2, . . . , i(t+ n− 1) = in.
For each i = 1, . . . , L, define
ϕLi (y) = yi[1− F (yi)] + α
min{L,i+k}∑
j=i+1
yj[F (min{yi, . . . , yj−1})− F (yj)]+ . (2.15)
The quantity ϕLi (y) is the revenue obtained from customers who initially arrive
in period i under policy y. Hereafter, we drop the superscript. When L ≤ k + 1,
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the formula (2.15) reduces to
ϕi(y) = yi[1− F (yi)] + α
L∑
j=i+1
yj[F (min{yi, . . . , yj−1})− F (yj)]+ . (2.16)
Therefore,
L∑
i=1
ϕi(y) =
L∑
i=1
{
yi[1− F (yi)] + α
L∑
j=i+1
yj[F (min{yi, . . . , yj−1})− F (yj)]+
}
=
L∑
j=1
yj[1− F (yj)] + α
L∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
yj[F (min{yi, . . . , yj−1})− F (yj)]+
=
L∑
j=1
ρj(y) = V (y) .
Consequently, V (y) =
∑L
i=1 ϕi(y) =
∑L
t=1 ϕi(t)(y). We also have V (y˜) =∑L
t=1 ϕt(y˜) where
ϕt(y˜) = y˜t[1− F (y˜t)] + α
L∑
s=t+1
y˜s[F (min{y˜t, . . . , y˜s−1})− F (y˜s)]+
= y˜t[1− F (y˜t)] + α
L∑
s=t+1
y˜s[F (y˜s−1)− F (y˜s)] . (2.17)
The final equality above holds because y˜ is decreasing.
Hence, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that ϕi(t)(y) ≤ ϕt(y˜) for
t = 1, . . . , L. To this end, fix t ∈ {1, . . . , L} and consider (2.16) with i = i(t):
ϕi(t)(y) =yi(t)[1− F (yi(t))] + α
L∑
j=i(t)+1
yj[F (min{yi(t), . . . , yj−1})− F (yj)]+ .
(2.18)
Notice that the jth term in the summation in (2.18) is non-zero only if yj <
min{yi(t), . . . , yj−1}, that is only if yj is the strict minimum of {yi(t), . . . , yj}.
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(Figure 2.3 depicts an example with the following bookkeeping.) Let j(1) <
j(2) < · · · < j(N) denote those times j ∈ {i(t) + 1, . . . , L} at which yj <
min{yi(t), . . . , yj−1}. By (2.18) we have
ϕi(t)(y) = yi(t)[1− F (yi(t))] + α
N∑
ℓ=1
yj(ℓ)[F (yj(ℓ−1))− F (yj(ℓ))] (2.19)
where we take j(0) = i(t) so yj(0) = yi(t) = y˜t.
Recall that y˜ contains the prices of y rearranged in decreasing order. Therefore,
{yj(1), . . . , yj(N)} ⊂ {y˜t+1, . . . , y˜L}. That is, yj(ℓ) = y˜z(ℓ) for some {z(ℓ)} with
t + 1 ≤ z(1) < z(2) < · · · < z(N) ≤ L. Let z(0) = t. Hence, for the ℓth term in
the sum in (2.19), we have
yj(ℓ)[F (yj(ℓ−1))− F (yj(ℓ))] = y˜z(ℓ)[F (y˜z(ℓ−1))− F (y˜z(ℓ))]
= y˜z(ℓ)
z(ℓ)∑
s=z(ℓ−1)+1
[F (y˜s−1)− F (y˜s)]
≤
z(ℓ)∑
s=z(ℓ−1)+1
y˜s[F (y˜s−1)− F (y˜s)]
where the inequality holds because y˜ is decreasing.
Plugging back into (2.19) and then using (2.17) yields
ϕi(t)(y) ≤ yi(t)[1− F (yi(t))] + α
N∑
ℓ=1
z(ℓ)∑
s=z(ℓ−1)+1
y˜s[F (y˜s−1)− F (y˜s)]
5The left panel shows a policy y and the right panel shows policy y˜ obtained by rearranging the
elements of y from largest to smallest. In this example, for t = 1, we have i(1) = 2 and N = 2
with j(1) = 3, j(2) = 5, z(1) = 4, z(2) = 5. For t = 2, we have i(2) = 1 and N = 2 with
j(1) = 3, j(2) = 5, z(1) = 4, z(2) = 5. For t = 3, we have i(3) = 4 and N = 1 with j(1) = 5
and z(1) = 5. For t = 4, we have i(4) = 3 and N = 1 with j(1) = 5 and z(1) = 5. For t = 5,
we have i(5) = 5 and the summation in (2.18) is empty.
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Figure 2.3: Rearrange the prices 5
= y˜t[1− F (y˜t)] + α
z(N)∑
s=t+1
y˜s[F (y˜s−1)− F (y˜s)]
≤ y˜t[1− F (y˜t)] + α
L∑
s=t+1
y˜s[F (y˜s−1)− F (y˜s)] = ϕt(y˜) .
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a sequence q ∈ Bn(L). By Lemma 3, q ∈
Cn(L). Then q = (s0, s1, . . . , sn) where si = (qτ(i), qτ(i)+1, . . . , qτ(i+1)−1) for i =
0, . . . , n.
In subsequence s1, we know by (2.14) that there exists m(1) ∈ {0, . . . ,min{k−
2, τ(2)− τ(1)− 2}} such that
min{qτ(1), qτ(1)+1, . . . , qτ(1)+m(1)} ≥ qτ(1)−1 > qτ(1)+m(1)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ qτ(2)−1.
Let (qi(1), qi(2), . . . , qi(m(1)+1)) be the re-arrangement of qτ(1), . . . , qτ(1)+m(1) from
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largest to smallest, and consider another sequence q˜ such that
q˜t =


qt if t ≤ τ(1)− 1
qi(1) if t = τ(1)
...
qi(m(1)+1) if t = τ(1) +m(1)
qt if t ≥ τ(1) +m(1) + 1
Observe that q˜τ(1) ≥ q˜τ(1)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ q˜τ(1)+m(1) ≥ q˜τ(1)−1 > q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1 ≥
· · · ≥ q˜τ(2)−1. The difference between sequences q and q˜ is that subsequence
s1 in q is replaced by a reordered decreasing sequence in q˜. Let s¯1 =
(q˜τ(1), . . . , q˜τ(1)+m(1), . . . , q˜τ(2)−1). Then q˜ = (s0, s¯1, s2, . . . , sn).
Next we will show VL(q) ≤ VL(q˜).
Since q˜t = qt for t ≤ τ(1)− 1, we have
ρt(q˜) = ρt(q) for t ≤ τ(1)− 1 (2.20)
Since s0 is decreasing, we have
qτ(1)+m(1)+1 = min{q1, . . . , qτ(1)+m(1)+1}
= q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1 = min{q˜1, . . . , q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1} (2.21)
By (2.21) and the fact that q˜t = qt for t ≥ τ(1) +m(1) + 1, we have
ρt(q˜) = ρt(q) for t ≥ τ(1) +m(1) + 2 (2.22)
Let y = (qτ(1), qτ(1)+1, . . . , qτ(1)+m(1), qτ(1)+m(1)+1), y˜ =
(q˜τ(1), q˜τ(1)+1, . . . , q˜τ(1)+m(1), q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1), and recall that q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1 =
qτ(1)+m(1)+1.
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Consider policy q. Since min{qτ(1), qτ(1)+1, . . . , qτ(1)+m(1)} ≥ qτ(1)−1, and
qτ(1)+m(1)+1 < qτ(1)−1, the customers who initially arrive before period τ(1) will
not buy anything in periods τ(1), τ(1)+1, . . . , τ(1)+m(1) and then some of them
will purchase in period τ(1) +m(1) + 1. We use X to denote the revenue accrued
in periods τ(1), . . . , τ(1) +m(1) + 1 from sales to customers who arrived in time
τ(1)− 1 or earlier. By the preceding comment, such revenues are received only in
period τ(1) +m(1) + 1. Hence
τ(1)+m(1)+1∑
t=τ(1)
ρt(q) = VL(y)(y) +X
where L(y) = m(1) + 2 and
X = αqτ(1)+m(1)+1
k∑
i=m(1)+2
[
F (min{qτ(1)+m(1)+1−i, . . . , qτ(1)−2, qτ(1)−1})
− F (qτ(1)+m(1)+1)
]+
Similarly,
τ(1)+m(1)+1∑
t=τ(1)
ρt(q˜) = VL(y˜)(y˜) + X˜
where L(y˜) = m(1) + 2 and
X˜ = αq˜τ(1)+m(1)+1
k∑
i=m(1)+2
[
F (min{q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1−i, . . . , q˜τ(1)−2, q˜τ(1)−1})
− F (q˜τ(1)+m(1)+1)
]+
By the definition of q˜, it is easy to seeX = X˜ . Lemma 4 implies VL(y)(y) ≤ VL(y˜)(y˜)
because L(y) = L(y˜) = m(1) + 2 ≤ k. Thus
τ(1)+m(1)+1∑
t=τ(1)
ρt(q) ≤
τ(1)+m(1)+1∑
t=τ(1)
ρt(q˜) (2.23)
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Therefore, by (2.20), (2.22), and (2.23) it follows that VL(q) ≤ VL(q˜).
Continuing in this fashion for subsequences s2, s3, . . . , sn, we obtain a sequence
q¯ = (s0, s¯1, . . . , s¯n) ∈ En(L) such that VL(q) ≤ VL(q¯). 
2.8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 5. For any policy y = (y1, . . . , yM+1) ∈ PM+1 with y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yM+1
and M ≤ k, consider the policy yˇ defined by yˇt = yt+1 for t = 1, . . . ,M . Then
VM+1(y)− VM(yˇ) = y1[1− F (y1)] + α
M∑
t=1
yt+1[F (yt)− F (yt+1)] = ϕM+11 (y),
where ϕM+11 (y) is defined in (2.15).
Proof. Both y and yˇ are decreasing, so by the definition of ρt(·),
ρt+1(y) = yt+1
{
1− F (yt+1) + αt[F (yt)− F (yt+1)]
}
ρt(yˇ) = yˇt
{
1− F (yˇt) + α(t− 1)[F (yˇt−1)− F (yˇt)]
}
= yt+1
{
1− F (yt+1) + α(t− 1)[F (yt)− F (yt+1)]
}
for t = 1, . . . ,M . Thus ρt+1(y)− ρt(yˇ) = αyt+1[F (yt)− F (yt+1)] for t = 1, . . . ,M .
Therefore,
VM+1(y)− VM(yˇ) = ρ1(y) +
M∑
t=1
[
ρt+1(y)− ρt(yˇ)
]
= y1[1− F (y1)] + α
M∑
t=1
yt+1[F (yt)− F (yt+1)]

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Preparation for the Proof of Proposition 4. Consider an arbitrary q ∈
En(L) and define
M(i) = min{t ∈ {t(i)+1, . . . , t(i+1)−1} : qt < qt(i)−1}− t(i)−1 for i = 1, . . . , n.
The time t(i) +M(i) + 1 is the first time in {t(i) + 1, . . . , t(i + 1) − 1} that the
price drops below qt(i)−1. Immediately after time t(i) − 1, there are M(i) + 1
consecutive prices greater than or equal to qt(i)−1. The length of sequence si is
t(i+1)− t(i), and there is at least one price lower than qt(i)−1 in si by condition 3
in the definition of En(L); therefore, we have t(i+1)− t(i)− [M(i)+1] ≥ 1. Thus
M(i) ≤ t(i + 1) − t(i) − 2. By condition 4 in the definition, t(i) +M(i) + 1 ≤
t(i) + k − 1, and thus M(i) ≤ k − 2. Hence,
M(i) ∈ {0, . . . ,min{k − 2, t(i+ 1)− t(i)− 2}}. (2.24)
Moreover,
qt(i) ≥ qt(i)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ qt(i)+M(i) ≥ qt(i)−1 > qt(i)+M(i)+1 ≥ qt(i)+M(i)+2
≥ · · · ≥ qt(i+1)−1.
For policy q ∈ En(L), consider another policy q′ with length L− 1 as follows.
q′j =


qj for 1 ≤ j ≤ t(n)− 1
qj+1 for t(n) ≤ j ≤ L− 1
(2.25)
Intuitively, q′ is constructed from q by removing price qt(n) from q and shifting all
prices originally in periods t(n) + 1, . . . , L one period earlier. We also consider
another policy q′′ = ψ(q) with length L+ 1 as follows.
q′′j =


qj for 1 ≤ j ≤ t(n)
qj−1 for t(n) + 1 ≤ j ≤ L+ 1
(2.26)
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If we want to emphasize the dependence of q′′ on q, we will use the notation ψ(q)
to denote the sequence defined in (2.26). Intuitively, q′′ is constructed from q by
inserting a copy of price qt(n) in period t(n)+1 and shifting those prices originally
in periods t(n) + 1, . . . , L one period later. Define
∆1(q) = VL(q)− VL−1(q′)
∆2(q) = VL+1(q
′′)− VL(q).
It may be helpful to refer to Figure 2.4 to visualize the arguments in the proof of
the following lemma.
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Figure 2.4: Lemma 6 illustration 6
Lemma 6. For any q ∈ En(L) with t(n)+M(n) ≥ k+1, we have ∆1(q) = ∆2(q).
6The left panel shows a portion of an element q of some En(L) and the right panel shows a
portion of q′ as defined in (2.25). The policy q′ is constructed from q by removing price qt(n)
from q and shifting all prices originally in periods t(n)+1, . . . , L one period earlier. The dashed
line through qt(n)−1 and q
′
t(n)−1 may be helpful for understanding the bookkeeping in the proof
of Lemma 6.
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Proof. Fix q ∈ En(L). Consider q′ as defined in (2.25). We begin by obtaining
an expression for ∆1(q) in terms of the entries of q.
We have ρt(q
′) = ρt(q) for t ≤ t(n)− 1, because q′j = qj for j ≤ t(n)− 1. Also
qt(n)+M(n)+1 = min{q1, . . . , qt(n)+M(n)+1}
= min{q′1, . . . , q′t(n)+M(n)}
= q′t(n)+M(n),
q′j = qj+1 for j ≥ t(n) +M(n) + 1, and t(n) +M(n) ≥ k + 1 so we have ρt(q′) =
ρt+1(q) for t ≥ t(n) +M(n) + 1.
Therefore,
∆1(q) = VL(q)− VL−1(q′) =
t(n)+M(n)+1∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q)−
t(n)+M(n)∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q
′) (2.27)
We will now evaluate the terms on the right side of (2.27).
No customers who initially arrive prior to period t(n) purchase in periods
t(n), . . . , t(n) + M(n) when prices are set according to q because qt(n)−1 ≤
min{qt(n), . . . , qt(n)+M(n)}. Therefore,
t(n)+M(n)∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q) =
M(n)+1∑
t=1
ρt(y) = VM(n)+1(y)
where y = (y1, . . . , yM(n)+1) = (qt(n), . . . , qt(n)+M(n)). Likewise, no customers who
arrive prior to period t(n) will purchase in t(n), . . . , t(n) +M(n)− 1 when prices
are set according to q′. Hence,
t(n)+M(n)−1∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q
′) =
M(n)∑
t=1
ρt(yˇ) = VM(n)(yˇ)
where yˇ = (yˇ1, . . . , yˇM(n)) = (qt(n)+1, . . . , qt(n)+M(n)).
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In addition, qt(n) ≥ qt(n)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ qt(n)+M(n) and M(n)+1 ≤ k−1. Therefore
by Lemma 5, we have
t(n)+M(n)∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q)−
t(n)+M(n)−1∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q
′)
=qt(n)[1− F (qt(n))] + α
M(n)∑
i=1
qt(n)+i[F (qt(n)+i−1)− F (qt(n)+i)] (2.28)
Next we consider ρt(n)+M(n)+1(q) and ρt(n)+M(n)(q
′) in (2.27). We have
ρt(n)+M(n)+1(q)
= qt(n)+M(n)+1
{
1− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)
+ α
k∑
j=1
[F (min{qt(n)+M(n)+1−j , . . . , qt(n)+M(n)})− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)]+
}
= qt(n)+M(n)+1
{
1− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)
+ α(M(n) + 1)[F (qt(n)+M(n))− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)]
+ α(k − 1−M(n))[F (qt(n)−1)− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)]
}
The last equality above holds because min{qt(n)+M(n)+1−j , . . . , qt(n)+M(n)} =
qt(n)+M(n) > qt(n)+M(n)+1 for j ∈ {1, . . . ,M(n) + 1}, and
min{qt(n)+M(n)+1−j , . . . , qt(n)+M(n)} = qt(n)−1 > qt(n)+M(n)+1 for j ∈
{M(n) + 2, . . . , k}. Notice that the indices in the summation above satisfy
t(n) + M(n) + 1 − j ≥ 2 for j = 1, . . . , k because t(n) + M(n) ≥ k + 1 by
assumption.
We also have
ρt(n)+M(n)(q
′) =q′t(n)+M(n)
{
1− F (q′t(n)+M(n))
+ α
k∑
j=1
[F (min{q′t(n)+M(n)−j , . . . , q′t(n)+M(n)−1})− F (q′t(n)+M(n))]+
}
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=qt(n)+M(n)+1
{
1− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)
+ αM(n)[F (qt(n)+M(n))− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)]
+ α(k −M(n))[F (qt(n)−1)− F (qt(n)+M(n)+1)]
}
Notice that here the indices in the summation satisfy t(n)+M(n)−j ≥ 1 because
t(n) +M(n) ≥ k + 1 again by assumption.
From the preceding expressions for ρt(n)+M(n)+1(q) and ρt(n)+M(n)(q
′) it follows
that
ρt(n)+M(n)+1(q)− ρt(n)+M(n)(q′) = αqt(n)+M(n)+1[F (qt(n)+M(n))− F (qt(n)−1)]
(2.29)
Substituting (2.28) and (2.29) into (2.27) yields
∆1(q) = qt(n)[1− F (qt(n))] +
{
α
M(n)∑
i=1
qt(n)+i[F (qt(n)+i−1)− F (qt(n)+i)]
}
+ αqt(n)+M(n)+1[F (qt(n)+M(n))− F (qt(n)−1)]
By essentially duplicating the preceding analysis we obtain
∆2(q) =
t(n)+M(n)+2∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q
′′)−
t(n)+M(n)+1∑
t=t(n)
ρt(q)
= qt(n)[1− F (qt(n))] +
{
α
M(n)∑
i=1
qt(n)+i[F (qt(n)+i−1)− F (qt(n)+i)]
}
+ αqt(n)+M(n)+1[F (qt(n)+M(n))− F (qt(n)−1)]
= ∆1(q).

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Proof of Proposition 4. Let D0 = ∪κ+kL=1D0(L) where D0(L) = {q ∈ PL : q1 ≥
q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qL}. Observe that D ⊂ D0. The set D0 differs from D in two ways:
elements of D0 can have regeneration points and elements of D0 can be slightly
longer than those of D. Any element x ∈ D0 with say ℓ regeneration points can be
expressed as (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ, xℓ+1) where x1, . . . , xℓ+1 ∈ D and the average revenue
of x is a convex combination of the average revenues of x1, . . . , xℓ+1. In particular,
v(x) =
∑ℓ+1
i=1 λiv(x
i) where λi = L(x
i)/L(x). Hence, d ∈ argmaxp∈D v(p) satisfies
v(d) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ D0. (2.30)
Consider q ∈ argmaxp∈E v(p) and suppose for a contradiction that
v(q) > v(d). (2.31)
Let L = L(q). We have q ∈ E and therefore q ∈ En(L) for some n. We consider
two cases.
Case 1: t(n) +M(n) ≥ k + 1.
Consider sequence q′ with length L− 1 as defined in (2.25). By the definition
of En(L), we have qt(n)−1 < qt(n), qt(n) ≥ · · · ≥ qt(n)+M(n) ≥ qt(n)−1, and qt(n)−1 >
qt(n)+M(n)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ qt(n+1)−1.
If M(n) = 0, then qt(n)−1 < qt(n) and qt(n)−1 > qt(n)+1 ≥ · · · ≥ qt(n+1)−1. Thus
q′ ∈

 E
n−1(L− 1) if n ≥ 2
D0(L− 1) if n = 1
If M(n) 6= 0 and qt(n)+1 = · · · = qt(n)+M(n) = qt(n)−1, then
q′ ∈


En−1(L− 1) if n ≥ 2
D0(L− 1) if n = 1
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If M(n) 6= 0 and max{qt(n)+1, . . . , qt(n)+M(n)} > qt(n)−1, then q′ ∈ En(L− 1).
Taking the above three situations into consideration, q′ ∈ E or q′ ∈ D0. Thus
v(q′) ≤ max{v(q), v(d)} = v(q) (2.32)
where the last equality holds because of our supposition (2.31) that v(q) > v(d).
Thus,
∆1(q) = VL(q)− VL−1(q′) [by the definition of ∆1(q)]
= L · vL(q)− (L− 1)vL−1(q′)
= (L− 1)[vL(q)− vL−1(q′)] + vL(q)
≥ vL(q) [by (2.32)] (2.33)
Below we will use the notationM(n|q) and t(n|q) to emphasize the dependence
upon q. We will consider two subcases, (i) and (ii). Recall (2.24).
(i) Suppose that M(n|q) = k − 2. (Here M(n|q) = k − 2 − l with l = 0.) In
this case t(n|q) is an F-regeneration point of policy q1 = ψ(q) = q′′ as defined
in (2.26). To see why this is so, note that t(n|q) +M(n|q) + 1 = t(n|q) + k − 1
because M(n|q) = k − 2. In addition, qt(n|q)+i ≥ qt(n|q)−1 for i = 0, . . . ,M(n|q),
because q ∈ En(L). It follows by construction of q1 that
q1t(n|q)−1 ≤ min{q1t(n|q), . . . , q1t(n|q)+k−1}
and hence t(n|q) is an F-regeneration point of q1.
(ii) Suppose that M(n|q) < k − 2. Then M(n|q) = k − 2 − l for some l ∈
{1, . . . , k − 2}. Consider q1 = ψ(q). Then q1 ∈ En(L + 1) with t(n|q1) = t(n|q)
and M(n|q1) = M(n|q) + 1. Consider policy q2 = ψ(q1) = ψ(ψ(q)). If l = 1, then
q2 has an F-regeneration point at t(n|q).
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For general l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}, consider ql+1 ∈ PL+l+1 defined as follows:
let q0 = q, and qi = ψ(qi−1) ∈ PL+i for i = 1, . . . , l + 1. Intuitively, qi is
obtained from q by inserting i new copies of price qt(n|q) into q at time periods
t(n|q) + 1, . . . , t(n|q) + i and shifting all prices in q that appeared after t(n|q) “to
the right” by i time periods. By construction t(n|q) is an F-regeneration point
of ql+1. (It now may be helpful to refer back to Figure 2.2 in Section 2.4. In the
example depicted there with k = 5, the left panel shows q and the right panel
shows ql+1 where l + 1 = L′ = 2.) Note also that qi ∈ En(L + i) for i = 0, . . . , l.
Moreover, t(n|qi) = t(n|qi−1) = t(n|q) and M(n|qi) = M(n|qi−1)+1 = M(n|q)+ i
for i = 1, . . . , l.
We can now combine subcases (i) and (ii) to see that if M(n|q) = k− 2− l for
some l ∈ {0, . . . , k− 2} (which exhausts all possibilities because q ∈ En(L)), then
ql+1 has an F-regeneration point at time t(n|q). In addition, in either subcase, by
construction, qit(n|qi) = qt(n|q) for i = 0, . . . , l.
By Lemma 6, it follows that
∆2(q
i) = ∆1(q
i) for i = 0, . . . , l (2.34)
By the definition of ∆1 and ∆2, we have
∆2(q
i) = VL+i+1(q
i+1)− VL+i(qi) for i = 0, . . . , l
∆1(q
i+1) = VL+i+1(q
i+1)− VL+i(qi) for i = 0, . . . , l − 1
and hence
∆2(q
i) = ∆1(q
i+1) for i = 0, . . . , l − 1 (2.35)
From (2.34) and (2.35), it follows that
∆2(q
i) = ∆1(q
0) = ∆1(q) for i = 0, . . . , l (2.36)
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Consequently,
vL+l+1(q
l+1) =
1
L+ l + 1
VL+l+1(q
l+1)
=
1
L+ l + 1
[
VL(q
0) +
l∑
i=0
∆2(q
i)
]
=
1
L+ l + 1
[
VL(q) + (l + 1)∆1(q)
]
[by (2.36)]
≥ 1
L+ l + 1
[
VL(q) + (l + 1)vL(q)
]
[by (2.33)]
= vL(q) (2.37)
Since t(n|q) is an F-regeneration point of ql+1, we can decompose ql+1 into two
independent subsequences p1 = (ql+11 , . . . , q
l+1
t(n|q)−1) and p
2 = (ql+1t(n|q), . . . , q
l+1
L+l+1)
with L(p1) = t(n|q)− 1 and L(p2) = L+ l− t(n|q) + 2 so that ql+1 = (p1, p2) and
vL+l+1(q
l+1) =
1
L+ l + 1
[ t(n|q)−1∑
i=1
ρt(q
l+1) +
L+l+1∑
i=t(n|q)
ρt(q
l+1)
]
=
L(p1)
L+ l + 1
v(p1) +
L(p2)
L+ l + 1
v(p2). (2.38)
Observe that
p1 ∈

 E
n−1(t(n|q)− 1) if n ≥ 2
D0(t(n|q)− 1) if n = 1
and p2 ∈ D0. If n ≥ 2, then v(q) ≥ v(p1) and if n = 1, then v(q) > v(d) ≥ v(p1).
In either case, v(q) > v(d) ≥ v(p2). Here, we have used (2.30). The strict
inequalities follow from supposition (2.31). Hence v(q) > vL+l+1(q
l+1) by (2.38),
which contradicts (2.37). Therefore (2.31) cannot hold.
Case 2: t(n) +M(n) ≤ k.
Write q = (p1, p2), where p1 = (q1, . . . , qt(n)+M(n)) and p
2 =
(qt(n)+M(n)+1, . . . , qL). Reorder p
1 into a decreasing sequence p3 =
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(qi(1), . . . , qi(t(n)+M(n))). Then consider another sequence p
0 defined by
p0j =


qi(j) if j ≤ t(n) +M(n)
qj if j ≥ t(n) +M(n) + 1
Then p0 = (p3, p2) ∈ D0.
Since t(n) + M(n) ≤ k, it follows that t(n) + M(n) + 1 ≤ k + 1. Observe
that (p01, . . . , p
0
t(n)+M(n)+1) is (q1, . . . , qt(n)+M(n)+1) rearranged into a decreasing
sequence. Hence, by Lemma 4, we have
t(n)+M(n)+1∑
t=1
ρt(p
0) ≥
t(n)+M(n)+1∑
t=1
ρt(q) (2.39)
Since qt(n)+M(n)+1 = min{q1, . . . , qt(n)+M(n)+1} = p0t(n)+M(n)+1 =
min{p01, . . . , p0t(n)+M(n)+1}, and qj = p0j for j ≥ t(n) +M(n) + 1, we have
ρt(p
0) = ρt(q) for t ≥ t(n) +M(n) + 2 (2.40)
Thus by (2.39) and (2.40), we have V (p0) ≥ V (q), hence v(p0) ≥ v(q). Moreover,
v(d) ≥ v(p0) by (2.30) because p0 ∈ D0. Hence v(d) ≥ v(q), which contradicts
our supposition (2.31). So (2.31) cannot hold. This completes the proof. 
2.8.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Consider L ≥ k + m and q ∈ argmax{vL(p) : p ∈ D(L)}. We will
establish that there exists a policy q◦ ∈ D(k+m−1)∪D(1) such that v(q◦) ≥ v(q),
from which the proposition follows. To this end, observe that it must be that
qj = qj+1 for some j ∈ {k, . . . , L − 1} because there are m prices in P and q is
decreasing. (For a policy of length at least k +m, at least one price must appear
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multiple times in period k or later. The policy q is decreasing, so such a price
must appear in consecutive periods.)
Let x∗ ∈ argmax{v1(x) : x ∈ D(1)} = argmax{x[1 − F (x)] : x ∈ P}. If
vL(q) < v1(x
∗), then we are done. Therefore we just need to consider the case
that
vL(q) ≥ v1(x∗). (2.41)
Consider the sequence q† ∈ D(L− 1) ⊂ D as follows:
q†t =


qt for t = 1, . . . , j
qt+1 for t = j + 1, . . . , L− 1
From the definition of q† we have
j∑
t=1
ρt(q
†) =
j∑
t=1
ρt(q). (2.42)
Moreover,
ρt(q) = qt
{
1− F (qt) + αk[F (qt−1)− F (qt)]
}
for t = j + 1, . . . , L (2.43)
ρt(q
†) = qt+1
{
1− F (qt+1) + αk[F (qt)− F (qt+1)]
}
for t = j + 1, . . . , L− 1
(2.44)
because j ≥ k and both q and q† are decreasing. Thus by (2.43) and (2.44) it is
easy to see that ρt(q
†) = ρt+1(q) for t = j + 1, . . . , L− 1, and hence
L−1∑
t=j+1
ρt(q
†) =
L∑
t=j+2
ρt(q) . (2.45)
Therefore, by (2.42) and (2.45)
VL(q)− VL−1(q†) = ρj+1(q) = qj+1[1− F (qj+1)] ≤ v1(x∗). (2.46)
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The last inequality holds by the definition of x∗. Thus,
vL−1(q†)− vL(q) = VL−1(q
†)
L− 1 −
VL(q)
L
=
VL(q)− L[VL(q)− VL−1(q†)]
L(L− 1)
≥ VL(q)− L · v1(x
∗)
L(L− 1) [by (2.46)]
=
vL(q)− v1(x∗)
L− 1
≥ 0 [by (2.41)]
If L−1 = k+m−1 we are done with q◦ = q†. Otherwise we can remove a repeated
price from q† in some period later than k while improving (or keeping the same)
the average revenue as above. We continue in this fashion until we arrive at q◦
with length k +m− 1 as desired. 
2.8.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We will prove by induction that vj(q
j) ≤ vj+1(qj+1) for j = 1, . . . , k
when v1(q
1) ≤ v2(q2).
When j = 1, we have v1(q
1) ≤ v2(q2).
For any j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, suppose for the inductive hypothesis that
vj−1(qj−1) ≤ vj(qj). (2.47)
To complete the proof, we will show that vj(q
j) ≤ vj+1(qj+1). By (2.15), we have
ϕj1(q
j) = qj1[1− F (qj1)] + αqj2[F (qj1)− F (qj2)] + · · ·+ αqjj [F (qjj−1)− F (qjj )]
Let q̂j−1 = (qj2, . . . , q
j
j ). Then q̂
j−1 ∈ D(j − 1) and
vj−1(q̂j−1)− ϕj1(qj) ≤ vj−1(qj−1)− ϕj1(qj)
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= vj−1(qj−1)− [Vj(qj)− Vj−1(q̂j−1)] [by Lemma 5]
≤ vj−1(qj−1) + Vj−1(qj−1)− Vj(qj)
= jvj−1(qj−1)− jvj(qj)
≤ 0 [by (2.47)] (2.48)
Thus
vj(q
j) =
1
j
Vj(q
j) =
1
j
[
ϕj1(q
j) + Vj−1(q̂j−1)
]
=
1
j
[
ϕj1(q
j) + (j − 1)vj−1(q̂j−1)
]
≤ ϕj1(qj) [by (2.48)] (2.49)
Consider q˜j+1 ∈ D(j + 1) as follows.
q˜j+1t =


qj1 for t = 1
qjt−1 for t = 2, . . . , j + 1
Then
ϕj+11 (q˜
j+1) = q˜j+11 [1− F (q˜j+11 )] + α
{
q˜j+12 [F (q˜
j+1
1 )− F (q˜j+12 )]
+
j+1∑
t=3
q˜j+1t [F (q˜
j+1
t−1 )− F (q˜j+1t )]
}
= qj1[1− F (qj1)] + α
j∑
t=2
qjt [F (q
j
t−1)− F (qjt )]
= ϕj1(q
j) ≥ vj(qj) [by (2.49)] (2.50)
Hence
vj+1(q˜
j+1) =
1
j + 1
Vj+1(q˜
j+1) =
1
j + 1
[
ϕj+11 (q˜
j+1) + Vj(q
j)
]
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=
1
j + 1
[
ϕj+11 (q˜
j+1) + jvj(q
j)
]
≥ vj(qj)
by (2.50). Therefore, we have vj+1(q
j+1) ≥ vj+1(q˜j+1) ≥ vj(qj), which completes
the inductive step.
We have now proved that v1(q
1) ≤ v2(q2) ≤ · · · ≤ vk+1(qk+1). Consequently,
vk+1(q
k+1) ≥ max{v(q) : q ∈ ∪kL=1D(L)} where qk+1 ∈ D(k + 1), from which the
second statement in the proposition follows. If v1(q
1) < v2(q
2), then the above
argument is easily modified to show that v1(q
1) < v2(q
2) < · · · < vk+1(qk+1). 
Chapter 3
Pricing with Continuous Price
Set
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that a decreasing cyclic pricing policy achieves
optimality in the presence of patient customers. However, there are still two
questions that remain. First, the main result is derived with the assumption of a
discrete price set. It is natural that people may be interested in the performance
of the decreasing cyclic policy with a continuous price set. Second, although a
dynamic programming algorithm is proposed to compute the optimal decreasing
sequence, we could not derive the decreasing sequence explicitly.
In order to address the above two issues, we study the same pricing problem
in this chapter, but with a continuous price set. Section 3.2 establishes the
optimization problem and introduces some notation. Section 3.3 shows the
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optimality of decreasing cyclic policy through a discretization approach. In section
3.4, we solve the optimal decreasing sequence in a special case that customers have
uniform valuation distribution and their patience level k is small.
3.2 Problem Description
We assume prices are selected from a continuous set [0, P¯ ] where P¯ < ∞. Thus
our objective is to solve the following optimization problem.
sup
p
{H(p) : p ∈ [0, P¯ ]∞}. (3.1)
First, we will introduce some notations. Let
D0(L) = {q ∈ [0, P¯ ]L : q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qL}
D(L) = {q ∈ D0(L) : q has no F-regeneration points}.
Throughout this section, we use D(L) to denote the set of decreasing price
sequences with no F-regeneration points where the individual prices are selected
from the continuous price set [0, P¯ ]. Note that this is slightly different from D(L)
as used Section 2.4, where prices are selected from a finite price set.
For L ≥ 1, let dL ∈ argmax{vL(q) : q ∈ D0(L)}. Consider the problem
sup{vk+1(q) : q ∈ [0, P¯ ]k+1}. Since vk+1(·) is continuous and [0, P¯ ]k+1 is compact,
the supremum is a maximum. By Lemma 4 (which holds when P = [0, P¯ ]) there
is a decreasing sequence that is optimal. Therefore dk+1 = (dk+11 , d
k+1
2 , . . . , d
k+1
k+1) ∈
argmax{vk+1(q) : q ∈ [0, P¯ ]k+1}, where dk+11 ≥ dk+12 ≥ · · · ≥ dk+1k+1.
Let P̂(n) = {dk+11 , dk+12 , . . . , dk+1k+1} ∪ {0, 1n , 2n , . . . , V n − 2n , V n − 1n , V n} where
V n = ⌊nP¯ ⌋/n. Observe that P̂(n) is a finite set.
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Define
D̂0(n, L) = {q ∈ P̂(n)L : q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qL}
D̂(n, L) = {q ∈ D̂0(n, L) : q has no F-regeneration points}
Observe that dk+1 is an element of D̂0(n, k+ 1) for all n by construction of P̂(n).
Note also that D̂0(n, L) and D̂(n, L) are finite sets, and therefore the supremum
of any real-valued function taken over those sets is in fact a maximum.
3.3 Main Result (Discretization)
First, I will introduce an upper bound, which is independent of the number of
prices in P̂(n), for the cycle length of the optimal decreasing cyclic policy given
price set P̂(n).
Lemma 7. There exists a finite integer c, which does not depend upon n, with
c ≥ k + 1 such that for all L > c, the following inequality holds:
max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ D̂0(n, L)} ≤ vk+1(dk+1) for all n ≥ 1.
Proof. It suffices to show supq{vL(q) : q ∈ D0(L)} ≤ vk+1(dk+1), because
D̂0(n, L) ⊂ D0(L).
Consider L ≥ 1 and d = dL ∈ argmaxq∈D0(L) vL(q). Then
VL(d) =
L∑
i=1
ρi(d)
= d1[1− F (d1)] +
k∑
i=2
di
{
1− F (di) + α(i− 1)[F (di−1)− F (di)]
}
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+
L∑
i=k+1
di
{
1− F (di) + αk[F (di−1)− F (di)]
}
=
k∑
i=1
{
di[1− F (di)] + α
L∑
j=i+1
dj[F (dj−1)− F (dj)]
}
+
L∑
i=k+1
di[1− F (di)]
≤ kP¯ + (L− k)v1(d1)
The last inequality holds because each item inside the large curly braces is bounded
above by P¯ and because d1 maximizes v1(x) = x[1 − F (x)] over x ∈ [0, P¯ ]. It
follows that
vL(d
L) ≤ v1(d1) + k(P¯ − v1(d
1))
L
. (3.2)
Note that F (P¯ ) = 1, so v1(P¯ ) = 0. Thus, d
1 < P¯ . For x ∈ [d1, P¯ ], let
R(x) = v2(x, d
1)− v1(d1) = 1
2
{
x[1− F (x)] + αd1[F (x)− F (d1)]− d1[1− F (d1)]
}
Observe that R(d1) = 0, and R′(x) = 1
2
{1 − F (x) − xf(x) + αd1f(x)} where
f(x) = F ′(x). The price d1 maximizes x[1 − F (x)], and hence by the first order
condition, we have 1−F (x)−xf(x)|x=d1 = 0. Therefore, R′(d1) = 12αd1f(d1) > 0
where the inequality holds because F (·) is strictly increasing. It follows that there
must exist some p ∈ (d1, P¯ ] such that R(p) > 0. Hence the sufficient condition (i)
following Proposition 6 is satisfied. Then by the same proof as Proposition 6, we
have
v1(d
1) < v2(d
2) < · · · < vk+1(dk+1). (3.3)
Therefore, vL(d
L) ≤ vk+1(dk+1) for all L sufficiently large by (3.2) and (3.3).
Hence, there exists some c < ∞ such that vL(dL) = supq{vL(q) : q ∈ D0(L)} ≤
vk+1(d
k+1) when L > c. 
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Next, I will show the lipschitz continuity of the long-run average revenue
function H(·).
Lemma 8. Suppose that |F (x) − F (y)| ≤ A|x − y| for all x, y ∈ [0, P¯ ] for some
finite A; that is, F (·) is Lipschitz continuous on [0, P¯ ]. Then |H(p) − H(q)| ≤
C supt |pt − qt| for any p, q ∈ [0, P¯ ]∞ where C is a finite constant.
Proof. Consider p = (p1, p2, . . . ) ∈ P∞ and q = (q1, q2, . . . ) ∈ P∞. We have
|H(p)−H(q)| =
∣∣∣ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρt(p)− lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρt(q)
∣∣∣
≤ lim sup
T→∞
∣∣∣ 1
T
T∑
t=1
[ρt(p)− ρt(q)]
∣∣∣
≤ sup
t
∣∣∣ρt(p)− ρt(q)∣∣∣
≤ sup
t
∣∣∣pt[1− F (pt)]− qt[1− F (qt)]∣∣∣
+ α
k∑
i=1
sup
t
∣∣∣pt[F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)]+
− qt[F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})− F (qt)]+
∣∣∣
Now we will evaluate the terms in the final expression above.∣∣∣pt[1− F (pt)]− qt[1− F (qt)]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣pt[F (qt)− F (pt)] + [1− F (qt)](pt − qt)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣pt[F (qt)− F (pt)]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣[1− F (qt)](pt − qt)∣∣∣
≤ ptA
∣∣∣pt − qt∣∣∣+ [1− F (qt)]∣∣∣pt − qt∣∣∣
≤ (P¯A+ 1)
∣∣∣pt − qt∣∣∣
Similarly,∣∣∣qt[1− F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})]− pt[1− F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})]∣∣∣
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≤
∣∣∣qt[F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})]∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣[1 − F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})](qt − pt)∣∣∣
≤ P¯A sup
j
∣∣∣pj − qj∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣qt − pt∣∣∣
So
∣∣∣pt[F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)]+ − qt[F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})− F (qt)]+∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣pt[F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)]− qt[F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})− F (qt)]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣pt[1− F (pt)]− pt[1− F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})]− qt[1− F (qt)]
+ qt[1− F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})]
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣pt[1− F (pt)]− qt[1− F (qt)]∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣qt[1− F (min{qt−i, . . . , qt−1})]
− pt[1− F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})]
∣∣∣
≤ 2(P¯A+ 1) sup
j
∣∣∣pj − qj∣∣∣
Therefore, taking C = (1 + 2kα)(P¯A + 1) we have
∣∣∣H(p)−H(q)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
t
{
(P¯A+ 1)
∣∣pt − qt∣∣}+ αk sup
t
{
2(P¯A + 1) sup
j
∣∣pj − qj∣∣}
≤ C sup
t
∣∣pt − qt∣∣.
Theorem 2. Suppose P = [0, P¯ ] and F (·) is Lipschitz continuous and strictly
increasing on [0, P¯ ]. Then there exists a decreasing cyclic policy that is an optimal
solution to (3.1).
The uniform distribution function is Lipschitz continuous, and therefore
Theorem 2 applies to settings where customers’ valuations follow the uniform
distribution.
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Proof. Consider a sequence of pricing policies {pn} ∈ P∞ = [0, P¯ ]∞ such that
H(pn) ≥ H∗ − 1
n
(3.4)
where H∗ = supp{H(p) : p ∈ [0, P¯ ]∞}.
Let p̂n = (p̂n1 , p̂
n
2 , . . . ) where p̂
n
t is equal to p
n
t rounded to the closest element
in the set P̂(n). By Lemma 8,
|H(pn)−H(p̂n)| ≤ C sup
t
|pnt − p̂nt |, (3.5)
where C is a finite constant. By (3.4) and (3.5), we have H(p̂n) ≥ H∗ − C+1
n
.
Define Hn = supp{H(p) : p ∈ P̂(n)∞}. By definition, Hn ≥ H(p̂n) because
p̂n ∈ P̂(n)∞. So Hn ≥ H∗ − C+1n . Given any ε > 0, it follows that Hn ≥ H∗ − ε
for n > n(ε) = C+1
ε
. Therefore, lim infnHn ≥ H∗ − ε. This holds for any ε > 0,
and so
lim inf
n
Hn ≥ H∗ . (3.6)
Moreover,
Hn = max
q
{H(p) : p = (q, q, q, . . . ), q ∈ ∪|P̂(n)|+k−1L=1 D̂(n, L)} (3.7)
by Theorem 1 (and its proof, which shows that the decreasing cycles in the theorem
have no F-regeneration points when viewed in isolation).
We now take a brief detour and observe that ∪ML=1D(L) ⊂ ∪ML=1D0(L) for any
M . Any element x ∈ ∪ML=1D0(L) with say ℓ regeneration points can be expressed
as (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ, xℓ+1) where x1, . . . , xℓ+1 ∈ ∪ML=1D(L) and the average revenue of
x is v(x) =
∑ℓ+1
i=1 λiv(x
i) for some {λi}. Hence, for any d ∈ argmaxp∈∪M
L=1D0(L)
v(p)
we have
v(d) ≤ v(y) for some y ∈ ∪ML=1D(L). (3.8)
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By (3.7), we now have
Hn = max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪|P̂(n)|+k−1L=1 D̂(n, L)} [by Lemma 1]
≤ max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪|P̂(n)|+k−1L=1 D̂0(n, L)} [D̂(n, L) ⊂ D̂0(n, L)]
≤ max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪cL=1D̂0(n, L)} [by Lemma 7 and dk+1 ∈ D̂0(n, k + 1)]
≤ sup
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪cL=1D0(L)} [D̂0(n, L) ⊂ D0(L)]
= max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪cL=1D0(L)} [∪cL=1D0(L) is compact
= max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪cL=1D(L)} [by (3.8)]. (3.9)
As an aside, we note that the second inequality above becomes an equality for n
so large that |P̂(n)|+ k − 1 ≥ c.
By (3.9) and Lemma 1, we see that
Hn ≤ max
q
{H(p) : p = (q, q, q, . . . ), q ∈ ∪cL=1D(L)} . (3.10)
By (3.6) and (3.10) it follows that
max
q
{H(p) : p = (q, q, q, . . . ), q ∈ ∪cL=1D(L)} ≥ H∗
and hence
max
q
{H(p) : p = (q, q, q, . . . ), q ∈ ∪cL=1D(L)} = H∗. (3.11)
Therefore there exists a decreasing cyclic policy that is an optimal solution to
(3.1) when P = [0, P¯ ]. In particular, any policy that attains the maximum in the
optimization problem on the left side of (3.11) solves (3.1) for P = [0, P¯ ].
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3.4 Optimal Policy for a Special Case
Ahn et al. (2007) derived the optimal policy in a special case that customers are
willing to wait just one period and have uniform valuation distribution. Their
method apparently does not readily extend to cases with k > 1. In this section,
we propose another method to analyze the optimal policy when k is relatively
small. Our approach works for k = 2 (and also k = 1) and can possibly adapted
to work for other “small” values of k.
Through this section, we assume that all the customers have patience level k =
2 and their valuation has uniform distribution on the support of [0,1]. (Readers
will find it is easy to apply the same method to another values of k.) Our main
result here is that a decreasing cyclic policy of length 3 = k + 1 is optimal.
By Theorem 2, it suffices to solve the following optimization problem.
max
q
{v(q) : q ∈ ∪L≥1D(L)} (3.12)
Recall that qj ∈ arg max
q∈D(j)
V (q) denotes the optimal decreasing sequence among
all the decreasing sequences with length j. Hence, for any t ≥ 3,
ρt(q
j) = qjt{1− qjt + 2(qjt−1 − qjt )}.
The idea is as follows. For any n-period decreasing sequence A, we construct a
n− 1-period decreasing sequence B and argue that the total revenue of sequence
A is less than the sum of that of B and the average revenue of the optimal
three-period decreasing sequence. Thus V (qn) ≤ V (qn−1) + v(q3). Then by
induction, we are able to show v(q3) ≥ v(qn), ∀n ≥ 4. And it is easy to
show v(q3) > v(q2) > v(q1). Therefore, the optimality of three-period decreasing
sequence is proved.
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Lemma 9. For n ≥ 3, the optimal decreasing price policy {qn ∈ arg max
q∈D(n)
V (q)}
is unique.
Proof.
V (qn) =
n∑
t=1
ρt(q
n) = qn1 (1− qn1 ) + qn2 [1− qn2 + qn1 − qn2 ]
+ qn3 [1− qn3 + 2(qn2 − qn3 )] + · · ·+ qnn [1− qnn + 2(qnn−1 − qnn)]
By taking derivatives, we get the hessian matrix of V (qn) is as follows:

−2 1
1 −4 2
2 −6 2
. . .
2 −6 2
2 −6


It is not hard to verify this matrix is negative definite, which implies the strict
concavity of V (qn). Hence the optimal solution qn is unique.
The above lemma establishes the uniqueness of optimal decreasing sequence,
therefore, qn ∈ arg max
q∈D(n)
V (q) can be written as qn = arg max
q∈D(n)
V (q).
Proposition 10. Consider the optimal decreasing price policies {qn =
arg max
q∈D(n)
V (q), n = 3, 4, . . . }. Then qn3 ≤ qn+13 for all n ≥ 3.
Proof. We shall first show that if qn+13 < q
n
3 , then it must be that q
n+1
4 < q
n
4 .
Suppose qn+13 < q
n
3 . For a contradiction, suppose also that q
n+1
4 ≥ qn4 . Note
that qn3 > q
n+1
3 ≥ qn+14 ≥ qn4 .
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Consider the policy q˜ = (q˜1, . . . , q˜n+1) ∈ D(n+ 1) given by
q˜t =

 q
n
t for t = 1, . . . , 3
qn+1t for t = 4, . . . , n + 1
From the definition of q˜ and qn+1 that,
0 < V (qn+1)− V (q˜) =
4∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1)−
4∑
t=1
ρt(q˜) (3.13)
Consider now the policy q̂ = (q̂1, . . . , q̂n) ∈ D(n) given by
q̂t =


qn+1t for t = 1, 2, 3
qnt for t = 4, . . . , n
Observe next that
ρ4(q
n)− ρ4(q̂)− [ρ4(q˜n)− ρ4(qn+1)]
= 2qn4 (q˜3 − qn+13 ) + 2qn+14 (qn+13 − q˜3)
= 2(qn3 − qn+13 )(qn4 − qn+14 )
≤ 0
Hence,
ρ4(q
n)− ρ4(q̂) ≤ ρ4(q˜n)− ρ4(qn+1) (3.14)
Then
0 < V (qn)− V (q̂)
=
4∑
t=1
ρt(q
n)−
4∑
t=1
ρt(q̂)
=
[ 3∑
t=1
ρt(q
n) + ρ4(q
n)
]
−
[ 3∑
t=1
ρt(q̂) + ρ4(q̂)
]
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=
[ 3∑
t=1
ρt(q
n)−
3∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1)
]
+
[
ρ4(q
n)− ρ4(q̂)
]
[by the definition of q̂]
≤
[ 3∑
t=1
ρt(q
n)−
3∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1)
]
+
[
ρ4(q˜)− ρ4(qn+1)
]
[by (3.14)]
=
4∑
t=1
ρt(q˜)−
4∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1) [by the definition of q˜]
That is,
4∑
t=1
ρt(q˜)−
4∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1) > 0,
which contradicts with (3.13).
By similar analysis, we have if qn+1k < q
n
k , then q
n+1
k+1 < q
n
k+1 for k = 3, . . . , n−1.
Especially,
qn+1n < q
n
n . (3.15)
Consider now the policy q¯ = (q¯1, q¯2, . . . , q¯n+1) ∈ D(n+ 1) given by
q¯t =

 q
n
t for t = 1, . . . , n
qn+1t for t = n + 1
Therefore,
V (q¯)− V (qn+1)
=
n∑
t=1
ρt(q¯) + ρn+1(q¯)− [
n∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1) + ρn+1(q
n+1)]
=
n∑
t=1
ρt(q
n) + ρn+1(q¯)− [
n∑
t=1
ρt(q
n+1) + ρn+1(q
n+1)] [By the definition of q¯]
> ρn+1(q¯)− ρn+1(qn+1) [By the optimality of qn]
= 2qn+1n+1(q
n
n − qn+1n )
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> 0 [By (3.15)]
which contradicts with the definition of qn+1.
Lemma 10. 1. v(q1) < v(q2) < v(q4) < v(q3) ;
2. q53 = 66/115.
Proof. By Lemma 9, we know V (qn) is jointly concave. By taking derivatives, we
get
v(q1) =
1
4
, v(q2) =
2
7
, v(q3) =
89.25
289
, v(q4) =
297
968
.
When n = 5, we solved that q53 = 66/115.
Lemma 11. For n ≥ 5, consider qn = arg max
q∈D(n)
V (q). Define q˜=(q˜1,q˜2,. . . ,q˜n−1)
as following
q˜t =


1+qn3
2
for t = 1
qnt+1 for t = 2, . . . , n− 1
Then
V (qn)− V (q˜) < v(q3). (3.16)
Proof. By the definition of q˜, it is easy to see that ρt(q
n) = ρt−1(q˜) for t = 4, . . . , n.
Hence,
V (qn)− V (q˜)
= ρ1(q
n) + ρ2(q
n) + ρ3(q
n)− [ρ1(q˜) + ρ2(q˜)]
= qn1 (1− qn1 ) + qn2
[
1− qn2 + (qn1 − qn2 )
]
+ qn3
[
1− qn3 + 2(qn2 − qn3 )
]
− 1 + q
n
3
2
(
1− 1 + q
n
3
2
)
− qn3
[
1− qn3 +
1 + qn3
2
− qn3
]
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= qn1 (1− qn1 ) + qn2
[
1− qn2 + (qn1 − qn2 )
]
+ qn3
(
− 5
4
qn3 + 2q
n
2 −
1
2
)
− 1
4
=: G(qn1 , q
n
2 , q
n
3 )
By taking derivatives, we get the hessian matrix of the function G is:

−2 1 0
1 −4 2
0 2 −5/2


It is not hard to verify this matrix is negative definite, hence G(qn1 , q
n
2 , q
n
3 )
is jointly concave. By Lemma 10, we know q51 > q
5
2 > q
5
3 =
66
115
. Thus, by
Proposition 10, we have that qn1 ≥ qn2 ≥ qn3 ≥ q53 = 66115 for n ≥ 5. To complete the
proof, we will next show that
G∗ := max {G(q1, q2, q3) : q1 ≥ q2 ≥ q3 ≥ 66
115
} < v(q3).
From the KKT conditions, we get G∗ = 358288
648025
− 1
4
< 89.25
289
= v(q3). This
completes the proof.
Theorem 3. v(q3) > v(qn) for n 6= 3. That is, the best three-period decreasing
sequence is optimal to problem (3.12).
Proof. By Lemma 10, it suffices to show v(q3) > v(qn), for n ≥ 4. We will prove
this by induction. For the base case n = 4, we have v(q3) > v(q4) by Lemma 10.
For arbitrary n ≥ 5, suppose v(q3) > v(qn−1) and consider q˜ defined in Lemma 11,
then
v(qn) =
V (qn)
n
<
V (q˜) + v(q3)
n
[by Lemma 11]
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≤ (n− 1)v(q
n−1) + v(q3)
n
[by the definition of qn−1]
< v(q3) [by v(q3) > v(qn−1)]
This completes the proof.
Chapter 4
Learning and Pricing with
Patient Customers
4.1 Introduction
In dynamic pricing and revenue management areas, much research assumes
that the seller has full information about customers’ demand functions (such as
function parameters, parametric families, etc) or population-level characteristics
(such as the fraction of strategic customers). However, in reality, this is impossible
even with the help of current technology. Hence, in most cases, the decision maker
has to make pricing or allocation decisions without knowing such information.
Thus, lack of information raises several fundamental research questions.
1. How to estimate revenue loss due to imperfect information? How to quantify
the value of full information?
2. Is there any way to make revenue loss as small as possible by combining
80
81
learning and pricing strategies?
In this chapter, we study a finite horizon learning and pricing problem without
knowing the fraction of patient customers. We assume customers are divided into
two groups, myopic customers and patient customers. The myopic customers make
purchase only when the price offered in the period they arrived is lower than their
valuation, while the patient customers will wait up to some amount of periods if
the current period’s price is larger than their valuation. Each period a stochastic
amount of customers arrives and they have heterogeneous patience levels. We will
propose some algorithms combining learning and pricing to minimize the revenue
loss compared to the optimal revenue collected by a clairvoyant who knows the
fraction of patient customers in advance.
4.2 Literature Review
In recent years there is a growing stream of research in learning and pricing area.
This work focuses on balancing learning parameter values and gaining revenue.
Besbes and Zeevi (2009) study a single-product pricing problem with finite
initial inventory. They assume the seller does not know the underlying functional
relationship between price and mean demand rate. For the case of non-parametric
learning, they develop a policy achieving a bound of O(n−1/4) for the revenue
loss. For the parametric case, they obtain a bound of O(n−1/3). In addition, they
derive a lower bound of O(n−1/2) for both cases. Wang et al. (2014) study the
same problem and propose a learning-while-doing algorithm, which can achieve a
regret of O(n−1/2), thus closing the gap between upper bound and lower bound of
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this problem. This algorithm only involves function value estimation to achieve a
near-optimal performance.
Besbes and Zeevi (2012) extend their method to a general class of network
revenue management problems, where the mean demand is determined by a vector
of prices. In a discrete feasible price setting, they derived a regret of O(n−1/3). In
a continuous price setting, a regret of O(n−1/(d+3)) is obtained, where d denotes
the number of products. They show the asymptotic optimality of their algorithm
as the volume of sales increases.
Border and Rusmevichientong (2012) consider a dynamic pricing problem in
which the seller faces a sequence of T customers. The parameters of a general
parametric choice model are unknown to the seller who wants to minimize the
regret. They show that the regret of the optimal pricing strategy is O(
√
T ) for the
general case and reduce the regret to O(log(T )) when the demand curves satisfy
a “well-separated” condition. Keskin and Zeevi (2014) show regret of O(
√
T ) if
the seller knows nothing about the parameters of the demand curve, and regret
of O(log(T )) if he knows the expected demand under an incumbent price.
Den Boer and Zwart (2014) propose a controlled variance pricing strategy
which enhances the certainty equivalent policy by constructing a lower bound
on the sample variance of the chosen prices. Thus, they can control the speed at
which the prices converge and collect enough new information before it converges.
They demonstrate that the value of the optimal price will be learned and the
regret is O(T−1/2+δ), where δ is positive and can be arbitrarily small.
Harrison et al. (2012) study a problem in which the seller needs to offer
prices sequentially to a stream of customers. Different from the above models,
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the authors impose a binary assumption on the demand model with an initial
probability. They argue the myopic Bayesian policy can lead to incomplete
learning and thus incur large revenue loss. To solve this problem, a constrained
variant of the myopic Bayesian policy is proposed and they demonstrated that the
revenue loss is bounded by a constant as the number of sales attempts becomes
large.
There is one common assumption that customers are myopic in all the above
papers. In this chapter, we incorporate patient customer behavior into the learning
and pricing problem, trying to see what kind of regret result we can obtain and
what effect does the customer behavior have on the learning process. In section
4.3, I establish our model and introduce some notation. In section 4.4 and 4.5,
by assuming deterministic customer arrivals and homogeneous patience levels, I
propose an algorithm and demonstrate a result of regret O(
√
T ). Section 4.6
describes my future research directions.
4.3 Model Description
I study a finite horizon discrete time learning and pricing problem. In each period
t, N customers arrive, where N is a random variable with some distribution. If
the price offered in period t is larger than customer’s valuation, he will wait in the
market up to some number of periods and make a purchase as soon as the price
falls below his valuation. We assume Vt(i) to be the value of ith customer arrival
in period t and say a customer has patience level j (0 ≤ j ≤ k) if this customer is
willing to wait up to j periods in the market. Let Zt(i) denote the ith customer’s
patience level in period t and P (Zt(i) = j) denote the probability that customer’s
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patience level is j. To simplify notation, we let αj = P (Zt(i) = j) for each j.
Hence
∑k
j=0 αj =
∑k
j=0 P (Zt(i) = j) = 1.
The firm has no inventory considerations. I use St to denote the demand
function in period t. Thus, for a pricing policy p = (p1, p2, . . . ), I have
St =
N∑
i=1
1{Vt(i)≥pt} +
k∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
1{pt≤Vt−j(i)<min{pt−1,...,pt−j},Zt−j(i)≥j} (4.1)
I use π to denote the pricing policy which implies a price process (pt, 1 ≤ t ≤
T ). Let J(π∗, T |α) denote the optimal revenue given α is known, J(π̂, T ;α) be
the revenue accrued by implementing policy π̂ given the estimated parameter α̂
while the underlying true value is α. Therefore,
J(π∗, T |α) = sup
π∈PT
J(π, T |α) = E[
T∑
t=1
Stπ
∗
t ].
J(π̂, T ;α) = E[
T∑
t=1
Stπ̂t].
Assuming the true value of parameter is α∗, my objective is
inf
π̂
sup
α∗
J(π∗, T |α∗)− J(π̂, T ;α∗) (4.2)
I assume that a fixed number of customers arrive each period and all the
patient customers have the same fixed patience level k. That is, N = n and
α = (α0, α1, . . . , αk) = (α0, 0, . . . , 0, αk). To simplify notation, I let αk = α, and
thus α0 = 1 − α. We also assume valuation Vt(i) and patience level Zt(i) are
independent. With the assumption of fixed patience level and independence, I
have the expected demand each period λt(p, α) as follows
λt(p, α) = n[1− F (pt)] + nα
k∑
i=1
[
F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)
]+
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4.4 Algorithm
Algorithm π̂l:
Step 1:
(a) Set the number of steps to be l and define ∆(i), i = 1, . . . , l such that∑l
i=1∆
(i) = T − (l − 1).
(b) Choose a two-period decreasing sequence p̂1 = (p1, p2).
Step 2:
Set t1 = 0.
For i = 1, . . . , l.
(a) Let Li = L(p̂i), ηi = ⌊∆(i)Li ⌋, and δi = ∆(i) − ηiLi. Apply p̂i on the interval
[ti + 1, ti + ηiL
i]. Define Y ij =
∑Li
m=1 Sti+m+(j−1)Li where j = 1, . . . , ηi.
(b) Compute
α̂i =
1
ηi
∑ηi
j=1 Y
i
j −
∑Li
t=1 n[1− F (p̂it)]∑Li
t=1min{t− 1, k}n[F (p̂it−1)− F (p̂it)]
and the optimal decreasing sequence p̂i+1 given α̂i.
(c) Apply a δi-period decreasing sequence to the interval [ti+ηiL
i+1, . . . , ti+
∆(i)], and apply p to the period ti +∆
(i) + 1. Set ti+1 = ti +∆
(i) + 1.
End for.
On interval [ti +1, ti+∆
(i)], we apply the decreasing price sequence p̂i for the
number of ηi times on interval [ti+1, ti+ηiL
i] (Y ij is the total demand within each
cycle) and apply another decreasing sequence to [ti+ ηiL
i+1, ti+∆
(i)]. To avoid
the customers who arrived in phase ∆(i) to buy product in phase ∆(i+1), we apply
a lowest price p at the end of phase ∆(i) for each i. Hence
∑l
i=1∆
(i) = T − (l−1).
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4.5 Revenue Loss Estimation
Now I will evaluate J(π∗, T |α∗)− J(π̂l, T ;α∗).
First I introduce some notations. We use v(λ(p, α);α) to denote the
average-revenue accrued by implementing price sequence p when the true
parameter is α, r(λ(p, α);α) to denote the total revenue accrued by implementing
the price sequence p when the true parameter is α. That is,
r(λ(p, α);α) =
L(p)∑
t=1
λt(p, α)pt
and
v(λ(p, α);α) = r(λ(p, α);α)/L(p).
We let
D(L) = {p ∈ PL : p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pL}
denote the set of decreasing price sequences with length L.
Theorem 2 in Chapter 3 says that there exists a decreasing cyclic policy which
is optimal for an infinite horizon problem (T = ∞). Assume q = (p∗, p∗, p∗, . . . )
where p∗ is decreasing is an optimal policy when T =∞.
If T/L(p∗) is an integer, it’s easy to see π∗ = (p∗, p∗, . . . , p∗), and
J(π∗, T |α∗) = E[
T∑
t=1
Stπ
∗
t ]
= Tv(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗).
Otherwise, it is not hard to see J(π∗, T |α∗) < Tv(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗) due to the
finite-horizon end effect. Therefore, letting L = L(p∗),
J(π∗, T |α∗) ≤ Tv(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)
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On the other hand,
J(π̂l, T ;α∗) ≥ E
[ l∑
i=2
ηiL
iv(λ(p̂i, α∗);α∗)
]
.
Therefore,
J(π∗, T |α∗)− J(π̂l, T ;α∗)
≤ Tv(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− E
[ l∑
i=2
ηiL
iv(λ(p̂i, α∗);α∗)
]
= η1L
1v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗) + E
[ l∑
i=2
ηiL
i
(
v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p̂i, α∗);α∗))]
+ (
l∑
i=1
δi + l − 1)v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)
≤ η1L1np¯ +
l∑
i=2
ηiL
iE[v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p̂i, α∗);α∗)] + (
l∑
i=1
δi + l − 1)np¯
(4.3)
I will take the task of evaluating E[v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p̂, α∗);α∗)] next.
Lemma 12.
v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p̂i, α∗);α∗) ≤ Ai|α̂i − α∗| (4.4)
where
Ai =
np¯
L(p∗)
L(p∗)∑
t=1
min{t− 1, k}[F (p∗t−1)− F (p∗t )]
+
np¯
L(p̂i)
L(p̂i)∑
t=1
min{t− 1, k}[F (p̂it−1)− F (p̂it)]
Proof. For any p ∈ D(L) with L = k + 1 or k + 2,
λt(p, α)− λt(p, α′)
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= n(α− α′)
k∑
i=1
[
F (min{pt−i, . . . , pt−1})− F (pt)
]+
= n(α− α′)min{k, t− 1}[F (pt−1)− F (pt)] [by p is decreasing] (4.5)
Therefore,
r(λ(p, α);α)− r(λ(p, α′);α′)
=
L∑
t=1
λt(p, α)pt −
L∑
t=1
λt(p, α
′)pt =
L∑
t=1
pt[λt(p, α)− λt(p, α′)]
≤ p¯n(α− α′)
L∑
t=1
min{k, t− 1}[F (pt−1)− F (pt)] [by (4.5)]
= C1(α− α′) (4.6)
where C1 = np¯
∑L
t=1min{k, t− 1}[F (pt−1)− F (pt)].
Hence, by letting L = L(p), it follows
v(λ(p, α);α)− v(λ(p, α′);α′) = 1
L
[r(λ(p, α);α)− r(λ(p, α′);α′)]
≤ C1
L
(α− α′) = C2(α− α′) (4.7)
where C2 = C1/L.
Thus,
v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p̂, α∗);α∗)
= v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p∗, α̂); α̂) + v(λ(p∗, α̂); α̂)− v(λ(p̂, α̂); α̂)
+ v(λ(p̂, α̂); α̂)− v(λ(p̂, α∗);α∗)
≤ v(λ(p∗, α∗);α∗)− v(λ(p∗, α̂); α̂) + v(λ(p̂, α̂); α̂)− v(λ(p̂, α∗);α∗)
≤ C3|α̂− α∗|+ C4|α̂− α∗| [by (4.7)]
= C5|α̂− α∗| (4.8)
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where
C3 =
np¯
L
L∑
t=1
min{k, t− 1}[F (p∗t−1)− F (p∗t )]
C4 =
np¯
L(p̂)
L(p̂)∑
t=1
min{k, t− 1}[F (p̂t−1)− F (p̂t)]
C5 = C3 + C4
and the first inequality above holds because v(λ(p∗, α̂); α̂) ≤ v(λ(p̂, α̂); α̂).
Next I will evaluate |α̂i − α∗|.
Lemma 13.
E[|α̂i − α∗|] ≤ Biη−1/2i
for some suitable Bi.
Proof. By the definition of Y ij , I have
E[Y ij ] = E[Y
i
1 ] = E[Sti+1 + Sti+2 + · · ·+ Sti+Li]
=
Li∑
t=1
n[1− F (p̂it)] +
Li∑
t=1
min{t− 1, k}nα∗[F (p̂it−1)− F (p̂it)]
Since Y i1 , Y
i
2 , . . . , Y
i
ηi
are iid observations such that E[Y ij ] equals to the above
formula and 0 ≤ Y ij ≤ Lin, j = 1, . . . , ηi, then for any ǫ > 0, we have
P
(∣∣ 1
ηi
ηi∑
1
Y ij − E[Y ij ]
∣∣ > ǫ) ≤ 2e−2ηiǫ2/n2(Li)2 .
Through some algebra, we have
P
(∣∣α̂i − α∗∣∣ L
i∑
t=1
min{t− 1, k}n[F (p̂it−1)− F (p̂it)] > ǫ
)
≤ 2e−2ηiǫ2/n2(Li)2 .
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Hence,
E[|α̂i − α∗|] =
∫ ∞
0
P (|α̂i − α∗| > s)ds
≤ a +
∫ ∞
0
2e−2ηis
2(µi)2/(Li)2ds
= a+
e−2ηia
2(µi)2/(Li)2
2aηi(µi)2/(Li)2
= Biη
−1/2
i [taking a = η
−1/2
i ] (4.9)
Theorem 4. The revenue loss are bounded by below
J(π∗, T |α∗)− J(π̂l, T ;α∗) ≤ O(T 1/2) (4.10)
Proof. Plugging (4.4) and (4.9) into (4.3), we have
J(π∗, T |α∗)− J(π̂l, T ;α∗)
≤ η1L1np¯+
l∑
i=2
ηiL
iAiBiη
−1/2
i + (l − 1 +
l∑
i=1
δi)np¯
≤ ∆(1)np¯ +
l∑
i=2
Di(∆
(i))1/2 + (l − 1 +
l∑
i=1
δi)np¯
= O(T 1/2)
by taking ∆(1) = TX where X ≤ 1/2, and ∆(i) = βi(T − l + 1 − ∆(1)) in which∑l
i=2 βi = 1.
Chapter 5
Revenue Management with
Consumer Research Costs
5.1 Introduction
It is common for customers to search for information about products before making
purchase decisions. Besides testing or examining a product, customers may read
online descriptions, or reviews, or even request expert opinions. We refer to
such activities as researching a product. A 2010 survey from Zillow Mortgage
Marketplace (Zillow.com 2010) reveals that on average customers in America
spend 40 hours for a new home, 10 hours for a major home improvement, 10
hours for a car, 5 hours for a vacation or a mortgage, 4 hours for a computer, and
2 hours for a television set.
The research process may come with a cost, which may include a time cost
and information processing cost. When customers have to incur such research
91
92
costs prior to making a purchase, they may refrain from information search, and
purchase immediately without conducting research if their expected utility is high.
That is, customers may weigh the benefits and costs of researching to maximize
their utility. It is easy to understand a customer would rather not search anymore
if she is already sure that a particular product can satisfy most of her needs and
the cost of further research is high. For example, a scientific researcher might
decide to buy a laptop if her main need, the computing ability, is satisfied, and
thus she would be reluctant to spend time and energy researching.
In practice, retailers can control customer research costs to some extent,
especially online retailers. They can decrease or increase the research cost
by disclosing or hiding more product information. Traditionally, they may
describe product attributes through advertisements, phones, posters, and product
brochures. Recent developments in information technology have greatly reduced
customers’ cost of acquiring information. The sellers can post online instructions,
customer reviews, or even make videos or trial versions of products enabling
customers to have a free test. For example, the movie seller can post a trailer
of that movie, the video game seller can offer a 10-minutes free-playing demo, and
software retailers can provide a 3-days trial version, through which customers can
gain a direct feeling about whether they like a movie, video game, or software,
and the research cost is much less than making a phone call, reading instructions
and listening to a salesperson’s explanation.
The cost (or lack thereof) to a customer in time, money, or effort to research
a product may affect that customer’s purchase decisions. Firms may consider
it as a good way to differentiate its products (even homogeneous products) by
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assigning different search costs to different products. For example, on Best Buy’s
website, even for the video games under the same genre and developed by the
same company, some have free trailers but others do not. Dell uploads videos for
the most popular PC models but not for others. While there may be some reasons
for these differences, but a possible reason behind this phenomenon is that the
firm expects to differentiate the products.
Given that customers may behave differently under the existence of research
cost, how should retailers manage the research cost to affect customers’ behavior
to achieve their revenue-maximizing objective? What are the optimal pricing
decisions under different research cost scenarios? And how does the optimal
revenue change with feature uncertainty and customer research cost? This chapter
will take up the task of answering these questions.
We consider a revenue management problem in which customers face
uncertainty about whether they will like products under consideration. Customers
can either make a purchase decision based on the expected utility, or resolve
the uncertainty by incurring a research cost. Customers need to decide whether
to engage in search by comparing the expected utilities of each action. We
characterize a customer’s optimal policy, based on which we study the optimal
pricing decisions for the seller. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, the firm’s
revenue may increase with an increase in customer’s research cost. The reason
is as follows. When customers’ research cost is large enough, customers would
refrain from search and prefer to purchase directly. Thus, without incurring a
research cost, the customers are willing to pay a relatively higher price than they
would with a payment of the research cost. Therefore, the seller’s revenue may
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increase with customers’ research cost, which suggests the retailers that reducing
research cost is not always beneficial.
We also consider a problem with two substitutable products in which customers
not only need to decide whether to research, but also need to decide in which order
to do so. We study how the seller should manage the research cost of each product
to influence customers’ action to maximize its revenue. In the setting with two
homogeneous products, we study three scenarios: (1) both products have research
cost (it can be considered as two uncertain products, hereafter denoted by (U, U));
(2) only one product has research cost (it can be considered as one uncertain and
one certain product, hereafter denoted by (U,C)); (3) both products have no
research cost (it can be considered as two certain products, hereafter denoted by
(C,C)). In each scenario, based on customers’ optimal behavior, we derive the
optimal pricing decisions with the objective to maximize the seller’s total revenue.
Then we compare the optimal revenue accrued in these three different scenarios
to see which one is the best. We find that when the features of the two products
are independent, the revenue accrued by offering (U, U) is always smaller than
that by offering (U,C). One reason is that by assigning a different research cost
(i.e. zero and a positive value) to the otherwise homogeneous products, the seller
can better differentiate the customers. The homogeneous products with different
search costs become “non-homogeneous” to customers in some sense. The second
reason is the value of disclosing information. When customers need to resolve the
uncertainty of both products, the customers just need to pay one unit of research
cost in the scenario (U,C), and thus they are willing to pay a higher price than
the scenario (U, U) in which customers need to pay two units of research cost.
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The insight derived from this argument is that even for homogeneous products,
assigning different search costs enables the seller to better differentiate customers
and obtain a higher revenue.
Moreover, we find that with feature independence, the seller can accrue a larger
revenue by offering (C,C) than by offering (U,C) when the feature uncertainty is
high, and a lower revenue otherwise. The underlying reason is that when the
uncertainty is large, customers would always choose to search before making
a purchase. Hence, disclosing all the information saves customers one unit of
research cost, and thus customers are willing to pay more. However, when the
uncertainty is small, search is not necessary, thus there is no information advantage
in (C,C) anymore. On the other hand, offering (U,C) enables the seller to better
differentiate the customers due to the different research cost assigned to each
product. This result indicates that disclosing all the information is not always
optimal for sellers.
In addition, we study the effect of feature correlation. With perfectly positive
correlation, we find that offering (U,C) is better than offering (U, U) when
uncertainty is large, and is worse otherwise. This is consistent with our intuition
that disclosing one product’s information (which is equal to disclosing both
products’ information in the presence of perfect correlation) is better because
customers would always search before making a purchase when uncertainty is
large. With perfectly negative correlation, offering (U,C) (no research cost) is
always better than offering (U, U). Because in scenario (U,C) customers like
either product 1 or product 2, charging the highest possible price for both products
guarantees the seller the largest possible revenue. We also find that with general
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negative correlation, the revenue by offering (U,C) is always larger than that by
offering (U, U), which can be explained by the same reasoning as the independence
case.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews related
literature. Section 5.3 introduces the single product model and discusses the main
result in this setting. Section 5.4 describes the two-product model under different
research cost scenarios and contains results and discussion for cases in which the
features of the two products are independent. Section 5.5 studies the effect of
correlation. Section 5.6 presents some future research directions. Section 5.7
contains generalizations and proofs. Section 5.8 contains additional details of
computations used in the proofs.
5.2 Literature Review
There are two papers that are closely related to our research. In the paper by
Branco et al. (2012), the utility U of consuming a single product consists of two
parts,
U = v +
T∑
i=1
xi
where v is the ex ante expected utility prior to learning, and xi is the value of the
ith random attribute of the product. (Imagine a car has thousands of attributes,
such as color, pattern, safety, and engine.) It is assumed all xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , are
binary taking value z and −z with equal probability. In each step, the customer
can incur search cost c to learn the realization of a single attribute xi. There are
infinite number of attributes to learn (T is ∞). For simplicity, the authors work
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with a continuous process (Imagine there are so many small-valued attributes that
the change in utility from each attribute gets infinitely small as the number of
attributes goes to infinity.). Then the expected utility follows a Brownian motion
as customer keeps searching. The authors characterize the optimal stopping rule
for customers’ search process. They derive an upper bound and a lower bound
such that when the expected utility hits the upper (lower) bound the customer
would stop the search and purchase (not purchase) the product. In addition, the
authors study the firm’s optimal pricing decisions.
The other closely related paper is by Ke et al. (2014) who extend the
above model to a multi-product setting. They consider a continuous setting
where information about the product being researched changes according to a
Brownian motion. At the beginning the consumer chooses which product to start
researching. Without having complete information on the first product, she might
decide to switch, and search for information on the other product. At some point,
the consumer may decide to stop searching and purchase one of the products,
or stop searching and leave the market without making any purchase. They
investigate a consumer’s optimal search, switch, and purchase or exit strategy.
There are two main differences between our research and the above two papers.
The first one is that there are infinite number of attributes in the product in their
models and consumers learn one attribute each time by incurring a search cost c.
So the consumers gradually learn the information about the products. However, in
our model, research is a one step action. By incurring a research cost c, customers
learn all the unobservable information of the product. This leads to a simpler
model in our case that avoids the study of diffusions. The second major difference
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is that operational decisions are the focus of our paper, but not theirs. They focus
on characterizing the customers’ optimal behavior. Although Branco et al. (2012)
study the pricing decision, they do not consider how to manage the research cost.
Ke et al. (2014) do not involve any pricing decision and research cost decision,
whereas our model is trying to see how the seller should manage research cost and
make pricing decisions under different search cost scenarios.
There is some literature in the operations management area that incorporates
consumer’s search cost for product quality information. Boyaci and Akcay (2015)
assume customers have limited attention and capability to process the product
information. They employ a new choice model called the Generalized MNL model,
and study pricing decisions under a monopolist setting (one seller, one customer,
one product) and a competitive setting (two sellers, one customer, two products).
In the competitive setting, they also study when the quality of the two products
are perfectly positively correlated and perfectly negative correlated. There is a
big difference between their central assumptions and ours. They assume the firm
knows the quality level of the product, either low or high, and all customers
consider the product as either low quality or high quality. We do not have a true
quality level, but rather assume a fraction q of customers like the product and the
rest dislike the product. Another difference is that they study when customers
have limited attention and do some imperfect search for information, while we
assume customers can do a perfect search for information.
Cachon et al. (2006) study a model in which consumers search among multiple
competing firms for products that match their preferences at a reasonable price.
They focus on how easier search influences equilibrium prices, assortments, firm
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profits, and consumer welfare. They demonstrate that easier search exhibits
a market-expansion effect that encourages firms to expand their assortment.
Thus customers are more likely to find products that better match their ideal
preferences, improving the efficiency of the market, which may manifest itself in
higher prices, more profits, and increased welfare. In the conclusion, they argue
that search costs may be partially endogenous and reducing search costs allows
firms to expand their assortments.
Sahin and Wang (2014) investigate dynamic search policies given customers
are facing multiple products and need to incur a search cost to resolve the
uncertainty of each product. They study several heuristics and propose a
consider-then-search policy. Based on the tractability of this policy, they further
study the assortment problem. They argue that revenue ordered assortments
fail to be optimal, but that an optimal assortment can be obtained efficiently by
dynamic programming. Finally, they also study price competition and identify
how the equilibrium changes as search cost increases. They find that fewer firms
would serve the market when search cost is sufficiently high. Moreover, if the
product quality levels are not significantly different from each other, the firms
should make their product information easy to access and reduce consumer search
cost. In their future research directions, they mention that each firm may have
control over the search cost to some extent in practice. For example, the seller
may make the information about certain products easier or harder to access,
which is not uncommon in many firms, especially online sellers. Thus it would
be interesting to see what the optimal policy looks like in terms of pricing and
controlling search cost.
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In marketing, there is much research involving consumers’ search cost for
product’s quality information. For example, Lal and Sarvary (1999) argue that
the internet reduces consumer search costs for digital attributes of a product (such
as its price and dimension) but not for nondigital attributes (such as how well it
fits, in the case of clothing). They study when and how the internet is likely to
decrease the level of price competition between firms. In their model, customers
need to gather information on two types of product attributes, digital attributes
and nondigital attributes. Consumers choose between two brands but are familiar
with the nondigital attributes of only the brand purchased on the last purchase
occasion. Firms use traditional stores and internet to inform consumers about
their products’ attributes and to sell their products. They show that the impact of
the internet on competition will be different depending on the relative importance
of parameters describing the relevant shopping and distribution context. They
also show the use of internet can not only lead to higher prices but can also
discourage consumers from engaging in search.
Lynch and Ariely (2000) test conditions under which lowered search costs
should increase or decrease price sensitivity. They conduct an experiment in
which they varied search cost via electronic shopping (search cost for quality
information within a given store). They show that for differentiated products like
wines, lowering the cost of search for quality information reduces price sensitivity.
In addition, there are many discussions related to consumers’ search costs
effects on product prices. Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) argue that even if the same
product availability and prices are offered, the sales are different between an
Internet channel and traditional channel due to the lower search costs (on prices)
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on the Internet. Kuksov (2004) discusses the effects of changing search costs
on prices when product differentiation is fixed and when it is endogenously
determined in equilibrium. Bakos (1997) argues that electronic marketplaces
which lower the buyer’s cost to acquire information about seller prices and product
offerings can reduce the ability of sellers to extract monopolistic profits and
increase the ability of market to optimally allocate productive resources.
There is also research related to costly product information acquisition in
economics. Chan and Leland (1982) assume that sellers need to decide the prices
and quality levels of their products and customers can acquire price/quality
information about individual sellers at a cost. They study the equilibrium
existence under four different scenarios: (i) the price is costlessly observable,
while the quality is costly observable, (ii) the price is costly observable, while the
quality is costlessly observable, (iii) both price and quality are costly observable,
(iv) both price and quality are costlessly observable. They show price advertising
that makes price information costlessly observable can improve the social welfare.
5.3 One Product Model
We consider a monopolist selling a single product to a fixed population of
infinitesimal customers. Each customer has a valuation v + ǫ for the product,
where v is based on openly observable characteristics of the product and ǫ is based
on features that are not openly observable to customers (“hidden”). The quantity
v is the same for all customers, whereas ǫ is not. We assume that a fraction q
of customers like the hidden features. For such customers, ǫ is a positive number
δ. The remaining fraction 1− q of customers dislike the hidden features, and for
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such customers, ǫ equals −δ. A priori, each individual customer does not know
his/her value of ǫ, but does know what fraction of customers like hidden feature.
Hence, each individual customer knows a priori that his/her ǫ has distribution as
follows:
ǫ =

 δ with probability q−δ with probability 1− q.
To further illustrate the meaning of q, consider a scenario in which a customer
is considering whether to buy a popular book on Amazon.com. In addition to
some observable features (such as author, abstract, etc), customer reviews show
that a fraction q of customers like the book and the rest dislike the book. This
forms this customer’s prior knowledge about the hidden features of the book.
At the same time, since there are abundant past customers who participated in
customer reviews, it is reasonable to assume that customer composition in the
market is truly reflected by the customer reviews. That is, the probability a given
customer likes the hidden features is q.
In our basic problem, the seller’s decision is the price p of the product. Given p,
a customer’s utility u of purchasing this product is u = v−p+ ǫ. In the following,
we assume v ≥ δ, which means that getting the product for free always generates
a positive utility. We assume that the customers know the fixed valuation v, the
price p, and the distribution of ǫ.
Before deciding whether to purchase the product, an individual customer may
wish to research the product to determine if s/he likes the product’s hidden
features. Conducting such research comes at a cost (possibly in time or effort) to
the customer. To model this, we assume that by incurring a cost c, a customer
can find out his/her realization of ǫ. The cost c is not collected by the seller.
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Given a price p, a customer has the following options: (i) choose to research and
then buy if ǫ = δ and not buy if ǫ = −δ, (ii) choose to buy immediately without
research, (iii) leave without purchasing (or researching). We refer to these options
as s, b, and 0 respectively. Customers are a priori identical, so all customers make
the same choice among b, s, and 0 in our model. However, if the customers select
s, then some will buy the product and some will not.
Let A = {b, s, 0} be the set of the above options and wa(p) be the expected
utility of a customer choosing action a ∈ A given price p. We have
wa(p) =


q(v − p+ δ) + (1− q)(v − p− δ) if a = b
−c+ q(v − p+ δ) if a = s
0 if a = 0.
(5.1)
We assume each customer maximizes his/her expected utility. Some readers may
notice that customers could consider actions other than those in A. For example,
customers could choose to search and then buy the product no matter what the
search result is. However, the utility of this action is −c + q(v − p + δ) + (1 −
q)(v − p − δ), which is always less than wb(p). Customers might also choose to
search and then buy the product if they dislike the hidden information, and leave
otherwise. The utility of this action is −c+(1− q)(v−p− δ), which is always less
than max{wb(p), 0}. Therefore, there is no loss of optimality in assuming each
customer’s action set is A as defined above, and the utilities are (5.1).
Let a(p) be the optimal action of the customer given price p. Then
a(p) =


b if wb(p) ≥ ws(p) and wb(p) ≥ 0
s if ws(p) > wb(p) and ws(p) ≥ 0
0 if 0 > max{wb(p), ws(p)}.
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In case of “ties” we suppose for simplicity customers choose b over s and s over
0. The seller’s revenue from charging price p, denoted by r(p), can be written as
r(p) = r(p|a(p)) =


p if a(p) = b
q · p if a(p) = s
0 if a(p) = 0.
The seller’s problem is:
max
p
r(p) (5.2)
Hereafter, we assume q = 1/2 to simplify the presentation. Most of the results
below hold with slight modification for arbitrary q ∈ (0, 1). These more general
results are stated in section 5.7. In the following, we derive the optimal solution
p∗ to problem (5.2) and study the comparative statics of the optimal solution. We
have the following result.
Theorem 5.
1. If δ ≥ 1
3
v + 2c, then p∗ = v + δ − 2c. In this case, the customers’ optimal
action is to research the product (action s). The seller’s optimal revenue
r(p∗) = 1
2
(v + δ)− c.
2. If 2c ≤ δ < 1
3
v + 2c, then p∗ = v − δ + 2c. In this case, the customers’
optimal action is to purchase directly without research (action b). The
seller’s optimal revenue r(p∗) = v − δ + 2c.
3. If δ < 2c, then p∗ = v. In this case, the customers’ optimal action is to
purchase directly without research (action b). The seller’s optimal revenue
r(p∗) = v.
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Now we give some explanation of the results in Theorem 1. When δ is
large (as in part 1), customers research the product before making a purchase
because the value of knowing the realization of ǫ is large. In this case, the seller’s
optimal strategy is to choose the largest price that can keep customers’ utility
ws(p) positive and the consumer’s surplus is fully extracted by the seller. When
δ is small (as in part 3), customers opt not to research because the value of
information derived from searching is not worth the cost. In this case, the seller’s
optimal strategy is to choose the largest price that can keep customer’s utility
wb(p) positive and the customer’s surplus is again fully extracted by the seller.
When δ is in the middle (as in part 2), both actions b and s may be possible for the
customers. (Obviously the seller will not set the price that makes the customers
leave without purchase, otherwise the seller will get 0.) However, by calculation,
we find that inducing customers to purchase directly can generate higher revenue
than inducing customers to search in this case and the optimal price for the seller
is to choose the largest price that can keep wb(p) ≥ ws(p) (inducing customers
to buy directly). Note that in this case customers’ surplus is positive, because
decreasing the price makes option b more attractive, since lowering the price will
increase wb(p) by 1 while ws(p) by only 1/2.
Next we provide some comparative statics of the optimal price and the optimal
revenue. We have the following. Proofs, which will follow immediately from
Theorem 5, are omitted.
Proposition 11. Both p∗ and r(p∗) increase with v.
Proposition 11 is quite intuitive. It says that both the optimal price and the
optimal revenue increase with the known portion of the valuation of the product.
106
Next we consider how the optimal revenue changes with the magnitude of the
uncertainty parameter δ.
Proposition 12.
1. If δ ≥ 1
3
v + 2c, then r(p∗) increases in δ.
2. If 2c ≤ δ < 1
3
v + 2c, then r(p∗) decreases in δ.
3. If δ < 2c, then r(p∗) does not change with δ.
Next we illustrate the results in Proposition 12. As we have argued earlier,
when δ is large enough (as in part 1), customers will always prefer research to
immediate purchase, and the seller’s optimal strategy is to set the highest price
that can keep ws(p) positive. However, in this case ws(p) depends on the value of
the favorable outcome, which increases in δ. Therefore, so does the optimal price
and the optimal revenue. This leads to the part 1 of Proposition 12. When δ is
small, customers will never choose to search, and decide to whether to purchase
based on the expected utility which equals to v. Hence the revenue does not
change with δ. This leads to the third part of Proposition 12. When δ is in the
middle (as in part 2), customers can choose either to search or to purchase directly.
According to our earlier discussions, the seller needs to induce the customers to
purchase directly. Note that as δ increases, customers’ incentive to research also
increases, thus the seller has to decrease the price to keep wb(p) ≥ ws(p) (note that
as the price decreases, although both wb(p) and ws(p) increase, wb(p) increases
faster than ws(p)). Therefore, both price and revenue decrease in δ in this case.
To help visualize the results of Proposition 12, we plot r(p∗) against δ in
Figure 5.1 for an example. As we can see, the seller’s revenue doesn’t always
107
δ
r(
p∗
)
1
3v + 2c2c
Figure 5.1: Optimal revenue as a function of δ
decrease with the uncertainty parameter δ. To the contrary, it may increase in it
in certain range.
Next we study how the optimal revenue changes with the research cost c. We
have the following results:
Proposition 13.
1. If δ ≥ 1
3
v + 2c, then r(p∗) decreases in c.
2. If 2c ≤ δ < 1
3
v + 2c, then r(p∗) increases in c.
3. If δ < 2c, then r(p∗) does not change with c.
In addition, if the seller can choose the research cost, then it is optimal to set
c ≥ 1
2
δ, i.e., to set the research cost high.
Now we explain the results in Proposition 13. When c is small (as in part
1), customers will always choose to research the product and hence their utility
is decreased by the amount of the research cost. To keep the utility ws(p) of
action s positive, the seller needs to lower its price to make up customers’ utility.
Therefore, both the price and the revenue decrease in c in this case. When c
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is large enough (as in part 3), customers would never choose to research the
product. Hence the revenue is independent of c in this case. When c is in the
middle (as in part 2), either to research or to purchase directly may be optimal
for the customers. By calculation, we find that if δ < 1
3
v + 2c, then the revenue
when customers research is smaller than that when customers purchase directly.
Hence, in this case, the seller should induce customers to purchase directly. As
c decreases in this range, customers’ incentive to search increases, thus to keep
customers purchasing directly, the seller has to lower the price. As a result, the
optimal price and revenue increase in c in this case.
To help visualize the results of Proposition 13, we plot r(p∗) against c in
Figure 5.2. As we can see, the seller’s revenue first decreases with research cost c
then increases and reaches a steady maximum. This suggests that to obtain better
revenue, a seller should either eliminate the research cost of the product, or set the
research cost high enough. In our setting, the latter one leads to higher revenue
since it is equivalent to a perfect price discrimination policy which effectively
makes half of the customers to buy at price v + δ and the rest to buy at price
v − δ.
5.4 Two Product Model
In this section, we study a problem in which the monopolist sells two substitutable
products (indexed by i = 1, 2) to customers. A customer’s utility from consuming
product i is denoted by
ui = vi − pi + ǫi for i = 1, 2.
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Figure 5.2: Optimal revenue as a function of c
Similar to the previous section, for each i, we have ǫi = δ for a fraction q of the
population and ǫi = −δ for a fraction 1 − q of the population. To simplify our
analysis, we assume v1 = v2 = v and v ≥ δ. We allow the customers’ values
of these two products to be correlated, and the fraction of the population with
particular values for (ǫ1, ǫ2) pairs is given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Fraction of customers with different values of (ǫ1, ǫ2)
ǫ2
δ −δ
ǫ1
δ β q − β
−δ q − β 1− 2q + β
We assume that max{0, 2q − 1} ≤ β ≤ q. As before, each customer knows the
information above and consequently has a joint distribution on his/her values of
(ǫ1, ǫ2) as given by Table 5.1. From Table 5.1, it is easy to see that for i 6= j we
have
P (ǫi = δ|ǫj = δ) = β
q
,
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P (ǫi = δ|ǫj = −δ) = q − β
1− q .
That is, if the customer learns that he likes the hidden features of one product,
then the probability that he likes the hidden features of the other product is β
q
. If
the customer learns that he dislikes the hidden features of one product, then the
probability that he likes the hidden features of the other product is q−β
1−q . Note that
β = max{0, 2q− 1} denotes the maximal possible negative correlation between ǫ1
and ǫ2 and β = q corresponds a perfectly positive correlation.
In this section, we assume there are two decisions for the seller. First, the seller
can choose whether to impose search costs for the uncertain (to the customers)
feature of each product. If the seller does not impose the cost for a product i, then
all customers will know their values of ǫi. To simplify our analysis, we assume
the research cost is either c which corresponds to the situation that customers
need to spend some amount of time and effort to research the product, or 0 which
corresponds to the situation that all the information of the hidden features has
been disclosed to the customers and the research cost is so small that it can be
neglected. Second, he can choose the prices for each product. We are interested
in how the seller should manage the research cost of these two products to achieve
the largest revenue. Therefore, we consider three scenarios: (U, U) in which both
products have research costs, (U,C) in which one product has research cost, and
(C,C) in which neither product has research cost. Here, “U” stands for uncertain
and “C” stands for certain. Our objective is to find which scenario is optimal
(with respect to revenue) to the seller.
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5.4.1 Setup of the Three Scenarios
Scenario (U, U): Two Uncertain Products
In this scenario, we assume the seller hides the feature information of both
products, keeping customers uncertain about the product absent research effort on
their part. Each customer does not know his/her values of (ǫ1, ǫ2), but knows the
joint distribution as given in Table 5.1. That is, they do not know whether they
like or dislike the hidden features of each product, but have a prior distribution.
Each customer may learn his individual values of ǫ1, and/or ǫ2 at a cost of c for
each. Each customer buys at most one of the two products.
Without loss of generality, we assume the seller sets prices p1 and p2 such
that p1 ≤ p2. Faced with prices (p1, p2) a customer must select an action, i.e., a
contingency plan for researching/buying products. By symmetry, there are only
six possible actions that expected utility-maximizing customers might choose.
Those six actions are as follows.
• Purchase product 1 immediately without research. We use “b” to denote
this option.
• Research product 1 and buy it if ǫ1 = δ. Otherwise, research product 2 and
buy it if ǫ2 = δ. Otherwise, leave without purchase. We use “ss” to denote
this option.
• Research product 1 and buy it if ǫ1 = δ. Otherwise, leave without purchase.
We use “s0” to denote this option.
• Research product 1 and buy it if ǫ1 = δ. Otherwise, buy product 2
immediately without research. We use “sb” to denote this option.
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• Research product 2 and buy it if ǫ2 = δ. Otherwise, buy product 1
immediately without research. We use “−sb” to denote this option.
• Do not research or buy either product. We denote this by 0.
Let wa(p) denote the expected utility of a customer choosing action a given price
vector p = (p1, p2). Thus,
wa(p) =


v − p1 + (2q − 1)δ if a = b
−c+ q(v − p1 + δ) + (1− q)[−c+ q−β1−q (v − p2 + δ)] if a = ss
−c+ q(v − p1 + δ) if a = s0
−c+ q(v − p1 + δ) + (1− q)[v − p2 + (2 q−β1−q − 1)δ] if a = sb
−c+ q(v − p2 + δ) + (1− q)[v − p1 + (2 q−β1−q − 1)δ] if a = −sb
0 if a = 0
The expression (2 q−β
1−q − 1)δ that appears for a = sb,−sb is simply E[ǫi|ǫj = −δ]
for i 6= j.
Recall that we assume p1 ≤ p2. From the above expression we see that
wsb(p) ≥ w−sb(p) if q ≥ 1/2. Likewise, wsb(p) < w−sb(p) if q < 1/2. Thus,
we shall henceforth assume without loss of optimality that
A =

 {b, ss, s0, sb, 0} if q ≥ 1/2{b, ss, s0,−sb, 0} if q < 1/2
Let a(p) be the optimal action of the customer given price vector p, i.e.,
a(p) = argmax
a∈A
wa(p). Note that in case of ties, we assume the customer would
choose the action which maximizes the seller’s revenue.
The seller’s revenue from charging a price vector p, denoted by R(p), can be
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written as
R(p) = R(p|a(p)) =


p1 if a(p) = b
qp1 + (q − β)p2 if a(p) = ss
qp1 if a(p) = s0
qp1 + (1− q)p2 if a(p) = sb
qp2 + (1− q)p1 if a(p) = −sb
0 if a(p) = 0
The seller’s pricing problem is as follows:
R∗UU := max
p
R(p) (5.3)
Scenario (U,C): One Uncertain Product, One Certain Product
In this case, we assume the seller discloses the information about the hidden
features of product 2 to the public but keeps that of product 1 secret. This
means that each individual customer knows his/her value of ǫ2, and has posterior
information about the distribution of ǫ1 (conditional upon the customer’s value
of ǫ2). Each customer can find out his/her realization of ǫ1 by incurring a cost
c. A fraction q of customers have realization δ for ǫ2, and consuming product 2
generates an utility of v − p2 + δ to those customers. We call these customers
group 1. Let q1 = β/q. Group 1 customers have ǫ2 = δ. A fraction q1 of group 1
customers have ǫ1 = δ, and a fraction 1 − q1 of group 1 customers have ǫ1 = −δ.
Hence for a group 1 customer the conditional distribution of his ǫ1 is as follows:
ǫ1 =


δ with conditional probability q1
−δ with conditional probability 1− q1.
Similarly, a fraction 1 − q of customers dislike the hidden features of product 2.
For them, consuming it generates an utility of v−p2− δ. We call these customers
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group 2. Let q2 =
q−β
1−q . Group 2 customers have ǫ2 = −δ. A fraction q2 of group
2 customers have ǫ1 = δ, and a fraction 1− q2 of group 2 customers have ǫ1 = −δ.
Hence for a group 2 customer the conditional distribution of his ǫ1 is as follows:
ǫ1 =

 δ with conditional probability q2−δ with conditional probability 1− q2.
Given a price vector p, we can show both groups of customers have five possible
actions that expected utility-maximizing customers might choose. Those five
actions are as follows.
• Purchase product 2. We use “b2” to denote this option.
• Purchase product 1 immediately without research. We use “b1” to denote
this option.
• Research product 1 and buy it if he likes its hidden features, and buy product
2 otherwise. We use “sb” to denote this option.
• Research product 1 and buy it if he likes its hidden features, and leave
otherwise. We use “s0” to denote this option.
• Do not research or buy either product. We denote this by 0.
The set of actions for the customers is A = {b2, b1, sb, s0, 0}. Let wja(p) denote
the expected utility of group j (j = 1, 2) customers if they choose action a ∈ A
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given prices p. We have
wja(p) =


v − p2 + δ if a = b2, j = 1
v − p2 − δ if a = b2, j = 2
v − p1 + (2qj − 1)δ if a = b1
−c + qj(v − p1 + δ) + (1− qj)(v − p2 + δ) if a = sb, j = 1
−c + qj(v − p1 + δ) + (1− qj)(v − p2 − δ) if a = sb, j = 2
−c + qj(v − p1 + δ) if a = s0
0 if a = 0
Let aj(p) be the optimal actions of customers of group j given price p, i.e.,
aj(p) = argmax
a∈A
wja(p). As in scenario (U, U), we assume customers would choose
the action which maximizes the seller’s revenue in case of ties.
The seller’s revenue collected from group j customers by charging a price vector
p, denoted by Rj(p), can be written as
Rj(p) = Rj(p|aj(p)) =


p2 if a
j(p) = b2
p1 if a
j(p) = b1
qjp1 + (1− qj)p2 if aj(p) = sb
qjp1 if a
j(p) = s0
0 if aj(p) = 0
The seller’s pricing problem is as follows:
R∗UC := max
p
RUC(p) = qR
1(p) + (1− q)R2(p) (5.4)
Scenario (C,C): Two Certain Products
In this case, we assume the seller discloses the information about the (previously)
hidden features of both products, and each customer knows his/her values of
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(ǫ1, ǫ2). That is, each customer knows whether s/he likes or dislikes the hidden
features of each product. We have the following four segments of customers.
• Segment 1: a fraction β of them like the features of both product 1 and 2,
and the utilities of consuming product 1 and 2 are v− p1+ δ and v− p2+ δ
respectively.
• Segment 2: a fraction q − β like the features of product 1 but dislike those
of product 2, and the utilities of consuming product 1 and 2 are v − p1 + δ
and v − p2 − δ respectively.
• Segment 3: a fraction q − β like the features of product 2 but dislike those
of product 1, and the utilities of consuming product 1 and 2 are v − p1 − δ
and v − p2 + δ respectively.
• Segment 4: a fraction 1−2q+β dislike the features of both product 1 and 2,
and the utilities of consuming product 1 and 2 are v− p1− δ and v− p2− δ
respectively.
It is easy to see that in this case, the action set for each customer is A =
{b1, b2, 0} where b1 denotes buying product 1 and b2 denotes buying product 2.
Let wja(p) denote the expected utility of segment j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) customers if
they choose action a ∈ A given prices p. We have
wja(p) =


v − p1 + δ if a = b1, j = 1, 2
v − p1 − δ if a = b1, j = 3, 4
v − p2 + δ if a = b2, j = 1, 3
v − p2 − δ if a = b2, j = 2, 4
0 if a = 0.
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Let aj(p) be the optimal actions of customers of segment j given price p, i.e.,
aj(p) = argmax
a∈A
wja(p). As in scenario (U, U), we assume customers would choose
the action which maximizes the seller’s revenue in case of ties.
Therefore, the revenue collected from segment j customers, denoted by Rj(p),
can be written as follows:
Rj(p) = Rj(p|aj(p)) =


p1 if a
j(p) = b1
p2 if a
j(p) = b2
0 if aj(p) = 0.
The seller’s pricing problem is
R∗CC : = max
p∈P2
RCC(p)
= βR1(p) + (q − β)R2(p) + (q − β)R3(p) + (1− 2q + β)R4(p). (5.5)
5.4.2 Independent Features
Again, to simplify the presentation, we assume q = 1/2. In addition, we assume
that β = q2 = 1/4 in this subsection, so that ǫ1 and ǫ2 are independent (see
Table 5.1). In the following, we compare the three scenarios described in the
previous section under these assumptions. Most of the results below hold with
slight modification for arbitrary q ∈ (0, 1). These more general results are stated
in Section 5.7.
First, we have the comparison between scenario (U, U) and (U,C).
Proposition 14. Suppose β = q2 = 1
4
. Then R∗UU ≤ R∗UC. That is, if the features
are independent, the optimal revenue from offering (U, U) is always smaller than
the optimal revenue from offering (U,C).
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In case (U,C) the seller can differentiate the customers better than in case
(U, U), because the products in (U,C) become “non-homogeneous” in some sense
by assigning a different research cost (c or 0) to each product. For any price
vector under which customers choose not research in case (U, U), the seller can
accrue a higher revenue in case (U,C) by setting the same prices. In other words,
as long as customers choose not research in case (U, U), the seller can induce
the customers to choose the same or better option in case (U,C) which gives the
same or greater revenue. For example, if customers choose to not search and buy
directly in case (U, U), the seller can set the same price to induce all customers to
not search and buy directly the uncertain product in case (U,C) which gives the
seller the exact amount of revenue as in case (U, U). However, the seller can induce
a fraction 1− q of customers who dislike the certain product (group 2 customers)
to buy the uncertain product directly without research, and induce a fraction q
of customers who like the certain product (group 1 customers) to purchase at the
largest possible price v + δ. In this way, the seller can collect more revenue from
the fraction q of customers than in case (U, U).
Another reason is the value of disclosing information. Whenever customers in
case (U, U) choose to research at least one product, they need to pay the research
cost at least once, which can be saved by the customer in case (U,C). Thus, in
case (U,C) customers are willing to pay more and the revenue is larger.
Hence, no matter whether the customers research or not in case (U, U), offering
(U,C) can give the seller a higher revenue. Next we describe which of (U,C) and
(C,C) is better for the seller. By Proposition 4, the better of these two is also the
best among the three (U, U), (U,C) and (C,C).
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Proposition 15. Suppose β = q2 = 1
4
.
1. If δ ≥ 2c and δ ≥ max{1
5
v + 6
5
c, 1
7
v + 12
7
c}, then offering (C,C) is optimal,
the optimal prices are p∗1 = p
∗
2 = v + δ, and R
∗
CC =
3
4
(v + δ).
2. If δ ≥ 2c and δ < max{1
5
v + 6
5
c, 1
7
v + 12
7
c}, then offering (U,C) is optimal,
either p∗1 = v − δ + 2c, p∗2 = v − δ + 4c or p∗1 = v − δ + 2c, p∗2 = v + δ. In
addition, R∗UC = max{v − 12δ + 32c, v − δ + 3c}.
3. If δ < 2c, then offering (U,C) is optimal, p∗1 = v, p
∗
2 = v + δ, and R
∗
UC =
v + 1
2
δ.
When the feature uncertainty is large, customers always choose to research.
Thus offering (C,C) is better than offering (U,C), because customers save one
unit of research cost and thus they are willing to pay more. When the feature
uncertainty is small, customers may not research and they are more willing to buy
based on their expectation. Hence there is no value of providing extra information.
Moreover, offering (U,C) allows the seller to better differentiate the customers
because of the “non-homogeneous” products.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the three scenarios (v = 2, q = 0.5, c = 0.2)
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Figure 5.3 illustrates the proceeding two propositions. The figure shows that
the optimal revenue from offering (U, U) is always lower than that from offering
(U,C), which is consistent with Proposition 14. Moreover, the optimal revenue
from offering (U,C) is larger than that from offering (C,C) when δ is small,
and is smaller than from offering (C,C) when δ is large. This is consistent with
Proposition 15.
Proposition 16. In case (U,C), we have p∗1 < p
∗
2. That is, the price of the
uncertain product is always smaller than that of the certain product.
There are two main reasons for the preceding result. The first one is that
for the certain product, the seller has already disclosed the feature information
and thus customers do not need to incur a research cost to learn the information.
Therefore, the seller can charge a higher price than the uncertain product. The
second reason is charging different prices for the two products allows the seller to
differentiate customers better.
Let R∗all = max{R∗UU , R∗UC , R∗CC}. Next we study some comparative statics of
R∗all. We have the following.
Proposition 17. For any fixed parameter set (v, c),
1. If δ < 2c, then R∗all is increasing in δ.
2. If δ ≥ 2c and δ < max{1
5
v + 6
5
c, 1
7
v + 12
7
c}, then R∗all is decreasing in δ.
3. If δ ≥ 2c and δ ≥ max{1
5
v + 6
5
c, 1
7
v + 12
7
c}, then R∗all is increasing in δ.
Now we explain the results in Proposition 17. When δ is large (as in part
3), customers always choose to research. Thus offering (C,C) is the best choice.
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Moreover, the best strategy is to seize the high valuation customers who like at
least one of the products and let them buy at the largest possible price v + δ.
Hence, it is easy to see that R∗all is increasing in δ.
When δ is small (as in part 1), customers choose to not search because it
is not worth the research cost. As we argued before, offering (U,C) is the best.
Since group 2 customers dislike the certain product and group 1 customers like the
certain product, the best strategy is to let group 2 customers buy the uncertain
product based on their expected utility v (which is equivalent to a perfect price
discrimination to group 2 customers) and let group 1 customers buy the certain
product at the largest possible price v + δ. Therefore, R∗all is increasing in δ.
When δ is in the middle (as in part 2), by computation, offering (U,C) is better
than offering (C,C). For group 2 customers who dislike the certain product,
the optimal strategy is to induce them to buy the uncertain product based on
their expected utility. As we argued in part 2 of Proposition 12, as δ increases,
customers’ incentive to research also increases, thus the seller has to decrease the
price of the uncertain product (p∗2 = v−δ+2c) to let them choose to not research.
For group 1 customers, it is easy to see that their optimal decision is either to buy
the certain product or to research the uncertain product first and buy if they like
it, otherwise buy the certain product. If the optimal action is to buy the certain
product, then the price of the certain product has to be lower than some bound
which is connect to the price of the uncertain product (otherwise, they will choose
to search the feature information of the uncertain product). As δ increases, since
the price of the uncertain product decreases, the price of the certain product also
decreases. Hence the revenue is decreasing in δ in this case. If the optimal action
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is to research the uncertain product first, then the price of the certain product can
be as high as v + δ. Since there are more customers who purchases the uncertain
product in this case, the revenue is decreasing in δ.
To summarize the results of Proposition 17, we plot R∗all against δ in Figure 5.4.
As we can see, the seller’s revenue does not always decrease with the uncertainty
parameter δ. To the contrary, it may increase in it in certain range. This is
consistent with the finding in the single product setting.
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Figure 5.4: R∗all as a function of δ
Next, we study how the optimal revenue R∗all changes with the research cost
c. We have the following results:
Proposition 18. For any fixed parameter set (v, δ),
1. If δ < 2c, then R∗all is constant.
2. If δ ≥ 2c,
(a) If δ < max{1
5
v + 6
5
c, 1
7
v + 12
7
c}, then R∗all is increasing in c.
(b) If δ ≥ max{1
5
v + 6
5
c, 1
7
v + 12
7
c}, then R∗all is constant.
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Next, we illustrate the results in Proposition 18. When δ is large (as in part 3),
customers always choose to search, and offering (C,C) is the best choice. Thus,
R∗all is a constant in c. When δ is small (as in part 1), as we argued before,
offering (U,C) is optimal and the optimal strategy is to let group 2 customers
purchase the uncertain product directly based on their expected utility and let
group 1 customers purchase the certain product. No customers choose to research
in this case. Thus, R∗all is a constant to c. When δ is in the middle, for group
2 customers, as c decreases, customers’ incentive to research also increases, thus
the seller has to decrease the price of the uncertain product (p∗2 = v − δ + 2c)
to let them choose to not research. Hence, the price of the uncertain product is
increasing in c. For group 1 customers, if the optimal action is to buy the certain
product, then the price of the certain product has to be lower than some bound
which is connect to the price of the uncertain product (otherwise, they will choose
to search the feature information of the uncertain product). As c decreases, since
the price of the uncertain product decreases, the price of the certain product also
decreases. Hence the revenue is increasing in c in this case. If the optimal action
is to research the uncertain product first, then the price of the certain product
can be as high as v + δ. Thus, the revenue is increasing in c.
To help visualize the results of Proposition 18, we plot R∗all against c in
Figure 5.5. As we can see, the seller’s revenue first does not change with research
cost c then increases and reaches a steady maximum. This confirms the insight in
the single product setting that in order to obtain better revenue, a seller should
set the research cost high enough.
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Figure 5.5: R∗all as a function of c
5.5 Correlated Features
5.5.1 Perfectly Positive Correlation
In this subsection, we study the scenario that the features of the two products
are perfectly positively correlated. This is a special case with β = q of the model
considered in section 5.4. Specifically, we assume the customer composition is as
given in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Fraction of customers with different values of (ǫ1, ǫ2)
ǫ2
δ −δ
ǫ1
δ q 0
−δ 0 1− q
With perfectly positive correlation, it is easy to see that case (U, U) is reduced
to the one uncertain product case. Hence the optimal solution is the same as in
Theorem 5.7.1. That is,
R∗UU =


max{q(v + δ)− c, v − δ + c
1−q} if δ ≥ c2q(1−q)
v − δ + 2qδ if δ < c
2q(1−q)
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Moreover, both case (U,C) and case (C,C) are reduced to the one certain product
case in which a fraction q of customers like the product and the rest dislike the
product. Thus, the optimal revenue is R∗UC = max{q(v+ δ), v−δ}. Then we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 19. Suppose the features are perfectly positively correlated.
1. Suppose δ ≥ 2c
(a) If δ ≥ 1
3
v + 4
3
c, then R∗UU ≤ R∗UC.
(b) If δ < 1
3
v + 4
3
c, then R∗UU > R
∗
UC.
2. Suppose δ < 2c. Then R∗UU > R
∗
UC.
If δ is large, customers would always research before purchasing the uncertain
product. In case (U,C), customers save one unit of research cost and thus are
more willing to pay more. Hence, the seller can collect more revenue. Therefore,
disclosing the feature information is better than hiding it. If δ is small, in case
(U, U) customers are not willing to research and would make a purchase directly,
as long as their expected utility is positive. And it is equivalent that a fraction
q of customers buy at high price v + δ and the rest buy at the low price v − δ,
which is a perfect price discrimination. Hence, the seller can collect more revenue
from selling the uncertain product. Therefore, hiding the feature information is
better than disclosing. We can see that disclosing all information is not necessarily
always good to firm.
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5.5.2 Perfectly Negative Correlation
In this subsection, we study the scenario that the features of the two products
are perfectly negatively correlated. We assume the customer composition is as
given in Table 5.3. Note that this is not a special case of the model in section 5.4,
unless we take q = 1/2 above (which corresponds to q = 1/2, β = 0 in Table 5.1
in Section 5.4).
Table 5.3: Fraction of customers with different values of (ǫ1, ǫ2)
ǫ2
δ −δ
ǫ1
δ 0 q
−δ 1− q 0
Case (U, U): two uncertain products
Note that since the features are perfectly correlated, it suffices to research the
feature of only one product if customers want to search. Then customers have the
following possible optimal options to choose.
• Purchase product 1 directly without research. We use “b1” to identify this
option.
• Purchase product 2 directly without research. We use “b2” to identify this
option.
• Research product 1 and buy if ǫ1 = δ. Otherwise, buy product 2. We use
“sb” to identify this option.
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Thus, A = {b1, b2, sb, 0}. And customer’s expected utility can be written as
wa(p) =


v − p1 + (2q − 1)δ if a = b1
v − p2 + (1− 2q)δ if a = b2
−c+ q(v − p1 + δ) + (1− q)(v − p2 + δ) if a = sb
0 if a = 0
Notice that customers may have other actions. For example, a customer may
search product 2 , buy if ǫ2 = δ, and buy product 1 otherwise. This action gives
customers expected utility −c+(1−q)(v−p2+ δ)+ q(v−p1+ δ) which is equal to
wsb(p). And customers may research product 1, buy if ǫ1 = δ, and leave otherwise.
This action gives customers −c + q(v − p1 + δ) which is less than wsb(p). Hence,
the optimal action set is A = {b1, b2, sb, 0}.
Let a(p) be the optimal action of the customer given price p. Then
a(p) =


b1 if wb1(p) ≥ max{wa(p), a ∈ A}
b2 if wb2(p) ≥ max{wa(p), a ∈ A}
sb if wsb(p) ≥ max{wa(p), a ∈ A}
0 if w0(p) ≥ max{wa(p), a ∈ A}
The revenue collected by charging a price vector p, denoted by R(p), can be
written as
R(p) = R(p|a(p)) =


p1 if a(p) = b1
p2 if a(p) = b2
qp1 + (1− q)p2 if a(p) = sb
0 if a(p) = 0
Therefore, the seller’s problem is as follows:
R∗UU = max
p
R(p) (5.6)
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Lemma 14. The optimal solution is
1. If δ ≥ c, then R∗UU = v + δ − c.
2. If δ < c, then R∗UU = v.
Case (U,C) and Case (C,C):
Since the features are perfectly correlated, then case (U,C) is exactly the same
as case (C,C). That is, in both cases, there is q fraction of customers who like
product 1 but dislike product 2 (call them group 1), and 1−q fraction who dislike
product 1 but like product 2 (call them group 2). The revenue function of each
group, denoted by R1(p) and R2(p), can be written as
R1(p) =


p1 if v − p1 + δ ≥ v − p2 − δ and v − p1 + δ ≥ 0
p2 if v − p2 − δ > v − p1 + δ and v − p2 − δ ≥ 0
0 otherwise
and
R2(p) =


p1 if v − p1 − δ ≥ v − p2 + δ and v − p1 − δ ≥ 0
p2 if v − p2 + δ > v − p1 − δ and v − p2 + δ ≥ 0
0 otherwise
Therefore, the seller’s problem is as follows:
R∗UC = max
p∈P2
qR1(p) + (1− q)R2(p) (5.7)
It is easy to figure out that the optimal solution is p∗1 = p
∗
2 = v + δ, and
R∗UC = R
∗
CC = v + δ.
Proposition 20. Suppose the features are perfectly negatively correlated. Then
R∗UU < R
∗
UC = R
∗
CC.
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This result is quite intuitive. With perfectly negative correlation, in case (U,C)
the seller can set the highest price v+ δ for both products and all customers make
a purchase because all customers like at least one of the products. Actually, v+ δ
is the largest possible revenue that the seller can collect in any scenarios. Hence,
the revenue in case (U,C) is larger.
5.6 Future Directions
1. In the single product setting, I assume that customers’ valuation v, which
is based on openly observable characteristics of the product, is the same
across all customers. I am interested in the situation that v has a continuous
distribution.
2. In the single product setting, I assume that customers’ valuation ǫ, which
is based on the hidden features of the product, has a binary distribution.
What if it has a continuous distribution, such as a normal distribution?
3. In the two product setting, I assume that the two products are homogeneous
since ǫ1 and ǫ2 have the same distribution. What if the two products are
heterogeneous? For example, I could assume one product has a larger
uncertainty than the other. Mathematically, we let
ǫi =

 δi with probability q−δi with probability 1− q,
and δ1 > δ2.
I hope to answer the following questions:
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• When the seller offers two uncertain products, which one should have a lower
price? The one with high uncertainty or the one with low uncertainty?
• Does the result still hold that offering two uncertain products is worse than
offering one uncertain product and one certain product?
5.7 Appendix
In Section 5.7.1 below we state the general versions (general q) of our results
of this chapter. In Sections 5.7.2, 5.7.3, and 5.7.4, we provide the solutions to
problems (U, U), (U,C), and (C,C) respectively. The reader is directed to Section
5.8 for the lengthy derivations of the solutions. Section 5.7.5 contains proofs of
the results stated in Section 5.7.1. Those proofs use the solutions presented in
Sections 5.7.2-5.7.4.
5.7.1 Results with General q
In this section, we state all the results with a general q (0 < q < 1). All the
theorems, lemmas, and propositions in the previous sections in this chapter can
be obtained by putting q = 1/2 into the results in this section. We append a G
below to indicate the general version of theorems and propositions from Sections
5.2-5.4. For instance, Theorem 5G is the general version of Theorem 5. Theorem
5 can be obtained as a special case of Theorem 5G by taking q = 1/2.
Theorem 5G.
1. If δ ≥ 1−q
1+q
v + 2−q
1−q2 c, then p
∗ = v + δ − c
q
. In this case, customers’ optimal
action is to search the product (action s). The seller’s optimal revenue
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r(p∗) = q(v + δ − c
q
).
2. If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−q1+qv+ 2−q1−q2 c, then p∗ = v−δ+ c1−q . In this case, customers’
optimal action is to purchase directly without search (action b). The seller’s
optimal revenue r(p∗) = v − δ + c
1−q .
3. If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then p
∗ = v + (2q − 1)δ. In this case, customers’ optimal
action is to purchase directly without search (action b). The seller’s optimal
revenue r(p∗) = v + (2q − 1)δ.
Proposition 11G. Both p∗ and r(p∗) increase with v and q.
Proposition 12G.
1. If δ ≥ 1−q
1+q
v + 2−q
1−q2 c, then r(p
∗) increases in δ.
2. If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−q1+qv + 2−q1−q2 c, then r(p∗) decreases in δ.
3. If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then r(p
∗) increases in δ when q > 1
2
and decreases in δ when
q < 1
2
.
Proposition 13G.
1. If δ ≥ 1−q
1+q
v + 2−q
1−q2 c, then r(p
∗) decreases in c.
2. If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−q1+qv + 2−q1−q2 c, then r(p∗) increases in c.
3. If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then r(p
∗) does not change with c.
In addition, if the seller can choose the research cost, then it is optimal to set
c ≥ 2δq(1− q), i.e., to set the research cost high.
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Proposition 14G. If β = q2, then R∗UU ≤ R∗UC. That is, if the features are
independent, the optimal revenue by offering (U, U) is always smaller than by
offering (U,C).
Let θ = max{ (1−q)2
1+q2
v + q
2+1−q
(1−q)(1+q2)c,
(1−q)2
1+2q−q2 v +
2−q
(1−q)(1+2q−q2)c}.
Proposition 15G. Suppose β = q2.
1. If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) .
(a) If δ ≥ θ, then offering (C,C) is optimal. And R∗CC = q(2− q)(v + δ).
(b) Otherwise, offering (U,C) is optimal. And R∗UC = max{[q2 + (1 −
q)](v − δ + c
1−q ) + q(1− q)(v + δ), v − δ + 2−q1−qc}.
2. If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then offering (U,C) is optimal. And R
∗
UC = v − δ + 2qδ +
2q(1− q)δ.
Proposition 16G. In case (U,C), p∗1 < p
∗
2. That is, the price of the stochastic
product is always smaller than that of the deterministic product.
Proposition 17G. For any fixed parameter set (v, c, q),
1. If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
all is increasing in δ if q ≥ 2−
√
2
2
, and decreasing in δ
otherwise.
2. If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) and δ < θ, then R
∗
all is decreasing in δ.
3. If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) and δ ≥ θ, then R∗all is increasing in δ.
Let γ = min{ (1+q2)(1−q)
q2+1−q δ − (1−q)
2(1−q)
q2+1−q v,
(1+2q−q2)(1−q)
2−q δ − (1−q)
2(1−q)
2−q v}.
Proposition 18G. For any fixed parameter set (v, δ, q),
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1. If c ≥ 2q(1− q)δ, then R∗all is constant.
2. If c < 2q(1− q)δ,
(a) If c ≥ γ, then R∗all is increasing in c.
(b) If c < γ, then R∗all is constant.
Proposition 19G. Suppose the features are perfectly positively correlated.
1. Suppose δ ≥ c
2q(1−q)
(a) If δ ≥ 1−q
1+q
v + 1
1−q2 c, then R
∗
UU ≤ R∗UC .
(b) If δ < 1−q
1+q
v + 1
1−q2 c, then R
∗
UU ≥ R∗UC.
2. Suppose δ < c
2q(1−q) . Then R
∗
UU ≥ R∗UC.
Lemma 14G. The optimal solution is
1. Suppose q ≥ 1
2
.
(a) If δ ≥ c
2(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v + δ − c.
(b) If δ < c
2(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
2. Suppose q < 1
2
.
(a) If δ ≥ c
2q
, then R∗UU = v + δ − c.
(b) If δ < c
2q
, then R∗UU = v + δ − 2qδ.
Proposition 20G. Suppose the features are perfectly negatively correlated. Then
R∗UU < R
∗
UC = R
∗
CC.
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5.7.2 Optimal Solution of Case (U, U)
Part 1: Positive correlation and q ≥ 1/2 The optimal solution is as follows:
• If δ ≥ 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , (2q − β)(v + δ) −
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v + δ)− c}.
• If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−β−q+q
2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Part 2: Positive correlation and q < 1/2 The optimal solution is as follows:
• If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and β ≥ q(1−2q)1−q , then R∗UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , (2q − β)(v +
δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and β <
q(1−2q)
1−q , then R
∗
UU = max{v−δ+ c1−q , (2q−β)(v+ δ)−
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v+δ)−c, v−δ+ 1−q1−2q+β c− 2β(q−β)q(1−2q+β)δ+ βq(1−2q+β)c+2δ(q−β)−c}.
• If 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c ≤ δ < c2(q−β) , then R∗UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v + δ)− c}.
• If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−β−q+q
2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Part 3: Negative correlation and q ≥ 1/2 The optimal solution is as follows:
• If δ ≥ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c, (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(2− q)c}.
• If c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ≤ δ < 2−3q+β2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R∗UU = max{(2q − β)(v + δ) −
(2− q)c, v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c}.
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• If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < c2(q−β) (1−q)
2
1−2q+β , then R
∗
UU = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c.
• If c
2(q−β) ≤ δ < c2q(1−q) , then R∗UU = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c.
• If δ ≤ c
2(q−β) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Part 4: Negative correlation and q < 1/2
• Case 1:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + c1−q .
– If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
• Case 2: Upper bound: If δ ≥ 2−q
2(1−q)(2q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(2− q)c.
• Case 3:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = q(v + δ)− c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
• Case 5: Upper bound
– if δ ≤ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
∗
UU ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c.
– if δ ≥ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
∗
UU ≤ RC or R∗UU ≤ min{RA, RB}, where
RA = v − δ − 2β(q−β)
q(1−2q+β)δ +
1−q
1−2q+β c +
β
q(1−2q+β)c + 2δ(q − β)− c, RB =
v+(3q−2β−1)δ+ q(2q−2β−1)
1−q δ+
q2(1−q)
(q−β)(1−2q)c, and R
C = v− δ+ 1−q
1−2q+β c
– We also proved that R∗UU is decreasing in β.
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5.7.3 Optimal Solution of Case (U,C)
Part 1: Positive Correlation
• If δ ≥ max{ c
2(q−β)
q2
β
, c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β}, then R∗UC = max{v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c +
q2
β
c, (2q−β)(v+ δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c+
q2
β
c, q(v+ δ), v− δ+ 1−q
1−2q+β c+2δ(q−β)−
qc,min{(2q−β)(v+δ)− q(1−q)
q−β c, (2q−β)(v+δ)− (2q−β)(1−q)q−β c+2(q−β)δ−qc}}.
• If c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ≤ δ < c2(q−β) q
2
β
(hold only when q ≥ 1/2), then R∗UC =
max{v − δ + 1−q
1−2q+β c + 2(q − β)δ, (2q − β)(v + δ) − (1−q)(2q−β)q−β c + 2(q −
β)δ, q(v + δ)}.
• If c
2(q−β)
q2
β
≤ δ < c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β (hold only when q < 1/2), then R
∗
UC =
max{v − δ + 2(q−β)
1−q δ +
q2
β
c, q(v + δ), v − δ + 2 q−β
1−q δ + 2δ(q − β)− qc}.
• If δ < min{ c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ,
c
2(q−β)
q2
β
} , then R∗UC = max{v− δ+ 2(q−β)1−q δ+2(q−
β)δ, q(v + δ)}.
Part 2: Negative Correlation
• If δ ≥ q−2q2+β
2β(1−2q+β)c, then R
∗
UC = max{v− δ+ 1−q1−2q+β c+ q
2
β
c, (2q− β)(v+ δ)−
(1− q)c, v + δ + (1−q)(1+β−q)
1−2q+β c− 2δ(1 + β − q)}.
• If max{ c
2(q−β)
q2
β
, c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β} ≤ δ ≤ q−2q
2+β
2β(1−2q+β)c, then R
∗
UC = max{v+(2q−
1)δ + (1−q)
2
1−2q+β c, (2q − β)(v + δ)− (1− q)c}.
• If c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ≤ δ < c2(q−β) q
2
β
, then R∗UC = max{v+(2q−1)δ+ (1−q)
2
1−2q+β c, (2q−
β)(v + δ)− (1− q)c}.
• If c
2(q−β)
q2
β
≤ δ < c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β , then R
∗
UC = v + (2q − 1)δ + 2(q − β)δ.
• If δ ≤ min{ c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ,
c
2(q−β)
q2
β
}, then R∗UC = v + (2q − 1)δ + 2(q − β)δ.
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5.7.4 Optimal Solution of Case (C,C)
R∗CC = max{(q − β)(v + δ) + (1− q + β)(v − δ), (2q − β)(v + δ)}.
5.7.5 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas in Section 5.7.1
In this section, we will prove all the results stated in Subsection 5.7.1.
Proof of Theorem 5G. We first consider the case when δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) . In this
case, we have the following.
• If p ≤ v− δ+ c
1−q , then wb(p) ≥ max{ws(p), 0}. Thus a(p) = b. That is, the
customers’ optimal action is to purchase directly without search.
• If v − δ + c
1−q < p ≤ v + δ − cq , then ws(p) > wb(p) and ws(p) ≥ 0. Thus
a(p) = s. That is, the customers’ optimal action is to search the product.
• If p > v + δ − c
q
, then 0 > max{wb(p), ws(p)}. Thus a(p) = 0. That is, the
customers’ optimal action is to leave without purchase.
Therefore, when δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , we have
r(p) =


p if p ≤ v − δ + c
1−q
q · p if v − δ + c
1−q < p ≤ v + δ − cq
0 if p > v + δ − c
q
.
Maximizing over p, we obtain
p∗ =

 v − δ +
c
1−q if v − δ + c1−q > q(v + δ − cq )
v + δ − c
q
if v − δ + c
1−q ≤ q(v + δ − cq )
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and
r(p∗) =

 v − δ +
c
1−q if v − δ + c1−q > q(v + δ − cq )
q(v + δ − c
q
) if v − δ + c
1−q ≤ q(v + δ − cq )
Further, we note that δ < 1−q
1+q
v+ 2−q
1−q2 c is equivalent to v− δ+ c1−q > q(v+ δ− cq ).
Therefore, parts 1 and 2 of the theorem are proved.
Next we consider the case where δ < c
2q(1−q) . In this case, we have:
• If p ≤ v + (2q − 1)δ, then wb(p) ≥ max{ws(p), 0}. Thus a(p) = b. That is,
the customers’ optimal action is to purchase directly without search.
• If p > v + (2q − 1)δ , then 0 > max{wb(p), ws(p)}. Thus a(p) = 0. That is,
the customers’ optimal action is to leave without purchase.
Hence, p∗ = v+(2q−1)δ and r(p∗) = v+(2q−1)δ. This completes the proof. 
Next I will introduce Lemma 15, Lemma 16, and Lemma 17. They will be
used to prove Proposition 14G and Proposition 15G.
Lemma 15. If β = q2, then the optimal solution in case (U, U) is as follows:
1. If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) and q ≥ 3−
√
5
2
, then R∗UU = max{v− δ+ c1−q , q(2− q)(v+ δ)−
(2− q)c}.
2. If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) and q <
3−√5
2
, then R∗UU = max{v− δ+ c(1−q)2 − 2q
2
1−qδ+2q(1−
q)δ − c, q(2− q)(v + δ)− (2− q)c}.
3. If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Proof. We put β = q2 into the optimal solution in Part 1 in Section 5.7.2, we get
that if q ≥ 1
2
,
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• If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = max{v− δ+ c1−q , q(2− q)(v+ δ)− (2− q)c, q(v+
δ)− c}.
• If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
We put β = q2 into the optimal solution in Part 2 in Section 5.7.2, we get that
if q < 1
2
,
• If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) and q ≥ 3−
√
5
2
, then R∗UU = max{v− δ + c1−q , q(2− q)(v+ δ)−
(2− q)c, q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) and q <
3−√5
2
, then R∗UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , v − δ + c(1−q)2 −
2q2
1−qδ + 2q(1− q)δ − c, q(2− q)(v + δ)− (2− q)c, q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Next, we will combine the solutions when q ≥ 1
2
and when q < 1
2
. Note that
q(2− q)(v + δ)− (2− q)c− [q(v + δ)− c]
= (q − q2)(v + δ)− (1− q)c
≥ q(1− q)2δ − (1− q)c (by v ≥ δ)
= (1− q)(2qδ − c)
≥ 0 (by δ ≥ c
2q(1− q)).
Therefore, q(v + δ) − c is kicked out of the optimal solution when δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) .
Hence, part 1 is proved.
To prove part 2, it suffices to show
v − δ + c
(1− q)2 −
2q2
1− q δ + 2q(1− q)δ − c− [v − δ +
c
1− q ]
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=
c
(1− q)2 −
c
1− q −
2q2
1− q δ + 2q(1− q)δ − c
=
−1 + 3q − q2
(1− q)2 c+
2q(1− 3q + q2)
1− q δ
=
1− 3q + q2
1− q (2qδ −
c
1− q )
≥ 0 (by δ ≥ c
2q(1− q)).
It is apparent that part 3 holds. Then proved.
Lemma 16. If β = q2, then the optimal solution in case (U,C) is as follows:
1. If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UC = max{q(2− q)(v + δ)− (1− q)c, (q2 + 1− q)(v −
δ + c
1−q ) + q(1− q)(v + δ), v − δ + 2−q1−qc}.
2. Otherwise, R∗UC = v − δ + 2qδ + 2q(1− q)δ.
Lemma 17. If β = q2, then the optimal solution in case (C,C) is R∗CC =
max{q(2− q)(v + δ), (q2 + 1− q)(v − δ) + q(1− q)(v + δ)}.
Proof of Proposition 14G. It is easy to see
v − δ + c
1− q < v − δ +
2− q
1− q c,
q(2− q)(v + δ)− (2− q)c < q(2− q)(v + δ)− (1− q)c.
Therefore, R∗UU ≤ R∗UC if δ ≥ c2q(1−q) and q ≥ 3−
√
5
2
.
Note that
v − δ + c
(1− q)2 −
2q2
1− q δ + 2q(1− q)δ − c
− [(q2 + 1− q)(v − δ + c
1− q ) + q(1− q)(v + δ)]
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= v − δ + c
(1− q)2 −
2q2
1− q δ + 2q(1− q)δ − c
− [v − δ + 2qδ − 2q2δ + q
2 + 1− q
1− q c]
=
4q − 3q2 − 1 + q3
(1− q)2 c−
2q2
1− q δ
≤ 4q − 3q
2 − 1 + q3
(1− q)2 c−
q
(1− q)2 c (by δ ≥
c
2q(1− q))
=
(q − 1)3
(1− q)2 c
≤ 0.
Hence R∗UU ≤ R∗UC if δ ≥ c2q(1−q) and q < 3−
√
5
2
.
Clearly, R∗UU ≤ R∗UC if δ < c2q(1−q) . Then proved. 
Proof of Proposition 15G. We first consider when δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) . It is easy to
see
q(2− q)(v + δ)− (1− q)c ≤ q(2− q)(v + δ),
(q2 + 1− q)(v − δ + c
1− q ) + q(1− q)(v + δ)
≥ (q2 + 1− q)(v − δ) + q(1− q)(v + δ).
Hence, R∗CC ≥ R∗UC if and only if q(2−q)(v+ δ) ≥ max{(q2+1−q)(v−δ+ c1−q )+
q(1− q)(v+ δ), v− δ+ 2−q
1−qc}, from which we derive δ ≥ θ. Thus, part 1 is proved.
Next, we study when δ < c
2q(1−q) . We have
v − δ + 2qδ + 2q(1− q)δ − [q(2− q)(v + δ)]
= (1− 2q + q2)v − (1− 2q + q2)δ
= (1− q)2(v − δ) ≥ 0
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v − δ + 2qδ + 2q(1− q)δ − [(q2 + 1− q)(v − δ) + q(1− q)(v + δ)]
= v − δ + 2qδ + 2q(1− q)δ − [v + (2q − 2q2 − 1)δ]
= 2qδ ≥ 0.
Therefore, R∗CC < R
∗
UC if δ <
c
2q(1−q) . Then proved. 
Proof of Proposition 16G. If p∗1 = p
∗
2, then group 1 customers’ optimal action
is to buy product 2, and group 2 customers’ optimal action is to buy product 1.
And it is easy to figure out p∗1 = p
∗
2 = v+(2q2−1)δ, and R∗UC = qp2+(1− q)p1 =
v + (2q2 − 1)δ.
Next I will show there exists a price vector (p′1, p
′
2) in which p
′
1 = v+(2q2−1)δ
and p′2 > p
′
1 such that customers behavior is the same as above. Then we
have r(p′1, p
′
2) > R
∗
UC . Through some analysis, it suffices to show w
1
b2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) >
max{w1a(p∗1, p∗2), a ∈ {b1, sb, s0, 0}} and w2b1(p∗1, p∗2) > max{w2a(p∗1, p∗2), a ∈
{b2, sb, s0, 0}}. It is easy to see
v − p∗2 + δ − [v − p∗1 + (2q1 − 1)δ] > 0,
v − p∗2 + δ − [−c+ q1(v − p∗1 + δ) + (1− q1)(v − p∗2 + δ)] > 0,
v − p∗2 + δ − [−c+ q1(v − p∗1 + δ)] > 0,
v − p∗2 + δ − 0 > 0.
Thus, increasing p∗2 can still guarantee group 1’s customer buy product 2. That
is, w1b2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) > max{w1a(p∗1, p∗2), a ∈ {b1, sb, s0, 0}}.
Also, we have
v − p∗1 + (2q2 − 1)δ − [v − p2 − δ] > 0,
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v − p∗1 + (2q2 − 1)δ − [−c+ q2(v − p∗1 + δ) + (1− q2)(v − p∗2 − δ)] > 0,
v − p∗1 + (2q2 − 1)δ − [−c+ q2(v − p∗1 + δ)] > 0,
v − p∗1 + (2q2 − 1)δ − 0 > 0.
Thus, increasing p∗2 can still guarantee group 2’s customer buy product 1. That
is, w2b1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) > max{w2a(p∗1, p∗2), a ∈ {b2, sb, s0, 0}}. This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 17G and Proposition 18G. They immediately follows
Proposition 15G. 
Proof of Proposition 19G. It is easy to see that if δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , R
∗
UU ≥ R∗UC if
and only if v − δ + c
1−q ≥ q(v + δ), from which we derive δ < 1−q1+qv + 11−q2 c. Thus
part 1 is proved. And part 2 holds clearly. Then proved. 
Proof of Lemma 14G. Problem 5.6 can be written into several linear
optimization problems. We first solve
max{p1}
s.t. p2 − p1 ≥ 2(1− 2q)δ,
p2 − p1 ≥ 2δ − c
1− q ,
p1 ≤ v + (2q − 1)δ,
and get R(p∗) = v + (2q − 1)δ.
We then solve
max{p2}
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s.t. p1 − p2 ≥ 2(2q − 1)δ,
p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ − c
q
,
p2 ≤ v + (1− 2q)δ
and get R(p∗) = v + (1− 2q)δ.
We next solve
max{qp1 + (1− q)p2}
s.t. p2 − p1 ≤ 2δ − c
1− q ,
p2 − p1 ≥ −2δ + c
q
,
qp1 + (1− q)p2 ≤ v + δ − c,
and get R(p∗) = v + δ − c if δ ≥ c
4q(1−q) and infeasible otherwise.
By comparing these three possible optimal solutions, we arrive the conclusion.

Proof of Proposition 20G. Compare the optimal solution of each case, and
it is easy to see this proposition holds. 
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5.8 Supplemental Material
5.8.1 Optimal Solution of Case (U, U)
Solving UU
Here we solve the optimization problem in scenario (U, U). That is, we wish
to solve for R∗UU = max
p∈P2
R(p) = max
p1≤p2
R(p). To do so, we solve for RaUU ≡
max
p∈P2
{R(p|a(p)) : p1 ≤ p2, a(p) = a} for each a ∈ A. Then R∗UU = max
a∈A
RaUU .
Note that the constraint a(p) = a can be written as wa(p) ≥ wa′(p) for all
a′ ∈ A \ {a}.
By assuming p∗1 ≤ p∗2, the customers’ action set is A = {b, ss, s0, 0, sb} if
q ≥ 1/2, and A = {b, ss, s0, 0,−sb} if q < 1/2. Next, we obtain RaUU for each
action a ∈ A. In a few cases, we will not be able to compute RaUU exactly.
However, in those cases we will find bounds on RaUU which will allow us to reach
our ultimate goal of solving for R∗UU .
Case 1: a(p) = b. Then,
max
p
p1
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s.t.


wb(p) ≥ wss(p)⇒ (1− q)p1 − (q − β)p2 ≤ (1− 2q + β)v − (1− β)δ
+ (2− q)c
wb(p) ≥ ws0(p)⇒ p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q
wb(p) ≥ wsb(p)⇒ p2 − p1 ≥ 2q − β
1− q δ −
c
1− q (if q ≥
1
2
)
wb(p) ≥ w−sb(p)⇒ p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ(q − β) + c
q
(if q <
1
2
)
wb(p) ≥ w0(p)⇒ p1 ≤ v + (2q − 1)δ
p1 ≤ p2
It is easy to see the optimal solution in Case 1 is
• if δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q , and RbUU = v − δ + c1−q .
• if δ < c
2q(1−q) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2qδ, and RbUU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Case 2: a(p) = ss. Then,
max
p
qp1 + (q − β)p2
Subcase 2.1: q ≥ 1
2
s.t.


wss(p) ≥ wb(p)⇒ (1− q)p1 − (q − β)p2 ≥ (1− 2q + β)v − (1− β)δ
+ (2− q)c
wss(p) ≥ ws0(p)⇒ p2 ≤ v + δ − 1− q
q − β c
wss(p) ≥ wsb(p)⇒ p2 ≥ v − δ + 1− q
1− 2q + β c
wss(p) ≥ w0(p)⇒ qp1 + (q − β)p2 ≤ (2q − β)(v + δ)− (2− q)c
p1 ≤ p2
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Sub-subcase 2.1.1: β ≥ q2 We first study the situation when the features are
positively correlated, that is, β ≥ q2. We draw a graph of the feasible region
in Figure 5.6. In this figure, we define the following price vectors:
Figure 5.6: q ≥ 1
2
and positive correlation
A : pA1 = p
A
2 = v + δ −
1− q
q − β c
B : pB1 = v + δ −
c
q
, pB2 = v + δ −
1− q
q − β c
C : pC1 = v − δ +
c
1− q , p
C
2 = v + δ −
1− q
q − β c
We can easily see that β ≥ q2 implies pA1 ≤ pB1 (so point B lies to the right of
point A in Figure 5.6). Moreover, only if pC1 ≤ pA1 , then there is a feasible option.
Thus, a necessary condition is pC1 ≤ pA1 which can be written as δ ≥ 1−β−q+q
2
2(1−q)(q−β)c.
(Note that when this condition holds, v−δ+ 1−q
1−2q+β c ≤ v+δ− 1−qq−β c automatically
holds.) Hence, the optimal solution in Sub-subcase 2.1.1 is
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• If δ ≥ 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 = v + δ − 1−qq−β c, and RssUU = (2q − β)(v +
δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c.
• Otherwise, infeasible.
Sub-subcase 2.1.2: β < q2 Next, we study the negative correlation problem. That
is, β ≤ q2. We draw a graph of the feasible region in Figure 5.7. Note that point
A is to the right of point B. In this figure, we define the following price vectors:
Figure 5.7: q ≥ 1
2
and negative correlation
D : pD1 = p
D
2 = v + δ −
2− q
2q − β c
E : pE1 = p
E
2 = v −
1− β
1− 2q + β δ +
2− q
1− 2q + β c
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It is easy to see that only if pE1 ≤ pD1 , then there is a feasible solution. Note also
that pE1 ≤ pD1 ⇔ δ ≥ 2−q2(1−q)(2q−β)c. Moreover, v + δ − 1−qq−β c ≥ v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c ⇔
δ ≥ c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β . Thus, the optimal solution in Sub-subcase 2.1.2 is
• If δ ≥ max{ 2−q
2(1−q)(2q−β)c,
c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β}, then p∗1 = p∗2 = v + δ − 2−q2q−β c and
RssUU = (2q − β)(v + δ)− (2− q)c.
• Otherwise, infeasible.
Subcase 2.2: q < 1/2
s.t.


wss(p) ≥ wb(p)⇒ (1− q)p1 − (q − β)p2 ≥ (1− 2q + β)v − (1− β)δ
+ (2− q)c
wss(p) ≥ ws0(p)⇒ p2 ≤ v + δ − 1− q
q − β c
wss(p) ≥ w−sb(p)⇒ (1− 2q)p1 + βp2 ≥ (1− 2q + β)(v − δ) + (1− q)c
.......(∗)
wss(p) ≥ w0(p)⇒ qp1 + (q − β)p2 ≤ (2q − β)(v + δ)− (2− q)c
p1 ≤ p2
Sub-subcase 2.2.1: β ≥ q2 We first study the situation when the features are
positively correlated, that is, β ≥ q2. Compared with the constraints when q ≥ 1
2
in Sub-subcase 2.1.1, we find that the only difference is p2 ≥ v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c
is replaced by (∗). Note that p2 ≥ v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c is not tight for the optimal
solution in Sub-subcase 2.1.1. We put the optimal solution for Sub-subcase 2.1.1
into (∗), and find that if δ ≥ 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c then (∗) holds. Hence, the optimal
solution when q < 1
2
is the same as that when q ≥ 1
2
. Therefore, the optimal
solution in Sub-subcase 2.2.1 is
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• If δ ≥ 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 = v + δ − 1−qq−β c, and RssUU = (2q − β)(v +
δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c.
• Otherwise, infeasible.
Sub-subcase 2.2.2: β < q2 Now, we study the negative correlation problem. That
is, β ≤ q2. This subproblem becomes more complicated than that when q ≥ 1
2
.
Here, we will establish some upper bound on RssUU instead of the exact solution.
By the analysis of Sub-subcase 2.1.2, we can get the following upper bound in
Sub-subcase 2.2.2.
• If δ ≥ 2−q
2(1−q)(2q−β)c, then either R
ss
UU ≤ (2q−β)(v+δ)−(2−q)c, or infeasible.
Case 3: a(p) = s0. Then,
max
p
qp1
s.t.


ws0(p) ≥ wb(p)⇒ p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q
ws0(p) ≥ wss(p)⇒ p2 ≥ v + δ − 1− q
q − β c
ws0(p) ≥ wsb(p)⇒ p2 ≥ v + (2q − β
1− q − 1)δ (if q ≥
1
2
)
ws0(p) ≥ w−sb(p)⇒ (1− 2q)p1 + qp2 ≥ (1− q)v + (3q − 2β − 1)δ
(if q <
1
2
)
ws0(p) ≥ w0(p)⇒ p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q
p1 ≤ p2
It is easy to see the optimal solution in Case 3 is
• if δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq , and Rs0UU = q(v + δ)− c.
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• otherwise, infeasible.
Case 4: q ≥ 1
2
and a(p) = sb. Recall that sb ∈ A if and only if q ≥ 1/2. Then,
max
p
qp1 + (1− q)p2
s.t.


wsb(p) ≥ wb(p)⇒ p2 − p1 ≤ 2(q − β)
1− q δ −
c
1− q ......(∗)
wsb(p) ≥ wss(p)⇒ p2 ≤ v − δ + 1− q
1− 2q + β c
wsb(p) ≥ ws0(p)⇒ p2 ≤ v + (2q − β
1− q − 1)δ
wsb(p) ≥ w0(p)⇒ qp1 + (1− q)p2 ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c......(+)
p1 ≤ p2 ......(∗∗)
By (∗) and (∗∗), we have that only if δ ≥ c
2(q−β) , there is a feasible solution.
Subcase 4.1: β ≥ q2 We first study the positive correlation problem. That is,
β ≥ q2. With δ ≥ c
2(q−β) , we have v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c ≤ v + (2 q−β1−q − 1)δ. We draw a
graph of the feasible region in Figure 5.8.
A : pA1 = p
A
2 = v − δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c
B : pB1 = v − δ +
4q − 2β
q
δ − c
q
− (1− q)
2
q(1− 2q + β)c, p
B
2 = v − δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c.
We can show pA1 ≤ pB1 if β ≥ q2 and δ ≥ c2(q−β) . Therefore, the optimal solution
in Subcase 4.1 is
• if δ ≥ c
2(q−β) , then p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c, and RsbUU = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c.
• otherwise, infeasible.
Subcase 4.2: β < q2 Next, we study the negative correlation problem. That is,
β < q2. Again, by (∗) and (∗∗), we must have δ ≥ c
2(q−β) for feasibility. When
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Figure 5.8: Case 4: q ≥ 1
2
δ ≥ (1−q)2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c, we have v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c ≤ v + (2 q−β1−q − 1)δ. And we find that
pA1 ≤ pB1 if δ ≥ 2−3q+β2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, and pA1 > pB1 otherwise.
Since 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c ≥ (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c, the optimal solution when δ ≥
(1−q)2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c in Subcase 4.2 is
• if δ ≥ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 = R
sb
UU = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c.
• if (1−q)2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c ≤ δ < 2−3q+β2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then line qp1 + (1 − q)p2 = v +
(4q − 2β − 1)δ − c cuts the shaded region in Figure 5.8, and the optimal
pricing solution lies on the intersection of the line and the region, and RsbUU =
v+(4q−2β−1)δ−c. To understand this, note that the left-side of constraint
(+) is the same as the objective function.
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When c
2(q−β) ≤ δ < (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c ≥ v + (2 q−β1−q − 1)δ.
A : pA1 = p
A
2 = v + (2
q − β
1− q − 1)δ
B : pB1 = v + δ −
c
q
, pB2 = v + (2
q − β
1− q − 1)δ.
We can show that pB1 ≤ pA1 if β ≤ q2 and δ < (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c. Therefore, the
optimal solution when δ < (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c in Subcase 4.2 is
• if c
2(q−β) ≤ δ < (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then the optimal pricing solution is an interval
on the line qp1 + (1 − q)p2 = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c, and RsbUU = v + (4q −
2β − 1)δ − c.
• if δ < c
2(q−β) , then infeasible.
Putting the four bullets above together, we get the optimal solution for negative
correlation in Subcase 4.2.
Case 5: q < 1/2 and a(p) = −sb.
max
p
qp2 + (1− q)p1
s.t.


w−sb(p) ≥ wb(p)⇒ p1 − p2 ≥ c
q
− 2δ(q − β)
q
w−sb(p) ≥ wss(p)⇒ (1− 2q)p1 + βp2 ≤ (1− 2q + β)(v − δ) + (1− q)c
......(∗)
w−sb(p) ≥ ws0(p)⇒ (1− 2q)p1 + qp2 ≤ (1− q)v + (3q − 2β − 1)δ
w−sb(p) ≥ w0(p)⇒ (1− q)p1 + qp2 ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c ......(∗∗)
p1 ≤ p2
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By w−sb(p) ≥ wb(p) and p1 ≤ p2, we have that δ ≥ c2(q−β) is necessary condition
for a feasible solution.
Subcase 5.1: β ≥ q2 We first study the positive correlation case. That is, β ≥ q2.
We draw a graph of the feasible region in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: Case 5 with positive correlation (Subcase 5.1)
A : pA1 = v − δ −
2β(q − β)
q(1− 2q + β)δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c+
β
q(1− 2q + β)c
C : pC1 = v − δ +
c
1− q
E : pE1 = v − δ + 2qδ
By δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and β ≥ q2, we have pA1 ≤ pC1 ≤ pE1 .
B : pB1 = v − δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c
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D : pD1 = v +
3q − 2β − 1
1− q δ
F : pF1 = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c
Again, we have pB1 ≤ pD1 ≤ pF1 . Hence, the feasible region is as shown in Figure
5.9, and the optimal solution is either point B or point A, depending on the slopes
of constraint (∗) and (∗∗). The optimal solution in Subcase 5.1 is as follows,
• If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) .
– If 1−2q
β
≤ 1−q
q
, then point B is optimal and p∗1 = p
∗
2 = R
−sb
UU = v − δ +
1−q
1−2q+β c.
– If 1−2q
β
> 1−q
q
, then point A is optimal and p∗1 = v − δ − 2β(q−β)q(1−2q+β)δ +
1−q
1−2q+β c+
β
q(1−2q+β)c, p
∗
2 = p
∗
1 +
2δ(q−β)
q
− c
q
, R−sbUU = v− δ− 2β(q−β)q(1−2q+β)δ +
1−q
1−2q+β c+
β
q(1−2q+β)c+ 2δ(q − β)− c.
• Otherwise, infeasible.
Subcase 5.2: β < q2 Next, we consider the negative correlation case. It is too
complex to characterize the optimal solution completely. However, we are able
to (i) derive bounds which can be used to compare with R∗UC , and (ii) show that
R−sbUU is decreasing with β if p2 ≥ v − δ.
We do part (i) first. It is easy to see R−sbUU ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c by (∗∗).
However, this upper bound is not good enough for our purposes. We derive some
other tighter bounds. We draw a graph of the feasible region in Figure 5.10.
A : pA1 = v − δ −
2β(q − β)
q(1− 2q + β)δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c +
β
q(1− 2q + β)c,
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Figure 5.10: Case 5 with negative correlation (Subcase 5.2)
pA2 = p
A
1 +
2δ(q − β)
q
− c
q
,
R(pA| − sb) = v − δ − 2β(q − β)
q(1− 2q + β)δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c+
β
q(1− 2q + β)c
+ 2δ(q − β)− c.
G : pG1 = v +
2q − 2β − 1
1− 2q δ +
q(1− q)
(q − β)(1− 2q)c, p
G
2 = v + δ −
1− q
q − β c,
R(pG| − sb) = v + (3q − 2β − 1)δ + q(2q − 2β − 1)
1− 2q δ +
q2(1− q)
(q − β)(1− 2q)c.
B : pB1 = p
B
2 = R(p
B| − sb) = v − δ + 1− q
1− 2q + β c.
Through some analysis, we can show either R−sbUU ≤ R(pB| − sb) or R−sbUU ≤
min{R(pA| − sb), R(pG| − sb)}. Now we have the following upper bounds for
Subcase 5.2:
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• R−sbUU ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c.
• Either R−sbUU ≤ R(pB| − sb) or R−sbUU ≤ min{R(pA| − sb), R(pG| − sb)}.
In the future, we will use those upper bounds to compare R∗UU with R
∗
UC . We
will use the first bullet above if δ ≤ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c and we use the second bullet
otherwise.
Next, we do part (ii). Suppose β1 ≤ β2 and p2 ≥ v − δ. We use
(p∗1(βi), p
∗
2(βi), R
−sb
UU (βi)) to denote the optimal revenue and pricing solution when
β = βi. Then, we want to show R
−sb
UU (β1) ≥ R−sbUU (β2).
The idea is to show (p∗1(β2), p
∗
2(β2)) is a feasible solution when β = β1. We
need to verify (p∗1(β2), p
∗
2(β2)) satisfies all the constraints when β = β1.
For the first constraint,
p∗1(β2)− p∗2(β2) ≥
c
q
− 2δ(q − β2)
q
≥ c
q
− 2δ(q − β1)
q
.
Let’s rewrite the second constraint as (1 − 2q)p1 ≤ (1 − 2q)(v − δ) + β(v − δ −
p2) + (1− q)c. Since p2 ≥ v − δ, we have v − δ − p2 ≤ 0. Thus,
(1− 2q)p∗1(β2) ≤ (1− 2q)(v − δ) + β2(v − δ − p∗2(β2)) + (1− q)c
≤ (1− 2q)(v − δ) + β1(v − δ − p∗2(β2)) + (1− q)c
For the third constraint,
(1− 2q)p∗1(β2) + qp∗2(β2) ≤ (1− q)v+ (3q− 2β2− 1)δ ≤ (1− q)v+ (3q− 2β1− 1)δ.
For the fourth constraint,
(1− q)p∗1(β2) + qp∗2(β2) ≤ v + (4q − 2β2 − 1)δ − c ≤ v + (4q − 2β1 − 1)δ − c.
Therefore, R−sbUU (β1) ≥ R−sbUU (β2).
Case 6: a(p) = 0. Then the optimal solution for Case 6 is
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• R0UU = 0.
Summary
Part 1: Positive correlation (β ≥ q2) and q ≥ 1/2
• Case 1:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
b
UU = v − δ + c1−q .
– If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
b
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
• Case 2:
– If δ ≥ 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
ss
UU = (2q − β)(v + δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)q−β c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
• Case 3:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
s0
UU = q(v + δ)− c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
• Case 4:
– If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) , then R
sb
UU = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
We have v−δ+ 1−q
1−2q+β c ≤ v−δ+ c1−q (by β ≥ q2), hence Case 4 is not optimal.
Therefore, the optimal solution for β ≥ q2 and q ≥ 1/2 is
• If δ ≥ 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , (2q − β)(v + δ) −
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v + δ)− c}.
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• If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−β−q+q
2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Part 2: Positive correlation (β ≥ q2) and q < 1/2
• Case 1, 2, and 3 is the same as Part 1.
• Case 5:
– If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and q(1− 2q) ≤ β(1− q), then R−sbUU = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c.
– If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and q(1− 2q) > β(1− q), then R−sbUU = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c−
2β(q−β)
q(1−2q+β)δ +
β
q(1−2q+β)c + 2δ(q − β)− c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
Note that v−δ+ 1−q
1−2q+β c ≤ v−δ+ c1−q . So Case 5 is not optimal if q(1−2q) ≤
β(1 − q). We now have that the optimal solution for β ≥ q2 and q < 1/2 is as
follows:
• If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and β ≥ q(1−2q)1−q , then R∗UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , (2q − β)(v +
δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v + δ)− c}.
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• If δ ≥ c
2(q−β) and β <
q(1−2q)
1−q , then R
∗
UU = max{v−δ+ c1−q , (2q−β)(v+ δ)−
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v+δ)−c, v−δ+ 1−q1−2q+β c− 2β(q−β)q(1−2q+β)δ+ βq(1−2q+β)c+2δ(q−β)−c}.
• If 1−β−q+q2
2(1−q)(q−β)c ≤ δ < c2(q−β) , then R∗UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c, q(v + δ)− c}.
• If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < 1−β−q+q
2
2(1−q)(q−β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + c1−q , q(v + δ)− c}.
• If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Part 3: Negative correlation (β < q2) and q ≥ 1/2
• Case 1:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
b
UU = v − δ + c1−q .
– If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
b
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
• Case 2:
– If δ ≥ c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β , then R
ss
UU = (2q − β)(v + δ)− (2− q)c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
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• Case 3:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
s0
UU = q(v + δ)− c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
• Case 4:
– if δ ≥ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
sb
UU = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c.
– if (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c ≤ δ < 2−3q+β2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then RsbUU = v + (4q − 2β −
1)δ − c.
– if c
2(q−β) ≤ δ < (1−q)
2
2(q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
sb
UU = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c.
Before we introduce the optimal solution, let’s make several comparisons.
(Note that β ≤ q2 and v ≥ δ)
v − δ + c
1− q ≤ v − δ +
1− q
1− 2q + β c (5.8)
q(v + δ)− c ≤ (2q − β)(v + δ)− (2− q)c if δ ≥ c
2(q − β)
(1− q)2
1− 2q + β (5.9)
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v − δ + c
1− q ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c if δ ≥
2− q
2(1− q)(2q − β)c (5.10)
q(v + δ)− c ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c (5.11)
v − δ + 2qδ ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c if δ ≥ c
2(q − β) (5.12)
The optimal solution for β < q2 and q ≥ 1/2 is as follows:
• If δ ≥ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
∗
UU = max{v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c, (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(2− q)c} (By (5.8) and (5.9)).
• If c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ≤ δ < 2−3q+β2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R∗UU = max{(2q − β)(v + δ) −
(2− q)c, v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c} (By (5.9) and (5.10)).
• If c
2q(1−q) ≤ δ < c2(q−β) (1−q)
2
1−2q+β , then R
∗
UU = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c (by (5.10)
and (5.11)).
• If c
2(q−β) ≤ δ < c2q(1−q) , then R∗UU = v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c (by (5.12)).
• If δ ≤ c
2(q−β) , then R
∗
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
Part 4: Negative correlation (β < q2) and q < 1/2
• Case 1:
– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
b
UU = v − δ + c1−q .
– If δ < c
2q(1−q) , then R
b
UU = v − δ + 2qδ.
• Case 2: Upper bound: If δ ≥ 2−q
2(1−q)(2q−β)c, then R
ss
UU = (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(2− q)c.
• Case 3:
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– If δ ≥ c
2q(1−q) , then R
s0
UU = q(v + δ)− c.
– Otherwise, infeasible.
• Case 5: Upper bound
– if δ ≤ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
−sb
UU ≤ v + (4q − 2β − 1)δ − c.
– if δ ≥ 2−3q+β
2(2q−β)(1−2q+β)c, then R
−sb
UU ≤ RB or R−sbUU ≤ min{RA, RG}, where
RA = v − δ − 2β(q−β)
q(1−2q+β)δ +
1−q
1−2q+β c +
β
q(1−2q+β)c + 2δ(q − β)− c, RG =
v+(3q−2β−1)δ+ q(2q−2β−1)
1−q δ+
q2(1−q)
(q−β)(1−2q)c, and R
B = v−δ+ 1−q
1−2q+β c.
– We also proved that R−sbUU is decreasing in β in this case.
5.8.2 Optimal Solution of Case (U,C)
Solving (U,C)
Customers’ action set A = {b2, b1, sb, s0, 0}. For the convenience of presentation,
we will refer to b2 as action 1, b1 as action 2, sb as action 3, s0 as action 4, and 0
as action 5. We use case i+ j to denote the case that group 1 customers’ optimal
action is i and group 2 customers’ optimal action is j. It is easy to see there are
25 cases. Next, we will go over them one by one.
Case 1+1 (b2 + b2):
max
p
qp2 + (1− q)p2 = p2
s.t.


v − p2 + δ ≥ v − p1 + (2q1 − 1)δ
v − p2 + δ ≥ −c+ q1(v − p1 + δ) + (1− q1)(v − p2 + δ)
v − p2 + δ ≥ −c+ q1(v − p1 + δ)
v − p2 + δ ≥ 0
164

v − p2 − δ ≥ v − p1 + (2q2 − 1)δ
v − p2 − δ ≥ −c + q2(v − p1 + δ) + (1− q2)(v − p2 − δ)
v − p2 − δ ≥ −c + q2(v − p1 + δ)
v − p2 − δ ≥ 0
⇒
max
p
qp2 + (1− q)p2 = p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≥ − c
q1
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≤ v + δ

p1 − p2 ≥ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ − c
q2
q2p1 − p2 ≥ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p2 ≤ v − δ
Note that we write these constraints separately because we can copy either
part when we study the other cases. The first group of bracketed constraints deal
with group 1 customers. The second deal with group 2 customers. The optimal
solution has to satisfy all eight constraints.
It is easy to see the optimal solution is

p∗2 = v − δ
r∗1,1 = v − δ
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Case 1+2 (b2 + b1):
max
p
qp2 + (1− q)p1
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≥ − c
q1
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≤ v + δ

p1 − p2 ≤ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≤ c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q2δ
⇒ s.t.

max{−2(1− q1)δ,− c
q1
} ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ min{2q2δ, c
1− q2}
p1 ≤ min{v − δ + c
1− q2 , v − δ + 2q2δ}
p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
(i) Suppose positive correlation. That is, β ≥ q2 ⇒ q1 ≥ q2. The optimal
solution is as follows:
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , p∗2 = v − δ + c1−q2 + cq1 , r∗1,2 =
v − δ + 1−q
1−2q+β c+
q2
β
c.
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• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , p∗2 = v − δ + c1−q2 + 2(1 − q1)δ,
r∗1,2 = v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c+ 2(q − β)δ.
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q2δ, p∗2 = v − δ + 2q2δ + cq1 , r∗1,2 =
v − δ + 2 q−β
1−q δ +
q2
β
c.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q2δ, p∗2 = v − δ + 2q2δ + 2(1 − q1)δ,
r∗1,2 = v − δ + 2 q−β1−q δ + 2(q − β)δ.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. That is, β < q2 ⇒ q1 < q2. The optimal
solution is as follows:
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q2 ,
p∗2 =


v + δ if δ ≤ c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
v − δ + c
1− q2 +
c
q1
if δ >
c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
,
r∗1,2 =


v + (2q − 1)δ + (1− q)
2
1− 2q + β c if δ ≤
c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
v − δ + 1− q
1− 2q + β c+
q2
β
c if δ >
c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v−δ+ c1−q2 , p∗2 = v+δ, r∗1,2 = v+(2q−1)δ+
(1−q)2
1−2q+β c.
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v− δ+2q2δ, p∗2 = v+ δ, r∗1,2 = v+(2q−1)δ+2(q−β)δ.
Case 1+3 (b2 + sb):
max
p
qp2 + (1− q)[q2p1 + (1− q2)p2] = (1− q + β)p2 + (q − β)p1
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s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≥ − c
q1
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≤ v + δ

p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ − c
q2
p1 − p2 ≥ c
1− q2
p2 ≤ v − δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≤ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
⇒
s.t.


max{−2(1− q1)δ,− c
q1
,
c
1− q2} ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ −
c
q2
p2 ≤ v − δ
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≤ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
The optimal solution is as follows,
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v+δ− cq2 , p∗2 = v−δ, r∗1,3 = v+(2q−2β−1)δ− (1−q)c.
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , infeasible.
Case 1+4 (b2 + s0):
max
p
qp2 + (1− q)q2p1 = qp2 + (q − β)p1
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s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≥ − c
q1
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≤ v + δ

q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q2
p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q2
⇒
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ max{−2(1− q1)δ,− c
q1
}
v − δ ≤ p2 ≤ v + δ
v − δ + c
1− q2 ≤ p1 ≤ v + δ −
c
q2
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
(i) Suppose positive correlation. That is, β ≥ q2 ⇒ q1 ≥ q2. The optimal
solution is as follows.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v+ δ− cq2 , p∗2 = v+ δ− cq2 + cq1 , r∗1,4 = (2q−β)(v+
δ)− q(1−q)
q−β c− (1− q)c+ q
2
β
c.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq2 , p∗2 = v + δ − cq2 + 2(1 − q1)δ, r∗1,4 =
(2q − β)(v + δ)− q(1−q)
q−β c− (1− q)c+ 2(q − β)δ.
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If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , then infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. That is, β < q2 ⇒ q1 < q2. The optimal
solution is as follows.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ− cq2 , p∗2 = v + δ, r∗1,4 = (2q− β)(v + δ)− (1− q)c.
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , then infeasible.
Case 1+5 (b2 + 0):
max
p
qp2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≥ − c
q1
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≤ v + δ

p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≥ v − δ + 2q2δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q2
⇒
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≥ max{−2(1− q1)δ,− c
q1
}
v − δ ≤ p2 ≤ v + δ
p1 ≥ max{v + δ − c
q2
, v − δ + 2q2δ}
q1p1 − p2 ≥ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
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It is easy to see the optimal solution is

p∗2 = v + δ
r∗1,5 = q(v + δ)
Case 2+1 (b1 + b2):
max
p
qp1 + (1− q)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ 2(q1 − 1)δ......(∗)
p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q1δ

p1 − p2 ≥ 2q2δ......(∗∗)
p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ − c
q2
q2p1 − p2 ≥ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p2 ≤ v − δ
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 2+2 (b1 + b1):
max
p
p1
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q1δ
171

p1 − p2 ≤ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≤ c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q2δ
⇒
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ min{−2(1− q1)δ,−2δ + c
1− q1 , 2q2δ,
c
1− q2}
p1 ≤ min{v − δ + c
1− q2 , v − δ +
c
1− q1 , v − δ + 2q1δ, v − δ + 2q2δ}
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , r∗2,2 = v − δ +
1−q
1−2q+β c.
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q2δ, r∗2,2 = v − δ + 2 q−β1−q δ.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q1 , r∗2,2 = v − δ +
q
q−β c.
If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q1δ, r∗2,2 = v − δ + 2βq δ.
Case 2+3 (b1 + sb):
max
p
(2q − β)p1 + (1− 2q + β)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ 2(q1 − 1)δ......(∗)
p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q1δ
172

p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ − c
q2
p1 − p2 ≥ c
1− q2 ......(∗∗)
p2 ≤ v − δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≤ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 2+4 (b1 + s0):
max
p
qp1 + (1− q)q2p1 = (2q − β)p1
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q1δ

q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q2
p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q2
⇒
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ min{−2(1− q1)δ,−2δ + c
1− q1}
v − δ + c
1− q2 ≤ p1 ≤ min{v − δ +
c
1− q1 , v − δ + 2q1δ, v + δ −
c
q2
}
......(∗)
p2 ≥ v − δ
q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
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(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 =


v − δ + c
1− q1 if δ ≥
c
2
(
1
1− q1 +
1
q2
)
v + δ − c
q2
if δ ≤ c
2
(
1
1− q1 +
1
q2
)
,
r∗2,4 =


(2q − β)(v − δ) + q(2q − β)
q − β c if δ ≥
c
2
(
1
1− q1 +
1
q2
)
(2q − β)(v + δ)− (1− q)(2q − β)
q − β c if δ ≤
c
2
(
1
1− q1 +
1
q2
)
.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq2 , r∗2,4 = (2q − β)(v + δ)−
(1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c.
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , then infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2. Infeasible because of (∗).
Case 2+5 (b1 + 0):
max
p
qp1
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ 2(q1 − 1)δ
p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q1δ

p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≥ v − δ + 2q2δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q2
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⇒
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ min{2(q1 − 1)δ,−2δ + c
1− q1}
p2 ≥ v − δ
max{v − δ + 2q2δ, v + δ − c
q2
} ≤ p1 ≤ min{v − δ + c
1− q1 , v − δ + 2q1δ}
......(∗)
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If c
2q1(1−q1) ≤ δ ≤ c2 [ 1q2 + 11−q1 ], then p∗1 = v − δ + c1−q1 , r∗2,5 = q(v − δ) +
q2
q−β c.
If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q1δ, r∗2,5 = q(v − δ) + 2βδ.
Otherwise, infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2. Infeasible because of (∗).
Case 3+1 (sb+ b2):
max
p
βp1 + (1− β)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ − c
q1
......(∗)
p1 − p2 ≥ −2δ + c
1− q1
p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c

p1 − p2 ≥ 2q2δ......(∗∗)
p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ − c
q2
q2p1 − p2 ≥ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p2 ≤ v − δ
175
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 3+2 (sb+ b1):
max
p
q[q1p1 + (1− q1)p2] + (1− q)p1 = (1 + β − q)p1 + (q − β)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ − c
q1
......(∗)
p1 − p2 ≥ −2δ + c
1− q1
p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c

p1 − p2 ≤ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≤ c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q2δ
⇒
s.t.


−2δ + c
1− q1 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ −
c
q1
........(∗)
p1 ≤ min{v − δ + c
1− q2 , v − δ + 2q2δ}
p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , p∗2 = v + δ + c1−q2 − c1−q1 , r∗3,2 =
v − δ + 1−q
1−2q+β c+ 2δ(q − β)− qc.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then infeasible by (∗).
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If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q2δ, p∗2 = v + δ + 2q2δ − c1−q1 , r∗3,2 =
v − δ + 2 q−β
1−q δ + 2δ(q − β)− qc.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then infeasible by (∗).
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) ,
– If δ ≥ c
2
( 1
q1
+ 1
1−q2 ), then p
∗
1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , p∗2 = v + δ, r∗3,2 = v + δ +
(1−q)(1+β−q)
1−2q+β c− 2δ(1 + β − q).
– If δ ≥ c
2
( 1
q1
+ 1
1−q2 ), then p1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , p2 = v +
1+q1
1−q1 δ − c1−q1 −
q1
(1−q1)(1−q2)c, r
∗
3,2 ≤ v − (1− 2q)δ + 1−3q+3q
2−qβ
1−2q+β c is an upperbound.
– If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then infeasible by (∗).
If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq1 , p∗2 = v + δ, r∗3,2 = v + δ −
q(1+β−q)
β
c.
• If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then infeasible by (∗).
Case 3+3 (sb+ sb):
max
p
q[q1p1 + (1− q1)p2] + (1− q)[q2p1 + (1− q2)p2] = qp1 + (1− q)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ − c
q1
......(∗)
p1 − p2 ≥ −2δ + c
1− q1
p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c
177

p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ − c
q2
p1 − p2 ≥ c
1− q2 ......(∗∗)
p2 ≤ v − δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≤ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
Infeasible by (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 3+4 (sb+ s0):
max
p
q[q1p1 + (1− q1)p2] + (1− q)q2p1 = qp1 + (q − β)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ − c
q1
p1 − p2 ≥ −2δ + c
1− q1
p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c

q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q2
p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q2
⇒
s.t.


−2δ + c
1− q1 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ −
c
q1
v − δ + c
1− q2 ≤ p1 ≤ v + δ −
c
q2
v − δ ≤ p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c
q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
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(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) and δ ≥ c2q1(1−q1) , then p∗1 = v+ δ− cq2 , p∗2 = min{v+ δ, v+ δ+2δ−
c
q2
− c
1−q1}, r∗3,4 = min{(2q − β)(v + δ) −
q(1−q)
q−β c, (2q − β)(v + δ) − (2q−β)(1−q)q−β c +
2(q − β)δ − qc}.
Otherwise, infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2. By the second and third constraint,
we have −2δ + c
1−q2 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ − cq2 . Combining with the first constraint, we
have max{−2δ + c
1−q2 ,−2δ + c1−q1} ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ min{− cq1 , 2δ− cq2}. Since q1 < q2,
then it becomes −2δ + c
1−q2 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ − cq1 . Therefore, a necessary condition is
δ ≥ 1
2
[
c
1− q2 +
c
q1
]
It is not hard to see p2 = v + δ, p1 − p2 = − cq1 is an upperbound.
If δ ≥ 1
2
[ c
1−q2 +
c
q1
], then p1 = v + δ − cq1 , p2 = v + δ, r∗3,4 ≤ (2q − β)(v + δ)−
q2
β
c.
Otherwise, infeasible.
Case 3+5 (sb+ 0):
max
p
q[q1p1 + (1− q1)p2] = βp1 + (q − β)p2
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ − c
q1
......(∗)
p1 − p2 ≥ −2δ + c
1− q1
p2 ≤ v + δ......(∗∗)
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c
179

p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≥ v − δ + 2q2δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q2
.......(∗ ∗ ∗)
⇒
s.t.


−2δ + c
1− q1 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ −
c
q1
p1 ≥ max{v + δ − c
q2
, v − δ + 2q2δ}
v − δ ≤ p2 ≤ v + δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≤ v + δ − c
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq1 , p∗2 = v + δ, r∗3,5 = q(v + δ)− qc.
Otherwise, infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
By (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗), we have p1 − p2 ≥ − cq2 , which contradicts (∗). Hence,
infeasible.
Case 4+1 (s0 + b2):
max
p
qq1p1 + (1− q)p2 = βp1 + (1− q)p2
s.t.


q1p1 − p2 ≤ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≥ v + δ......(∗)
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q1
180

p1 − p2 ≥ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ − c
q2
q2p1 − p2 ≥ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p2 ≤ v − δ......(∗∗)
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 4+2 (s0 + b1):
max
p
qq1p1 + (1− q)p1 = (1 + β − q)p1
s.t.


q1p1 − p2 ≤ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≥ v + δ
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q1 ......(∗)
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q1

p1 − p2 ≤ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≤ c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q2 ......(∗∗)
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q2δ
⇒
s.t.


p1 − p2 ≤ min{2q2δ, c
1− q2}
v − δ + c
1− q1 ≤ p1 ≤ min{v + δ −
c
q1
, v − δ + c
1− q2 , v − δ + 2q2δ}
p2 ≥ v + δ
q1p1 − p2 ≤ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
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(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) ,
• If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 =


v + δ − c
q1
if δ ≤ c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
v − δ + c
1− q2 if δ ≥
c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
,
r∗4,2 =


(1 + β − q)(v + δ − q
β
c) if δ ≤ c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
(1 + β − q)(v − δ + 1− q
1− 2q + β c) if δ ≥
c
2
(
1
q1
+
1
1− q2 )
.
• If δ < c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq1 , r∗4,2 = (1 + β − q)(v + δ −
q
β
c).
If δ < c
2q1(1−q1) , then infeasible.
Case 4+3 (s0 + sb):
max
p
qq1p1 + (1− q)[q2p1 + (1− q2)p2] = qp1 + (1− 2q + β)p2
s.t.


q1p1 − p2 ≤ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≥ v + δ......(∗)
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q1

p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ − c
q2
p1 − p2 ≥ c
1− q2
p2 ≤ v − δ.......(∗∗)
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≤ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
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Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 4+4 (s0 + s0):
max
p
qq1p1 + (1− q)q2p1 = qp1
s.t.


q1p1 − p2 ≤ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≥ v + δ......(∗)
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q1

q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q2
p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q2
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2
[ 1
q2
+ 1
1−q1 ], then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq2 , r∗4,4 = q(v + δ)−
q(1−q)
q−β c.
Otherwise, infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
If δ ≥ c
2
[ 1
q1
+ 1
1−q2 ], then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq1 , r∗4,4 = q(v + δ)−
q2
β
c.
Otherwise, infeasible.
Case 4+5 (s0 + 0):
max
p
qq1p1 = βp1
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s.t.


q1p1 − p2 ≤ −c− (1− q1)(v + δ)
p2 ≥ v + δ
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q1
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q1
......(∗)

p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≥ v − δ + 2q2δ
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≥ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q2
.......(∗∗)
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q1(1−q1) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq1 , r∗4,5 = β(v + δ)− qc.
Otherwise, infeasible.
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 5+1 (0 + b2):
max
p
(1− q)p2
s.t.


p2 ≥ v + δ......(∗)
p1 ≥ v + (2q1 − 1)δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≥ v + δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q1
184

p1 − p2 ≥ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ − c
q2
q2p1 − p2 ≥ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p2 ≤ v − δ......(∗∗)
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 5+2 (0 + b1):
max
p
(1− q)p1
s.t.


p2 ≥ v + δ
p1 ≥ v + (2q1 − 1)δ......(∗)
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≥ v + δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q1

p1 − p2 ≤ 2q2δ
p1 − p2 ≤ c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + c
1− q2
p1 ≤ v − δ + 2q2δ......(∗∗)
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
If c
2q2(1−q2) ≤ δ ≤ c2 [ 1q1 + 11−q2 ], then p∗1 = v − δ + c1−q2 , r∗5,2 = (1− q)(v − δ) +
(1−q)2
1−2q+β c.
If δ ≤ c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v − δ + 2q2δ, r∗5,2 = (1− q)(v − δ) + 2(q − β)δ.
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Otherwise, infeasible.
Case 5+3 (0 + sb):
max
p
(1− q)[q2p1 + (1− q2)p2] = (q − β)p1 + (1− 2q + β)p2
s.t.


p2 ≥ v + δ......(∗)
p1 ≥ v + (2q1 − 1)δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≥ v + δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q1

p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ − c
q2
p1 − p2 ≥ c
1− q2
p2 ≤ v − δ......(∗∗)
q2p1 + (1− q2)p2 ≤ v + (2q2 − 1)δ − c
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
Case 5+4 (0 + s0):
max
p
(1− q)q2p1 = (q − β)p1
s.t.


p2 ≥ v + δ
p1 ≥ v + (2q1 − 1)δ
q1p1 + (1− q1)p2 ≥ v + δ − c
p1 ≥ v + δ − c
q1
......(∗)
186

q2p1 − p2 ≤ (1 + q2)δ − (1− q2)v − c
p1 ≥ v − δ + c
1− q2
p2 ≥ v − δ
p1 ≤ v + δ − c
q2
......(∗∗)
(i) Suppose positive correlation. q1 ≥ q2.
Infeasible because of (∗) and (∗∗).
(ii) Suppose negative correlation. q1 < q2.
If δ ≥ c
2q2(1−q2) , then p
∗
1 = v + δ − cq2 , r∗5,4 = (q − β)(v + δ)− (1− q)c.
Otherwise, infeasible.
Case 5+5 (0 + 0): r∗5,5 = 0.
Summary
Next, let’s derive the optimal solution.
Part 1: Positive Correlation (q1 ≥ q2)
(a) If δ ≥ max{ c
2q1(1−q1) ,
c
2q2(1−q2)}, then we have the Table 5.4. (Note that
“IF” denotes infeasible, “<” denotes its revenue is smaller than some other cases,
“*” denotes a possible optimal solution. )
Table 5.4: Part 1 (a)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * < * *
action 2(b1) IF < IF < <
3(sb) IF * IF * <
4(s0) IF IF IF < <
5(0) IF IF IF IF 0
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We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,3 < r
∗
3,2, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,4 < r
∗
1,4
r∗2,5 < r
∗
1,5, r
∗
3,5 < r
∗
1,5, r
∗
4,4 < r
∗
1,5, r
∗
4,5 < r
∗
1,5.
Hence, there are only 5 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v− δ+ 1−q1−2q+β c+ q
2
β
c, (2q−β)(v+ δ)− (1−q)(2q−β)
q−β c+
q2
β
c, q(v+ δ), v−
δ + 1−q
1−2q+β c + 2δ(q − β) − qc,min{(2q − β)(v + δ) − q(1−q)q−β c, (2q − β)(v + δ) −
(2q−β)(1−q)
q−β c+ 2(q − β)δ − qc}}.
(b) If c
2q2(1−q2) ≤ δ < c2q1(1−q1) (can hold only when q ≥ 1/2), then we have the
Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Part 1 (b)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * < * *
action 2(b1) IF < IF < <
3(sb) IF IF IF IF IF
4(s0) IF IF IF IF IF
5(0) IF IF IF IF 0
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,3 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2
r∗2,4 < r
∗
1,4, r
∗
2,5 < r
∗
1,5.
Hence, there are only 3 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v − δ + 1−q1−2q+β c + 2(q − β)δ, (2q − β)(v + δ) − (1−q)(2q−β)q−β c + 2(q −
β)δ, q(v + δ)}.
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(c) If c
2q1(1−q1) ≤ δ < c2q2(1−q2) (can hold only when q < 1/2), then we have the
Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Part 1 (c)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * IF IF *
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF <
3(sb) IF * IF IF <
4(s0) IF IF IF IF <
5(0) IF IF IF IF 0
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,5 < r
∗
1,5
r∗3,5 < r
∗
1,5, r
∗
4,5 < r
∗
1,5.
Hence, there are only 3 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v − δ + 2(q−β)1−q δ + q
2
β
c, q(v + δ), v − δ + 2 q−β
1−q δ + 2δ(q − β)− qc}.
(d) If δ < min{ c
2q2(1−q2) ,
c
2q1(1−q1)} , then we have the Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Part 1 (d)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * IF IF *
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF <
3(sb) IF IF IF IF IF
4(s0) IF IF IF IF IF
5(0) IF IF IF IF 0
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,5 < r
∗
1,5.
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Hence, there are only 2 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v − δ + 2(q−β)1−q δ + 2(q − β)δ, q(v + δ)}.
Part 2: Negative Correlation (q1 < q2)
(a) If δ ≥ c
2
[ 1
q1
+ 1
1−q2 ] =
q−2q2+β
2β(1−2q+β)c. We have the Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Part 2 (a)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * < * <
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF IF
3(sb) IF * IF < IF
4(s0) IF < IF < IF
5(0) IF IF IF < 0
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,3 < r
∗
3,2, r
∗
1,5 < r
∗
1,4, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2,
r∗3,4 < r
∗
1,4, r
∗
4,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
4,4 < r
∗
1,5, r
∗
5,4 < r
∗
1,4.
Hence, there are only 3 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v− δ+ 1−q1−2q+β c+ q
2
β
c, (2q−β)(v+ δ)− (1− q)c, v+ δ+ (1−q)(1+β−q)
1−2q+β c−
2δ(1 + β − q)}.
(b) If max{ c
2q1(1−q1) ,
c
2q2(1−q2)} ≤ δ < c2 [ 1q1 + 11−q2 ], that is,
max{ c
2(q−β)
q2
β
, c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β} ≤ δ ≤ q−2q
2+β
2β(1−2q+β)c. We have the Table 5.9.
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,3 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,5 < r
∗
1,4, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2,
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Table 5.9: Part 2 (b)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * < * <
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF IF
3(sb) IF < IF IF IF
4(s0) IF < IF IF IF
5(0) IF < IF < 0
r∗3,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
4,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
5,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
5,4 < r
∗
1,4.
Hence, there are only 2 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v + (2q − 1)δ + (1−q)
2
1−2q+β c, (2q − β)(v + δ)− (1− q)c}.
(c) If c
2q2(1−q2) ≤ δ < c2q1(1−q1) , that is, c2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ≤ δ < c2(q−β) q
2
β
. We have
the Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Part 2 (c)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * < * <
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF IF
3(sb) IF IF IF IF IF
4(s0) IF IF IF IF IF
5(0) IF < IF < 0
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,3 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,5 < r
∗
1,4,
r∗2,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
5,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
5,4 < r
∗
1,4.
Hence, there are only 2 possible cases left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = max{v + (2q − 1)δ + (1−q)
2
1−2q+β c, (2q − β)(v + δ)− (1− q)c}.
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(d) If c
2q1(1−q1) ≤ δ < c2q2(1−q2) , that is, c2(q−β)
q2
β
≤ δ < c
2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β . We have
the Table 5.11.
Table 5.11: Part 2 (d)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * IF IF <
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF IF
3(sb) IF < IF IF IF
4(s0) IF < IF IF IF
5(0) IF < IF IF 0
We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,5 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2,
r∗3,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
4,2 < r
∗
3,2, r
∗
5,2 < r
∗
1,2.
Hence, there is only 1 possible case left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = v + (2q − 1)δ + 2(q − β)δ.
(e) If δ ≤ min{ c
2q1(1−q1) ,
c
2q2(1−q2)}, that is, δ ≤ min{ c2(q−β)
(1−q)2
1−2q+β ,
c
2(q−β)
q2
β
}. We
have the Table 5.12.
Table 5.12: Part 2 (e)
Group 2’s action
1(b2) 2(b1) 3(sb) 4(s0) 5(0)
Group 1’s 1(b2) < * IF IF <
action 2(b1) IF < IF IF IF
3(sb) IF IF IF IF IF
4(s0) IF IF IF IF IF
5(0) IF < IF IF 0
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We can verify that
r∗1,1 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
1,5 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
2,2 < r
∗
1,2, r
∗
5,2 < r
∗
1,2.
Hence, there is only 1 possible case left which are identified by “ ∗ ”. Thus,
R∗UC = v + (2q − 1)δ + 2(q − β)δ.
5.8.3 Optimal Solution of Case (C,C)
Solving CC
Case 1: If p1 − p2 ≥ 2δ, then we have wjb2(p) ≥ wjb1(p) for all j. Therefore,
R1(p) = R3(p) = p21{p2≤v+δ}, and R
2(p) = R4(p) = p21{p2≤v−δ}. And
RCC(p) =


p2 if p2 ≤ v − δ
qp2 if v − δ < p2 ≤ v + δ
0 if p2 > v + δ.
Therefore, the optimal solution in this case is
1. If δ ≤ 1−q
1+q
v, then p∗2 = v − δ, and R∗CC = v − δ.
2. Otherwise, then p∗2 = v + δ, and R
∗
CC = q(v + δ).
Case 2: If 0 ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ 2δ, then we have wjb2(p) ≥ wjb1(p) for j ∈ {1, 2, 4},
w3b2(p) ≥ w3b1(p), R1(p) = R3(p) = p21{p2≤v+δ}, R2(p) = p11{p1≤v+δ}, and
R4(p) = p21{p2≤v−δ}.
Moreover,
RCC(p) =


(1− q + β)p2 + (q − β)p1 if p2 ≤ v − δ
qp2 + (q − β)p11{p1≤v+δ} if v − δ < p2 ≤ v + δ
0 if p2 > v + δ
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Therefore, the optimal solution in this case is
1. If β ≤ 1−2q+β
1+β
v, then p∗1 = v + δ, p
∗
2 = v − δ, and R∗CC = (q − β)(v + δ) +
(1− q + β)(v − δ).
2. Otherwise, p∗1 = v + δ, p
∗
2 = v + δ, and R
∗
CC = (2q − β)(v + δ).
Case 3: If −2δ ≤ p1 − p2 ≤ 0, by the symmetry of the two products, the optimal
solution in this case is
1. If β ≤ 1−2q+β
1+β
v, then p∗1 = v − δ, p∗2 = v + δ, and R∗CC = (q − β)(v + δ) +
(1− q + β)(v − δ).
2. Otherwise, p∗1 = v + δ, p
∗
2 = v + δ, and R
∗
CC = (2q − β)(v + δ).
Case 4: If p1 − p2 ≤ −2δ, by the symmetry of the two products, the optimal
solution in this case is
1. If δ ≤ 1−q
1+q
v, then p∗1 = v − δ, and R∗CC = v − δ.
2. Otherwise, then p∗1 = v + δ, and R
∗
CC = q(v + δ).
Summary
Combining the above 4 cases, we find that there are only 4 possible optimal
revenues, which is {v−δ, q(v+δ), (q−β)(v+δ)+(1−q+β)(v−δ), (2q−β)(v+δ)}.
It is easy to see that v−δ ≤ (q−β)(v+δ)+(1−q+β)(v−δ) and q(v+δ) ≤ (2q−
β)(v+δ). Therefore, R∗CC = max{(q−β)(v+δ)+(1−q+β)(v−δ), (2q−β)(v+δ)}.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Discussion
We consider several pricing problems with different consumer behavior which
is more complex than typically assumed in traditional models. In Chapter 2,
we consider dynamic pricing in the presence of patient customers. Our main
result establishes that for arbitrary fixed patience levels and arbitrary valuation
distributions, there is an optimal policy comprised of cycles of decreasing prices.
We also provide bounds on the length of these cycles and present an algorithm for
computing an optimal policy. Our work complements previous results that apply
to problems with uniform valuation distributions in which patient customers are
willing to wait one period to make a purchase. A direction for future research is
to prove the conjecture that there are optimal policies with cycles of length k+1
or k + 2, where k is the number of periods a patient customer is willing to wait
to make a purchase. It would also be of interest to consider pricing problems
with patient customers in which customer arrivals are stochastic. The models and
policies discussed in this paper could potentially form the basis for heuristics in
stochastic settings.
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In Chapter 3, we study the same pricing problem as chapter 2 but with a
continuous price set. Through a discretization approach, we proved that the
decreasing cyclic policy is still optimal. Given the decreasing structure within
each cycle, we proposed a new method to derive the optimal decreasing sequence
for smaller value of k and uniform distribution. However, our approach to derive
the optimal decreasing sequence works only for relatively small value of k. This is
a limitation. The conjecture from the previous chapter that the length of optimal
decreasing sequence is either k + 1 or k + 2 still remains. One future research
direction is to find an approach that works for general k. Also our approach needs
the uniform distribution assumption. A general valuation distribution problem is
another direction.
We consider a learning and pricing problem in which the seller does not
know the fraction of patient customers in Chapter 4. I propose some algorithms
combining learning and pricing to minimize the revenue loss compared to the
optimal revenue collected by a clairvoyant who knows the true fraction of patient
customers in advance. By assuming a deterministic arrival stream of customers
and homogeneous patience level, I derive a regret ofO(
√
T ), where T is the number
of time periods. I will work to extend these results to the stochastic case or get
an even better result of O(log(T )) for some special cases.
In Chapter 5, We study a problem in which a monopolist sells products for
which customers have uncertain valuations. They can resolve this uncertainty
by incurring research costs. In the single-product setting, the expected
utility-maximizing customers need to decide whether or not to research the
product. Based on customers’ optimal action, we characterize the optimal pricing
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decisions for the revenue-maximizing seller and provide some comparative statics.
It is perhaps surprising that the optimal revenue need not be decreasing in the
valuation uncertainty and the research cost. This suggests that the seller should
be careful when efforts are devoted to decrease the valuation uncertainty or alter
the cost of research. In the two-product setting, the customers not only need to
decide whether to research, but also need to decide in which order to research.
We consider three scenarios: (1) a base case in which customers have uncertainty
about both products and can resolve that uncertainty by incurring a cost or costs,
and two other cases in which the seller makes information about (2) one or (3) both
products freely available allowing customers to resolve their uncertainty about
one or both products without cost. It is interesting to see that assigning research
cost to only one of the two products can better differentiate the customers than
assigning research cost to both products, thus giving a higher revenue. This result
holds when the hidden features of the two products are negatively correlated,
independent, and even weakly positively correlated. In addition, when the
uncertainty is large, assigning no research cost to both products can generate the
largest revenue and otherwise, assigning research cost to only one of the products
is optimal. The managerial insight is as follows. When the monopolist sells two
substitute products, it is optimal to disclose the information of both products
to customers when there is a large valuation uncertainty. Otherwise, disclosing
the information of only one product and hiding the other as secret can better
differentiate the customers and thus improve the optimal revenue. Moreover, it is
never optimal to hide the information of both products. In addition, consistent
with intuition, the optimal revenue is decreasing in the correlation between the
197
hidden features of the two products. In the future, we would like to see how sellers
should manage the research cost in a competitive marketing environment.
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